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Abstract 
 
I argue that the philosophical discussion over William Rowe‘s evidential 
argument from evil needs to take a closer look at the epistemology of religious trust—i.e., 
the rationality of the theist‘s resilient confidence in God‘s goodness in the face of 
inscrutable evils. This would constitute a significant change of emphasis in the current 
literature away from ―skeptical theism,‖ the in vogue response to Rowe‘s argument 
among theistic philosophers today. I argue that the skeptical theist approach is inadequate 
for two reasons. First, in trying to defeat even the atheist‘s grounds for accepting Rowe‘s 
argument, skeptical theists seem to seriously underestimate the degree of skepticism they 
must motivate all reasonable persons to take regarding the human competency to detect 
God-justifying reasons for allowing evils. Second, I show that even a successful skeptical 
theism would be inadequate to defend the theist‘s actual doxastic stance towards 
inscrutable evils—a stance that goes beyond mere skepticism of that human competency. 
In place of the skeptical theist approach, I offer theists the ―religious trust‖ approach—a 
way of defending theism against Rowe‘s argument that focuses solely on defending the 
rationality of the theist‘s committed trust in God. I then explore the nature and 
epistemology of committed interpersonal trust more generally before turning my attention 
to religious trust in particular. I argue in the end that there is enough promising (from the 
theist‘s point of view) underexplored territory in the epistemology of religious trust to 
render too hasty the view that the world‘s inscrutable evils make the theist‘s trust in God 
unjustifiable. I think my religious trust approach thus affords theists a viable alternative 
to skeptical theism in defending the rationality of theism against Rowe‘s evidential 
argument. Importantly, it is also an approach that is willing to uphold, in a way skeptical 
theists refuse to do, just how powerful a defense of atheism Rowe‘s argument truly is. 
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Chapter 1: 
The Recent Debate over Inscrutable Evils 
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Chapter Introduction 
The year 1979 was marked by a significant resurgence of evil—not in the streets 
but in the philosophy of religion. It was the year that William Rowe offered a rejuvenated 
version of the argument from evil against the existence of God.1 His argument is still the 
most talked about argument from evil among philosophers of religion today.2 The 
primary aim of this dissertation is to argue that to best defend the rationality of theistic 
belief against this argument from evil, theistic philosophers would do well to set aside the 
current in vogue response to it, namely what has been dubbed the ―skeptical theist‖ 
approach, in favor of a new and promising response I will call the ―religious trust‖ 
approach. My goal in this opening chapter is to reconstruct the debate between 
proponents of Rowe‘s evidential argument from evil and its skeptical theist critics. In so 
                                                 
1William Rowe, ―The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,‖ American Philosophical Quarterly 
16 (1979): 335-41. 
2
 The most prominent alternative version of the argument from evil is Paul Draper‘s ―abductive‖ argument. 
See Paul Draper, ―Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists,‖ Nous 23 (1989): 331-50, and 
idem ―More Pain and Pleasure: A Reply to Otte,‖ in Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil, ed. Peter van 
Inwagen (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2004), 41-54. Draper attempts to avoid making Rowe‘s 
controversial claim (to be discussed shortly) that there exist evils for which an omnipotent, omnibenevolent 
being would not likely be justified in permitting. Draper argues that we should accept atheism simply 
because the best explanation of the amount, types, and distribution of evils found in our world is that these 
are the workings of natural processes absent any supernatural creator, an explanation he dubs the 
―Hypothesis of Indifference‖ (HI).  
Michael Bergmann has recently offered a compelling argument for thinking that Draper is, after 
all, committed to the claim that there are evils for which an omnipotent, omnibenevolent being would likely 
not be justified in permitting. See his ―Skeptical Theism and the Problem of Evil‖ in The Oxford Handbook 
of Philosophical Theology, ed. Thomas P. Flint and Michael C. Rea (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 383-86. The thrust of Bergmann‘s argument is that since Draper wants to argue that the probability 
of the world‘s evils (E) is higher on HI than it is on theism, he cannot assign a relatively low probability to 
E on theism without claiming that there are evils among E that the theistic God would not likely allow. This 
argument is also made independently in a recent essay by Gregory Ganselle and Yena Lee. See their 
―Evidential Problems of Evil‖ in God and Evil: The Case for God in a World Filled With Pain, ed. Chad 
Meister and James K. Dew Jr. (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2013), 20-23. The question of 
whether Draper‘s argument constitutes a significant alternative to Rowe‘s is beyond the scope of the 
dissertation. My focus will remain on Rowe‘s argument. 
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doing, I will show that much of the debate has focused on an inadequately formulated 
version of the background inference used to support the controversial premise of Rowe‘s 
argument and that once this background inference is adequately formulated, it becomes 
clear that the skeptical theist‘s strategy for blocking that inference must endorse a rather 
extreme skepticism that has not been sufficiently motivated. I will explain how this way 
of criticizing the skeptical theist‘s approach constitutes a more direct, frontal assault on 
skeptical theism than do the criticisms that feature more heavily in the philosophical 
literature. This is not to say, however, that those other criticisms are not very serious 
ones. To the contrary, they are quite thorny problems in their own right, which skeptical 
theists have proven to have a difficult time resolving. So after rounding out the chapter 
with a brief summary of these extant criticisms, I will conclude that the sum of issues 
raised in this chapter strongly suggest that theistic philosophers need to explore 
alternative approaches to skeptical theism in dealing with Rowe‘s argument from evil. 
My hope is that they will want to seriously consider the religious trust approach I begin 
constructing in the rest of this dissertation. 
Rowe’s Evidential Argument from Evil 
 Nowadays, arguments from evil are often categorized as being either ―logical‖ 
arguments from evil or ―evidential‖ arguments from evil, and Rowe‘s argument is 
considered the paradigmatic version of the newer ―evidential‖ variety. It is not clear, 
however, that arguments from evil can be neatly separated into these two categories, 
especially considering there does not seem to be any agreement about what precisely the 
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distinction is between them. Some think of this contrast as being between arguments that 
seek to logically prove the non-existence of God based on the existence of evil versus 
those that only seek to use the existence of evil to provide strong evidence against his 
existence. Others think of it as the contrast between arguments that depend on a priori 
premises versus those that depend on a posteriori premises. Still others view it as 
between those arguments that are logically deductive versus those that are logically 
inductive. But as Daniel Howard-Snyder points out in his recent commentary of this 
distinction, there is much that is misleading in categorizing arguments from evil in any of 
these ways. 
 
Evidential arguments involve quite a bit of logic, both deductive and 
inductive...and every undeniably logical argument is superlative evidence against 
theism, if it is a good argument. Moreover, every undeniably logical argument 
[from evil] has a premise that can only be known a posteriori, by empirical means, 
namely, a premise about evil, e.g., that it exists. And every undeniably evidential 
argument has a premise that can only be known a priori, e.g., a premise about 
what counts as good evidence or what we rightly expect from God in the way of 
preventing evil. And many ―inductive‖ arguments from evil are, on the face of it, 
deductively structured.3 
 
I do not think much hangs on this terminological distinction anyway. The more important 
                                                 
3Daniel Howard-Snyder ―Introduction: The Evidential Argument from Evil‖ in The Evidential Argument 
from Evil. ed D. Howard Snyder. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996): xii. 
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distinction is, of course, between those arguments from evil we should accept versus 
those we should not. And there is good reason to think Rowe‘s argument from evil 
compels our acceptance much more strongly than do prior versions of the argument. I 
think this major turn of events can be appreciated most easily by considering the way in 
which Rowe‘s argument mirrors previous arguments from evil in logical form yet shifts 
the focus of the debate from one of its two major premises to the other.  
 Consider first the paradigmatic member of the so-called logical arguments from 
evil famously defended by J.L. Mackie in the middle of the twentieth century.4  
 
Mackie’s Logical Argument from Evil 
1) If God exists, evil would not exist. 
2) Evil exists. 
 3) God does not exist. 
 
 Here the first premise is an a priori claim about the logical incompatibility of two 
describable states of affairs (i.e., the existence of God and the existence of evil) and the 
second premise is an a posteriori existential claim affirming the existence of one of those 
states of affairs (i.e., the existence of evil in the actual world). It was, for obvious reasons, 
the argument's a priori premise that was always the subject of serious debate. After all, 
no reasonable theist wants to deny the existence of evil (where ―evil‖ is just used as a 
synonym for ―suffering‖). They do, however, very much want to deny the logical 
                                                 
4See J. L. Mackie, ―Evil and Omnipotence,‖ Mind 64, no. 254 (April 1955): 200-12. 
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incompatibility of evil with the existence of God. Why, they ask, should we think God 
could not possibly exist alongside evil? Atheologians proved unable to satisfactorily 
answer that question. After all, it certainly seems logically possible that God would have 
some justifying reasons for allowing the existence of evil.5 In fact, theists were able to go 
beyond merely arguing for this possibility and offered compelling arguments for the 
overall value of a world containing evil.6 Seeking to avoid this easy out for the theist, 
proponents of the argument from evil sometimes beefed up the a priori premise to 
something like 
 
1*) If God exists, vast amounts of evils would not exist. 
or, 
1**) If God exists, horrendous evils would not exist. 
 
and modified the second premise of the argument accordingly.  
 These versions of the argument are stronger than Mackie's. Sensible theists do not 
want to deny the existence of vast amounts of evils and horrendous evils any more than 
they should deny the existence of evil as such, and it is harder to see why a perfect God 
would prefer a world containing all those evils as opposed to one with lesser amounts and 
less severe types of evil. But again, the bar for responding to the argument from evil was 
set too low; theists needed only argue for the logical possibility that God could have 
                                                 
5
 This possibility is masterfully argued for in Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: 
William B. Eerdmans, 1978). 
6
 In addition to free-will theodicies, John Hick‘s ―soul-building‖ theodicy was particularly influential. See 
John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (New York: Harper and Row, 1966); reissued 2
nd
 ed with a new 
preface by John Hick (New York: Palgrave Mcmillan, 2010). 
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justifying reasons for allowing vast amounts of evils and for allowing horrendous evils. 
Their efforts were aided again by those who offered more or less plausible arguments for 
the overall value of a world containing both vast amounts of evils as well as horrendous 
evils. The point I wish to emphasize here is that it was the a priori premise—the premise 
about the logical incompatibility of two states of affairs—that was always the subject of 
debate prior to Rowe.  
 The major shift effected by Rowe's version of the argument from evil is not due, 
contrary to what one might expect from the common nomenclature, to any change in the 
logical structure of his argument relative to the so-called ―logical‖ arguments. He still 
argues for the non-existence of God on the basis of an a priori incompatibility premise 
according to which the existence of God is incompatible with the existence of some other 
state of affairs involving evil and an existential premise to the effect that this describable 
state of affairs obtains in the actual world. Here now is Rowe‘s original formulation of his 
argument, though I have reversed the order of his two premises so that they parallel those 
in the logical argument from evil above. 
 
Rowe's Evidential Argument from Evil 
4) An omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence 
of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby 
losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 
5) There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient 
being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or 
8 
 
permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 
 6) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.7 
 
Using the now-accepted term ―gratuitous evil‖ to refer to the sorts of evils described in 
(4) and the term 'God' in place of ―an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being‖ the 
argument can be streamlined as follows: 
 
7) If God exists, gratuitous evils would not exist. [incompatibility premise] 
8) Gratuitous evils exist. [existential premise] 
 9) God does not exist. 
 
This streamlined formulation of Rowe‘s argument from evil will be the working 
formulation of the evidential argument from evil for the remainder of this dissertation. I 
will sometimes simply refer to it as ―the evidential argument.‖ Note that I will also often 
refer to a proponent of the evidential argument as ―the atheist‖ for short, but it must be 
underlined that one can be an atheist without thinking Rowe‘s argument for atheism is 
successful. 
Notice the equivalence in structure between Rowe‘s argument and Mackie's 
argument. Despite this similarity, however, this evidential argument from evil is a game 
changer. It has shifted virtually the entire debate over the argument from evil away from 
the a priori incompatibility premise and squarely onto the existential premise. This is 
                                                 
7Rowe, ―The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,‖ 336. 
9 
 
because most all theists are prepared to grant that a perfect God cannot coexist with evils 
that he does not need to allow for the attainment of greater goods, which renders the a 
priori premise innocuous to most parties to the debate.8 Theists now take aim at the 
existential premise in its new, revised form. Why, they ask, should we agree that 
gratuitous evils exist?  
This time, however, the proponent of the argument from evil has a much better 
answer to the theist's question. That answer is, ―Well, it sure looks like gratuitous evils 
exist.‖ To support their claim, defenders of the evidential argument point to the numerous 
instances of suffering for which there does not appear to be any necessary connection 
between the allowance of that instance of suffering and the preservation or obtainment of 
some redeeming, outweighing good. In other words, the proponent of the argument from 
evil now has at his disposal in defending the controversial premise of his argument the 
vast sum of human experiences with evils that appear to be gratuitous. Consider one 
famous example of such suffering from Rowe: 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Peter van Inwagen points out, however, that if God needs to allow evils for greater goods, he will have to 
draw an arbitrary line somewhere to demarcate the amount and sorts of evils he will allow. See his The 
Problem of Evil (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), 103-6. For example, if we suppose that God 
must allow a good deal of suffering of type T for the sake of some greater good, van Inwagen‗s point is that 
whatever good is being achieved by his allowances of the number n of T-sufferings he presently allows 
would likely be just as well achieved by his allowing n-1 T-sufferings. But due to the inherent vagueness of 
‗the amounts and types of evils needed for obtaining these greater goods,‘ the line must, says van Inwagen, 
be drawn arbitrarily at some point within a certain appropriate range and thus even a perfect God will have 
to admit of some ―gratuitous‖ suffering in this sense. In what follows, I assume the proponent of Rowe‘s 
argument can make reasonable accommodations for van Inwagen‘s very interesting point (perhaps simply 
by stipulating that by ―gratuitous evils,‖ he means evils that go beyond what could be excused on the basis 
of the vagueness of necessity.) 
 There are other philosophers who take themselves to be disputing the incompatibility premise on 
other grounds, but on pp. 17-8, I explain why they are mistaken. 
10 
 
Suppose in some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest 
fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for 
several days before death relieves its suffering. So far as we can see, the fawn‘s 
intense suffering is pointless. For there does not appear to be any greater good 
such that the prevention of the fawn‘s suffering would require either the loss of 
that good or the occurrence of an evil equally bad or worse.9 
 
 Of course, all the deer to ever burn in forest fires combined are, sad as it is, only a 
drop in the bucket of evils that seem to many folks to be unnecessary for greater goods. 
The general upshot of Rowe‘s shift to making the incompatibility premise of the 
argument from evil the uncontroversial premise and the existential premise the 
controversial one is that proponents of the argument from evil are now in position to 
provide, as they see it, a fair amount of hands-on evidence for their argument's 
controversial premise by pointing to allowances of evils that seem to be without 
justification. 
Matters are not quite as easy for proponents of this evidential argument, however, 
as merely pointing to the existence of terrible sufferings. The question of whether 
gratuitous evils exist—i.e., evils that are such that their allowances by an omnipotent, 
omniscient being are not necessary for greater goods—is not something that can be 
answered completely a posteriori; it requires a thoroughly philosophical judgment as to 
whether an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of certain evils really would be 
                                                 
9
 Rowe, ―The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,‖ 336. 
11 
 
necessary for greater goods. It is this philosophical judgment that has been the center of 
controversy for the last few decades among philosophers discussing the problem of evil. 
Rowe‘s assertion that gratuitous evils exist—unlike Mackie‘s assertion that evils as such 
exist—goes beyond making an uncontroversial empirical observation and asserts a 
philosophical claim that must be evaluated on philosophical terms. 
Inscrutable Evils as Evidence of Gratuitous Evils 
 It is important, then, to clarify the precise nature of the atheist's evidence for the 
philosophically-loaded premise that there exist gratuitous evils. In rehearsing an informal 
defense of that premise above, I used a common but rather unhelpful way of putting the 
point. I spoke, as Rowe and other commentators sometimes do, as if the evidence for 
gratuitous evils comes simply from the fact that many evils (e.g., the burned deer) appear 
to us be gratuitous. 10 But to suggest that the claim 'Some evils appear to be gratuitous' 
                                                 
10
 See, for example, Justin McBrayer‘s formulation of the argument for gratuitous evils in his excellent 
recent survey article on skeptical theism: ―At least some of the evils in our world appear gratuitous. 
Therefore, at least some of the evils in our world are gratuitous‖ [original emphasis]. See Justin McBrayer, 
―Skeptical Theism,‖ Philosophy Compass 5, no 7 (2010): 612. Likewise, Michael Peterson‘s formulation of 
the argument for gratuitous evils in his student-friendly work on the problem of evil reads ―It appears that 
some evils are connected to no outweighing goods. . . [therefore] . . .It is reasonable to believe that some 
evils are not connected to outweighing goods.‖ See Michael L. Peterson, God and Evil: an Introduction to 
the Issues (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 75. 
 The ―appearance‖ formulation of the argument is also the focus of a recent exchange between 
Trent Dougherty and Jonathan Matheson in Faith and Philosophy that discusses the skeptical theist attack 
in light of so-called ―common-sense epistemology.‖ She Dougherty‘s ―Epistemological Considerations 
Concerning Skeptical Theism,‖ Faith and Philosophy 25, no. 2 (2008): 172-6; Matheson‘s reply in 
―Epistemological Considerations Concerning Skeptical Theism: A Reply to Dougherty.‖ Faith and 
Philosophy 28, no. 3 (July 2011): 234-41; and Dougherty‘s rejoinder ―More Epistemological considerations 
Concerning Skeptical Theism,‖ Faith and Philosophy 28, no. 3 (July 2011): 560-73. Dougherty argues that 
skeptical theism violates common-sense epistemology because, in attempting to block the inference, ―It 
appears that gratuitous evils exist; therefore gratuitous evils exist,‖ it fails to afford credulity to those for 
whom many evils appear gratuitous. Matheson argues that Dougherty is mistaken since common-sense 
epistemology recognizes the defeasibility of beliefs grounded in appearance states, and skeptical theism 
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serves as the basic premise of the atheist‘s supporting argument for the existence of 
gratuitous evils is rather misleading in that it fails to strictly analyze why many evils 
appear to many folks to be gratuitous. The reason a given evil will ―appear‖ to one to be 
gratuitous is simply that the evil is one for which, try as one might, one cannot see any 
way in which the allowance of that evil by an omnipotent, omniscient being would be 
necessary for some greater good. Such evils are now commonly referred to as 
―inscrutable evils.‖ 
 
inscrutable evil=def., an evil for which we cannot see a way in which the 
allowance of that evil by an omnipotent, omniscient being would be necessary for 
the attainment of a greater good. 
 
The atheist‘s basic support, then, for his claim that gratuitous evils exist is the fact that 
inscrutable evils exist. This is the key inference that stands behind Rowe‘s evidential 
argument—a logical leap from the existence of inscrutable evils to the existence of 
gratuitous evils. Consequently, the current debate over Rowe‘s argument hinges on 
whether the leap is warranted.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
argues, says Matheson, that belief in gratuitous evils is defeated by the considerations offered by skeptical 
theists (to be discussed later in this chapter) despite the initial justification afforded it by the appearances of 
gratuitous evils. This is an interesting exchange, but fails on my view to get to the heart of the debate over 
gratuitous evils and skeptical theism for the reason I will cite immediately. 
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The Noseeum Inference 
Many commentators have helpfully dropped the emphasis on ―appearance‖ claims 
in order to focus on this crucial inference from inscrutability to gratuitousness. That 
inference is now commonly construed as a ―noseeum‖ inference. A noseeum inference is 
simply an inference of the following form.  
 
I cannot see any X. 
 There is no X. 
 
Thus, Stephen Wykstra is typical in formulating Rowe‘s crucial noseeum inference as 
follows. 
 
10)  We see no good for which God would allow evil e 
 11) There is no good for which God allows e.11 
 
On my view, however, formulating the atheist‘s background inference in this way, 
despite being a step in the right direction, still fails to get us to the heart of the matter. It 
belies a much more careful and sophisticated noseeum inference one could make from 
the existence of inscrutable evils to the existence of gratuitous evils. This is because it 
fails to capture the crucial fact that there is a very large and diverse sample of inscrutable 
                                                 
11
 Stephen Wykstra, ―Rowe‘s Noseeum Arguments from Evil,‖ in The Evidential Argument from Evil, ed. 
D. Howard-Snyder (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 127. 
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evils (e‘s) in our world. It seems reasonable to expect that this would count in favor of an 
inference from inscrutability to gratuitousness.12  
I am not suggesting that we simply substitute that entire set of inscrutable evils in 
place of ‗e‘ in the formulation above. That would leave us with this inference: 
  
12)  We see no goods for which God would allow inscrutable evils E1…En. 
 13) There are no goods for which God would allow inscrutable evils E1…En. 
 
Again, this would belie a more careful inference that can be made for the existence of 
gratuitous evils. The proponent of Rowe‘s argument is not committed to thinking that all 
the world‘s inscrutable evils are gratuitous. Instead, he need only maintain that at least 
some of the world‘s inscrutable evils are gratuitous. I think it crucial to recognize this 
fact, as I think skeptical theists tend to underappreciate just how initially plausible the 
atheist‘s noseeum inference should appear to be.  
Below is my attempt to formulate that atheist‘s noseeum inference for the 
existence of gratuitous evils as modestly and precisely as I know how. I will refer to this 
version of the inference throughout my dissertation simply as the Noseeum Inference.  
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Robert Bass is one philosopher at least who focuses on the quantity of inscrutable evils in formulating an 
interesting Bayesian version of the argument for gratuitous evils. See his ―Many Inscrutable Evils,‖ Ars 
Disputandi 11 (2011): 118-32. 
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The Noseeum Inference  
14) There is a large and diverse sample of evils E1…En for which we cannot 
identify any way in which their allowances [or the allowances of similar evils 
in their place] by an omnipotent, omniscient being would be necessary for [the 
attainment or preservation of] greater goods [or the prevention of some equal 
or worse evils.] 
 15) There are at least some evils among E1…En for which it is true that their          
allowances [or the allowances of similar possible evils in their place] by an 
omnipotent, omniscient being would not be necessary for [the attainment or 
preservation of] greater goods [or the prevention of equal or worse evils.] 
 
Several notes on my formulation of this inference are in order. First, the bracketed 
phrases are included for the sake of precision, but I will subsequently leave them out in 
my discussion for the sake of brevity. The first bracketed phrase recognizes that an evil 
cannot count as gratuitous simply because a similar evil could have been allowed in its 
place for the sake of the same greater good. Rather, it must be the case that it would have 
been unnecessary for an omnipotent, omniscient being to allow any relevantly similar 
evil for any greater good.13 The second bracketed phrase recognizes that there might be a 
distinction between allowing an evil in order to attain a greater good and allowing an evil 
                                                 
13
 As a crude illustration of this point, suppose that an omnipotent, omniscient being needs to allow a good 
number of animal burnings in order to attain some greater good. And suppose he therefore allows Bambi to 
burn in partial fulfillment of that mission. This would not mean that there is something about Bambi in 
particular that made the allowance of his burning necessary for the realization of the greater good at stake. 
So those who reject the existence of gratuitous evils are not committed to defending the ―necessity‖ of 
allowing particular evils in that sense. 
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to preserve a greater good. In particular, I suspect the language of ―attaining‖ is better fit 
to refer to an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s generating some sort of grander 
consequential outcome by allowing a given evil, whereas the language of ―preserving‖ 
might be more useful in referring to his securing some sort of deontological value (e.g., 
obeying certain principles of non-interference he is morally obligated to uphold) by 
allowing evils. I will dodge these conceptual issues, though, and simply refer to his 
allowances of evils as being (or not being) necessary for greater goods while leaving 
open whether the goods at stake are consequential or deontological. Finally, the third 
bracketed phrase recognizes (as numerous other commentators have) that there might be 
a distinction between securing a greater good and preventing a worse evil and that an 
omnipotent, omniscient being could be justified in allowing an evil for either purpose. 
For my purposes, though, we can treat the prevention of a worse evil as itself being a way 
of securing a greater good. In sum, whenever I speak in this dissertation of an 
omnipotent, omniscient being‘s needing (or not needing) to allow evils for greater goods, 
I mean his needing (or not needing) to allow them—or similar evils in their place—for 
the attainment or preservation of greater goods or the prevention of equal or worse evils.  
 Second, the ―therefore‖ relation between the premise and conclusion in the 
Noseeum Inference is to be understood to be broadly inductive; it is not intended to 
suggest that its proponent thinks the premise that a large and diverse set of inscrutable 
evils exist logically guarantees the conclusion that gratuitous evils exist. Nonetheless, this 
is endorsed as an inference, and so, its proponent maintains that the premise ―strongly 
supports‖ that conclusion to such a degree that it justifies one‘s acceptance of it. In other 
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words, he claims that belief in the existence of gratuitous evils exist is justified on the 
basis of the world‘s many inscrutable evils. 
Third, my formulation of the Noseeum Inference emphasizes that what is it issue 
is whether an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of inscrutable evils would be 
necessary for greater goods and not whether the evils themselves are necessary for greater 
goods. It is possible in a given case of suffering that no redeeming quality ever comes of 
it—i.e., there is never a sense in which the world is better off because that suffering 
occurred—yet it still be the case that there is a redeeming reason for an omnipotent, 
omniscient being‘s allowing that evil. Consider, for example that nothing good ever 
results from Rowe‘s deer burning in the woods and that the world would have better off 
had it never stumbled into the fire. It is still conceivable that an omnipotent, omniscient 
being would have an exonerating reason for allowing it if, say, he were bound to some 
moral obligation of non-interference in such cases. I have no idea what that obligation 
could be (which is why I agree that Rowe‘s burning deer is an inscrutable evil), but my 
point here is just that we can see that there is a difference in saying the evil itself is 
necessary for a greater good versus saying an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowance 
of that evil was necessary for greater good, and it is the latter that is at issue here.  
This third point, by the way, is also why I think some theistic philosophers like 
William Hasker and Bruce Little confuse matters when they take themselves to be 
arguing against the a priori premise of Rowe‘s evidential argument by claiming that a 
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perfect God would allow gratuitous moral evils.14 When they think of ―gratuitous‖ moral 
evils, they are thinking of ones that God knows would fail to benefit the world in any 
consequential way but which he must nonetheless allow if he is to give humans 
significant freedom.15 I think these theists would do well to stop calling such evils 
gratuitous since they clearly do not think God allows them without good reason.16 On 
their view, God allows these evils for the greater good of significant human freedom, and 
so, they are not really arguing for the compatibility of God and gratuitous evils in the 
relevant sense. A gratuitous evil would be one he allows without good reason.17 Hence, I 
will continue to emphasize that it is the allowances of evils by an omnipotent, omniscient 
being that it is at issue in the debate over gratuitous evils and not whether the evils 
themselves always contribute to better overall outcomes.  
  Fourth, I will continue to use (at least until the end of Chapter 2) the phrase 
―omnipotent, omniscient being‖ rather than the simpler term ―God,‖ because I think it 
crucial to keep in mind that the inscrutability of a given evil is a product of our inability 
to see how a being with the requisite power and knowledge to prevent it could be morally 
justified in allowing it. Since the label ―God‖ tends to connote a being who is by 
                                                 
14
 William Hasker, ―The Necessity of Gratuitous Evil,‖ Faith and Philosophy 9, no. 1 (1991): 23-44; Bruce 
Little, ―God and Gratuitous Evil‖ in God and Evil. ed. Chad Meister and James K. Dew Jr. (Downers 
Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2013): 38-49.  
15
 As Little puts it, ―[W]e are in some respects free to commit or cause gratuitous evil as well as do 
good…To prevent this possibility would require that many choices only be imagined and someone could 
only think that he could do this or that good or evil when, in fact, he would not be allowed as determined 
by God.‖ See his ―God and Gratuitous Evil,‖ 43. 
16
 Little even explicitly claims to be looking for ―good and sufficient reasons‖ for God‘s allowing 
gratuitous evils in his ―God and Gratuitous Evil,‖ 41. 
17
 For more on this distinction, see Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder, ―Is Theism Compatible with 
Gratuitous Suffering?‖ American Philosophical Quarterly 36, no. 2 (1999): 115-30; and David James 
Anderson, ―Skeptical Theism and Value Judgments,‖ International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 72, 
no. 1 (2012): 27-39. 
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definition morally perfect, it would muddy the water a bit if our question were 
imprecisely understood to be whether certain evils are such that he—i.e., a morally 
perfect being—would be morally justified in allowing them. By the end of Chapter 2, 
though, I will begin using the term ―God‖ as a proper name for the object of the religious 
person‘s devotion—an object that may or may not turn out to have the various omni-
properties of the classical theistic conception of God. For now, we can simplify matters 
by focusing on evils an omnipotent, omniscient being would be justified in allowing 
without giving him a name.  
 Fifth, my formulation of the Noseeum Inference emphasizes the subjunctive 
nature of gratuitous evils. Whether a given evil is gratuitous is a matter of whether an 
omnipotent, omniscient being would need to allow that evil for the sake of a greater good 
not whether it is being allowed by such a being for those goods. This is noteworthy, as 
some commentators seem to think that whether inscrutable evils are gratuitous depends 
on whether God actually exists, but I think this is a mistake. While there is certainly a 
sense in which much of our suffering must be pointless if there is no perfect God who 
ensures that it all fits into a grander plan, this is not what it means for our suffering to be 
gratuitous in the relevant sense. Even if naturalism is true, there could still be facts about 
how an omnipotent, omniscient being would have needed—i.e., had that being existed—
to allow these evils for certain greater goods. This is especially so considering that if such 
a being were to exist, the overall structure of the universe might well be quite different 
than it is on a naturalistic worldview. Presumably, for example, if this supernatural 
omnipotent, omniscient being actually existed, then our physical universe would be only 
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part of a larger reality that also includes a sizeable supernatural realm. Perhaps, then, such 
a being would see ways in which his allowances of our sufferings would be necessary in 
the grander scheme of this larger all-inclusive reality. Properly understood, then, an evil 
in our world is gratuitous only if such a being would not need to allow that evil for any 
greater good even if the actual world contained a sizeable supernatural realm. Since this 
is a subjunctive issue, it makes no difference whether the actual world is one of those 
supernatural worlds or whether it is actually inhabited by any omnipotent, omniscient, 
and/or omnibenevolent being. 
The Assumption of Sufficient Competence 
With these qualifications about the Nosseum Inference in place, we still need to 
make explicit why the proponent of Rowe‘s evidential argument thinks the existence of so 
many inscrutable evils justifies his belief in the existence of gratuitous evils. He makes a 
crucial assumption that theistic philosophers have since attacked.18 That assumption, 
which I will call the ―Assumption of Sufficient Competence,‖ goes as follows. 
 
The Assumption of Sufficient Competence  
We humans can justifiably consider ourselves sufficiently competent about the 
ways in which an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of evils would be 
needed to contribute to greater goods such that our inability to identify for any 
member of a very large and diverse sample of evils E1…En a way in which his 
allowing that evil would be necessary for some greater good justifies our believing 
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 Strictly speaking, they have attacked less sophisticated versions of the assumption. 
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that his allowances of at least some of E1…En would not necessary for greater 
goods.  
 
As we will soon see, a wellspring of prominent theistic philosophers have come 
forth to argue that ―mere‖ human beings cannot reasonably take themselves to be all that 
competent in the domain of God-justifying reasons for allowing suffering. Their position 
has thus come to be known as ―skeptical theism‖ since they argue for skepticism of this 
competency. A prolific philosophical debate has been ongoing in the philosophy of 
religion over this position for the last twenty-five years.  
I find that this discussion, though fascinating, is oftentimes sidetracked in an 
important respect due to the way in which the skeptical attacks by skeptical theists are 
generally aimed at looser and less modest versions of the atheist‘s assumption to 
competence than the one I have formulated here. This, again, is due to a lack of attention 
from both sides of the debate to the large and diverse sample of inscrutable evils available 
to the atheist. Failure to attend to this more modest inference has resulted in a failure to 
attend to the more modest assumption of competence that underlies it. Hence much of the 
discussion hides, I think, the significant degree of skepticism that the skeptical theist 
must motivate us to take towards the relevant competency.  
To see this, notice that the Assumption of Sufficient Competence does not at all 
require that we be able to justifiably take ourselves to be completely competent in the 
relevant domain. Rather, it asserts merely that it is highly unlikely that we would be so 
clueless about such matters such that we would fail to see for so many evils how their 
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allowances by an omnipotent, omniscient being would actually be justifiable. We humans 
know a good bit about ethics, after all. And it would seem that there is little initial reason 
to suppose that a supernatural agent‘s obligations (qua supernatural agent) with respect to 
human suffering would differ so drastically from ours in so many cases. Here, a pertinent 
quote from Rowe‘s original 1979 article comes to mind: 
 
In the light of our experience and knowledge of the variety and scale of human 
and animal suffering in our world, the idea that none of the suffering could have 
been prevented by an omnipotent being without thereby losing a greater good or 
permitting an evil at least as bad seems an extraordinarily absurd idea, quite 
beyond our belief [emphasis mine].19 
Skeptical Theism: Some Preliminaries 
Because I find it crucial to respect the relatively modest degree of competence 
presumed by the Assumption of Sufficient Competence, I will now state the thesis that 
skeptical theists need to establish to refute it even if they themselves do not tend to have 
this specific thesis in mind when making their arguments. Here, then, is my statement of 
the thesis that should define the basic position of skeptical theists.  
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 Rowe, ―The Problem of Evil and some Varieties of Atheism,‖ 338. 
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The Thesis of Skeptical Theism 
We humans cannot justifiably consider ourselves sufficiently competent about the 
ways in which an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of evils would be 
needed to contribute to greater goods for it to be the case that our inability to 
identify for any member of a large and diverse sample of evils E1…En a way in 
which his allowing that evil would be necessary for some greater good could 
justify our believing that his allowances of at least some of E1…En would not be 
necessary for greater goods.  
 
Or to put it less precisely but more concisely, skeptical theists must argue that it would be 
irrational for us to think we understand enough about this kind of stuff to justify thinking 
even some of the world‘s many inscrutable evils are gratuitous.  
We can note here that the label ―skeptical theism‖ is a bit of a misnomer. Both 
atheists and agnostics could assent to the above thesis, so it is somewhat unfortunate to 
have a label that, taken literally, would suggest that accepting this thesis makes one a 
theist of some sort of skeptical bent. For this reason, others have suggested defining 
skeptical theism more exactly as the conjunction of a skeptical thesis like the one I have 
formulated above and theism itself.20 While that approach is certainly more true to the 
label, it is clear that the sole focus of so-called ―skeptical theistic‖ arguments is the 
skeptical thesis—i.e., no skeptical theist takes himself to be arguing for theism when 
making his skeptical arguments. This way of responding to the evidential argument 
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 See, for example, McBrayer, ―Skeptical Theism,‖ 611. 
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became known as ―skeptical theism‖ only because the vast majority of philosophers 
advancing it were known to be theists intent on defeating Rowe‘s compelling argument 
for atheism. I suppose I could provide a new label that would refer solely to the skeptical 
thesis at the heart of their ―skeptical theism,‖ but I prefer to just keep with convention 
here and refer to the thesis itself as ―skeptical theism.‖ Perhaps it is worth repeating 
before I move on from this qualification, though, that one can most certainly be a 
―skeptical theist‖ as I am defining it without being any sort of theist in the literal sense.  
The skeptical theist movement has been a major fixture among theistic 
philosophers for the last few decades. It became prominent in the philosophical literature 
with Stephen Wykstra‘s hugely influential 1984 article (published five years after Rowe‘s 
evidential argument first appeared in print) in which he argued for skepticism of the 
human ability to detect God-justifying reasons for allowing suffering on epistemological 
grounds.21 Numerous other theistic philosophers followed suit with their own versions of 
skeptical theistic arguments including such notable figures in the philosophy of religion 
and epistemology as William Alston, Alvin Plantinga, Peter van Inwagen, and most 
recently, Michael Bergmann.22 In what follows, I will briefly sketch the two major 
strands of skeptical theistic argumentation that have been developed, each of which 
argues that (a) the Assumption of Sufficient Competence is justified for one only if one is 
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 Stephen Wykstra, ―The Humean Obstacle to Evidential arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the 
Evils of ‗Appearance.‘‖ International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 16 (1984): 73-94. 
22
 William Alston, ―The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition,‖ 
Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991): 29-67; Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 465-67; Peter van Inwagen, ―The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the 
Problem of Silence,‖ Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991), 135-165; Michael Bergmann, ―Skeptical Theism 
and Rowe‘s New Evidential Argument from Evil,‖ Nous 35 (2001): 278-96 and idem ―Skeptical Theism 
and the Problem of Evil‖.  
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justified in believing some additional ―enabling premise‖23 about the human cognitive 
condition, and (b) that none of us can be justified in believing that requisite enabling 
premise. These two strands of skeptical theism differ only by virtue of the precise content 
of the enabling premise they require we be justified in accepting before assenting to the 
Assumption of Sufficient Competence. As we will see, however, the differences between 
these two strands turn out to be insubstantial, as they are really just different ways of 
getting at the same point. And both, as we will also see, turn out to share the same major 
defect.  
 
Wykstra’s “CORNEA” Skeptical Theism 
 The first strand of skeptical theistic arguments—of which Wykstra‘s ―CORNEA‖ 
argument is the paradigm—requires an enabling premise that amounts to a cognitive 
sensitivity constraint on justification.24 The core idea of the CORNEA approach is that in 
order to be justified in believing the gratuitous evils exist, we must have justification for 
thinking our cognitive faculties would be sensitive to the presence or absence of 
necessary connections between an omnipotent, omniscient being allowances of E1…En 
and greater goods. In other words, the proponent of the Assumption of Sufficient 
Competence must have good reason to think that her cognitive situation—i.e., the 
necessary connections between an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of E1…En 
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I owe this label to Justin McBrayer. See his ―Skeptical Theism,‖ 614-15. 
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 I am indebted again to Justin McBrayer for showing that CORNEA functions as a sensitivity constraint 
on justification. See Justin McBrayer, ―CORNEA and Inductive Evidence,‖ Faith and Philosophy 26, no.1 
(2010):80-2. 
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and greater goods that appear to her—would be noticeably different in the nearest 
possible world in which those connections obtain.25 Wykstra calls his sensitivity 
constraint the ―Condition on Reasonable Epistemic Access‖ or CORNEA for short.  
The CORNEA principle has taken on a generous amount of varying formulations at 
the hands of Wykstra and other commentators, mostly in response to the flurry of 
criticisms the principle has faced.26 I will not attempt to survey all of the various 
formulations here, choosing instead to focus on Wykstra‘s own formulations of it.27 My 
goal in this section is to show that all the handwringing that has gone on in trying to 
formulate a workable version of CORNEA is largely a result of a collective failure to 
focus more specifically on what exactly Wykstra and his cohorts need the principle to 
accomplish. They need it to provide a principled constraint against accepting the 
Assumption of Sufficient Competence, thereby blocking the atheist‘s Noseeum Inference 
for the existence of gratuitous evils.  
All extant formulations of the principle are unnecessarily broad in light of this 
focused purpose, and consequently, as I will argue, run into all sorts of unnecessary 
trouble. After surveying Wykstra‘s own formulations of CORNEA and showing how they 
are subject to counterexample, I will provide my own formulation, which is specifically 
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 Wykstra, though, has recently advised that we not use the usual possible-world semantics here. See note 
37 for a fuller explanation. 
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 For criticisms of CORNEA, see William Rowe, ―Evil and the Theistic Hypothesis: A Response to 
Wykstra,‖ International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (1984): 95-100; Keith Chrzan, ―Debunking 
CORNEA,‖ International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 21 (1987): 171-77; Bruce Langtry, 
―Eyeballing Evil: Some Epistemic Principles.‖ Philosophical Papers 25 (1996): 127-37; Andrew Graham 
and Stephen Maitzen, ―Cornea and Closure,‖ Faith and Philosophy 24 (2007): 83-6; Justin McBrayer, 
―CORNEA and Inductive Evidence.‖ 
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 Alternative formulations are offered in Daniel Howard-Snyder, ―Seeing through CORNEA,‖ Philosophy 
of Religion 32 (1992): 36-46; and Nick Trakakis, The God Beyond Belief: In Defense of William Rowe’s 
Evidential Argument from Evil, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007): 90-2.  
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tailored as a principled constraint against the Noseeum Inference. This new CORNEA 
principle is, I think, wholly acceptable. Far from validating Wykstra‘s skeptical theistic 
conclusion, however, my contribution here serves only to refocus the debate away from 
his CORNEA principle and onto the skeptical theist‘s view that proponents of the 
argument from evil cannot satisfy the CORNEA constraint. This, on my view, is where 
the center of debate over the CORNEA approach to skeptical theism should really be 
anyway. 
Below are Wykstra‘s first two formulations of CORNEA labeled by their year of 
offering. 
 
1984-CORNEA 
On the basis of cognized situation s, human H is entitled to claim ―It appears that 
p‖ [or simply, ―p‖] only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, given her 
cognitive faculties and the use she has made of them, if p were not the case, s 
would likely be different than it is in some way discernible to her.
28
  
 
1996-CORNEA 
A situation of seeing no X justifies one‘s claiming ―it appears there is no X‖ [or 
simply ―there is no X‖] only if it is reasonable for one to believe that X is 
something to which we would likely have epistemic access in the situation.
29
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While both of these principles were originally formulated to target ―appearance‖ claims, 
such talk is now widely considered to be superfluous for reasons I discussed earlier, and 
so, I will treat these principles as instead invoking the bracketed replacements.  
The point I want to stress here is that 1984-CORNEA is a much broader epistemic 
principle than 1996-CORNEA. Whereas 1996-CORNEA places a constraint only on 
making inferences from ―noseeum‖ evidential situations to negative existential 
conclusions (i.e., from evidential situations of the form ―I see no X‖ to conclusions of the 
form ―there is no X‖), 1984-CORNEA places a constraint on forming any belief on the 
basis of any evidential situation whatsoever. 1984-CORNEA is thus a much broader and, 
as we will soon see, much more vulnerable principle than the more focused 1996-
CORNEA.  
Interestingly, though, Wykstra seems not to have noticed the potential advantages 
of employing a more restricted principle. In his 2007 and 2012 articles, for example, 
Wykstra casually takes CORNEA back in an extremely broad direction. In 2007, he 
makes the following claim about CORNEA.  
 
On all versions, the key idea behind CORNEA is a proposed test for whether 
some alleged evidence E seriously ―supports‖…some hypothesis H…The test is 
29 
 
this: ask whether, if H were false, E is still pretty much what one should expect. If 
the answer is ―yes,‖ then E can‘t seriously support H.30  
 
Here, again, we are talking about evidence and hypotheses in general as opposed to 
specifically noseeum evidence and negative existential conclusions.  
Wykstra makes clear in both recent articles that the above ―test‖ is to be 
understood quite literally as the key idea behind CORNEA and not the CORNEA 
principle itself. ―This key idea concerns a constraint on when some datum is levering 
evidence—to be distinguished from CORNEAS‘s constraint on when the datum can be 
reasonably regarded as levering evidence‖ [original emphasis].31 ―CORNEA itself,‖ he 
writes, 
 
…proposes a higher-level test-condition—a requirement on rational (justified, 
entitled) claims about the supports relation. The condition is this: for some human 
H (Henry, let‘s say) to be entitled to claim that new evidence E seriously supports 
H, it must be reasonable for Henry to believe (should he consider the matter) that 
the answer to the test question is ―No.‖32 
 
Or, as he (along with Timothy Perrine) puts this in 2012, 
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Although CORNEA has morphed through many versions, all versions offer an 
acid test for whether one can reasonably regard some piece of evidence E as being 
strong evidence for some hypothesis H. The test is this: ask whether, if H were 
false, E would likely be different. If the reasonable answer—what one is 
warranted in asserting—is “no,” then one isn‘t entitled to regard E as strong 
evidence for H.
33
  
 
Putting all this together, we get something like the following version of CORNEA, 
 
2007-CORNEA 
One is entitled to claim that a body of evidence e seriously supports hypothesis h 
(and so, can justifiably accept h on the basis of e) only if it is reasonable for one 
to expect that e would be noticeably different if h were false.  
 
Despite all the semantical differences between the original 1984-CORNEA and this 
2007-CORNEA, I do not think Wykstra intends them to be understood very differently. 
In fact, he seems content to use the 1984 formulation interchangeably with 2007-
CORNEA in his 2012 article. Since my goal in this section is to compare the relative 
merits of the broad epistemic principle represented in the 1984- and 2007-CORNEAS 
with the more narrowly focused 1996-CORNEA, and since the 1984 formulation remains 
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most prominent among commentators, I will simply focus now on comparing 1984-
CORNEA with 1996-CORNEA..  
I will argue for the following three theses: (i) the extremely broad 1984-CORNEA 
is much more vulnerable to counterexample than is the more focused 1996-CORNEA, 
(ii) 1996-CORNEA is nonetheless itself vulnerable to counterexample, and (iii) an even 
more focused formulation of CORNEA is available that seems immune to 
counterexample and would still meet Wykstra‘s skeptical theistic purposes in providing a 
principled block on the Noseeum Inference 
McBrayer’s Attack on CORNEA 
To establish theses (i) and (ii), I need only borrow from the excellent recent attack 
on CORNEA by Justin McBrayer, which takes aim at the broad epistemic constraint 
expressed by 1984-CORNEA.
34
 McBrayer proposes three counterexamples to CORNEA, 
all of which he claims are cases of highly reasonable inductive inferences that 
nonetheless fail to meet the (broadly construed) CORNEA constraint.  
 
 Case 1 
McBrayer believes his lottery ticket will lose on the basis of his knowing that the 
odds for a given ticket‘s being the winning ticket are one in a million. 
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 Case 2 
McBrayer is away from home and believes his son is home asleep on the basis of 
his knowing that his son is almost always asleep at that time of day. 
 
Case 3 
McBrayer believes that all crows are black on the basis of his never having seen 
any non-black crows among the many crows he has observed.
35
 
 
McBrayer argues that in each of these cases, CORNEA‘s requirement for forming 
justified beliefs is not met despite its being clear that his beliefs are in fact justified in all 
three cases. In Case 1, McBrayer‘s cognitive situation would be no different if he 
happens to be holding the winning ticket. In Case 2, his cognitive situation would be no 
different if his son happens to be awake due to an unexpected event. And in Case 3, his 
cognitive situation would be no different if there happens to be a single non-black crow 
flying around somewhere. Yet, McBrayer surmises, his beliefs are justified in all three 
cases. Thus, he concludes, ―CORNEA gives us the wrong answer in each case… [So,] 
unless we want to be skeptics about inductive justification—we should conclude that 
CORNEA is false.‖36 
I find that all three of McBrayer‘s cases are successful counterexamples against 
the extremely broad 1984-CORNEA once we make a slight change on his behalf to Case 
3. McBrayer thinks he can justifiably infer from his never having seen a non-black crow 
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that there are, therefore, no non-black crows anywhere. However, due to our background 
knowledge on the phenomenon of albinism, it should not seem unlikely that there is a 
non-black crow somewhere, and so the inference in Case 3 seems unjustified. We can 
easily amend the case to get around the ―albinism loophole‖ by changing McBrayer‘s 
inductive inference from his never having seen a red crow to the conclusion ‗there are no 
red crows.‘ The fact that McBrayer has never seen a red crow despite having seen a lot of 
crows does, I think, give us a counterexample to 1984-CORNEA. McBrayer would be 
justified in making this inference even though he could not reasonably expect his 
cognitive situation (i.e., his ―noseeum data‖) to be any different if there happened to be a 
red crow flying around somewhere. So McBrayer gives us, I think, three successful 
counterexamples to the extremely broad 1984-CORNEA.
37
 
Notice, though, that of McBrayer‘s three cases, only Case 3 can stand as a 
possible counterexample to the more focused 1996-CORNEA. This is because only Case 
3 is a noseeum case—i.e., a case in which McBrayer‘s inductive conclusion is of the form 
‗there is no X‘ (e.g., ‗there are no red crows‘) and is such that its evidential support 
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comes from his not seeing any X‘s (e.g., his never having seen any red crows).38 There is 
an important lesson here for proponents of Wykstra‘s skeptical theism: the more focused 
you keep your CORNEAs, the less trouble they will lead you into. And since, as 
McBrayer‘s Case 3 demonstrates, the more focused 1996-CORNEA gets into enough 
trouble of its own, proponents of Wykstra‘s approach would be wise to see if there is an 
even more focused version of the principle available that would better serve their 
dialectical needs. Let us, therefore, go back to the very beginning and see what sort of 
principle Wykstra‘s skeptical theistic argument really needs. 
Refocusing CORNEA 
Wykstra needs to block the Noseeum Inference for gratuitous evils. Recall that 
inference goes as follows: 
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on the basis of their not having seen any red ones among a large sample of crows.  
 
35 
 
The Noseeum Inference  
14) There is a large and diverse sample of evils E1…En for which we cannot 
identify any way in which their allowances by an omnipotent, omniscient 
being would be necessary for greater goods. 
 15) There are at least some evils among E1…En for which it is true that their          
allowances by an omnipotent, omniscient being would not be necessary for 
greater goods. 
 
To place a principled constraint on this inference, Wykstra needs only to defend 
the following focused principle, which I will dub (due to its tighter focus) ―20/20-
CORNEA.‖  
 
20/20-CORNEA 
A situation of seeing no corresponding X‘s for a large and diverse set of Y‘s, 
Y1…Yn, justifies one‘s believing there are some Y‘s among Y1…Yn for which 
there are no corresponding X‘s only if it reasonable for one to believe one would 
likely have epistemic access to at least some of those X‘s if in fact all those Y‘s 
had corresponding X‘s. 
 
This is a mouthful, I know, but it actually makes a rather simple claim. The key issue 
concerns the degree of observability we could expect certain entities to exhibit given that 
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the correspond to other observable entities.
39
 In the case of the Noseeum Inference, we 
already observe numerous inscrutable evils, and the possible entities that might or might 
not correspond to them are the necessary connections between an omnipotent, omniscient 
being‘s allowances of those evils and greater goods. 20/20-CORNEA requires that we be 
able to expect them to be observable in at least some of these cases if we are going to 
conclude that they are absent in some of them. 
 Before testing the strength of this more focused CORNEA, I want to go ahead 
now and spell out how it would be used in an argument against accepting the Noseeum 
Inference for gratuitous evils. 
 
The 20/20-CORNEA ARGUMENT 
16) A situation of seeing no corresponding X‘s for a large and diverse set of Y‘s, 
Y1…Yn, renders it likely that ―there are some Y‘s among Y1…Yn for which 
there are no corresponding X‘s‖ only if it reasonable for one to expect to have 
had epistemic access to at least some of those X‘s if in fact all those Y‘s had 
corresponding X‘s. [20/20-CORNEA] 
17) It is not reasonable for a human being to believe that he/she would likely have 
epistemic access to any of the necessary connections between an omniscient, 
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omnipotent being‘s allowances of evils E1….En and the attainment of greater 
goods even if, in fact, all those allowances of E1…En had corresponding 
necessary connections to greater goods.  
 18) One‘s seeing no necessary connections between an omniscient, omnipotent  
being‘s allowances of evils E1…En and the attainment of greater goods does 
not justify one‘s believing that there are some evils among E1…En for which 
there are no necessary connections between an omniscient, omnipotent 
being‘s allowance of those evils and the attainment of greater goods. 
 
If sound, this argument not only blocks the Noseeum Inference but also offers an 
explanation as to why we should not accept the atheist‘s Assumption of Competence 
which underlies it. The reason we cannot reasonably take ourselves to be sufficiently 
competent in the relevant domain (i.e., the domain of justifying reasons for an 
omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of evils like E1…En) is because we lack the 
―reasonably expectable access‖ to facts in that domain that 20/20-CORNEA requires. 
I will argue now that the first premise of this argument—my more focused 
formulation of the CORNEA principle—seems innocuous and that the second premise is, 
on the other hand, highly controversial. Thus I aim to validate my contention that the 
wealth of critical attention given to the CORNEA component of Wykstra‘s argument is 
ultimately distracting us from the more key issue in his strand of skeptical theism.  
To make my case that 20/20-CORNEA is an acceptable epistemic principle, I will 
show first that there is nothing in McBrayer‘s attack on the broader (but not completely 
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broad) 1984-CORNEA that would constitute a counterexample to it. We can focus again 
solely on McBrayer‘s Case 3 since, like 1996-CORNEA, 20/20-CORNEA is only 
concerned with beliefs formed via noseeum inferences. But unlike 1996-CORNEA, 
20/20-CORNEA applies only to a very particular sort of noseeum inference. Case 3 does 
not fit this mold as it stands, so we will need to modify it to make it applicable. To see 
why, recall that Case 3 involved an inference from the premise ―I see no red crows‖ to the 
conclusion ―No red crows exist.‖ That is the standard variety noseeum inference of the 
form ―I see no X‘s; therefore there are no X‘s.‖ As I stressed earlier, though, the Noseeum 
Inference for gratuitous evils is a much more careful inference than this standard variety 
noseeum inference. Crucially, it does not yield a categorical existential conclusion like 
―there are no X‘s.‖ Rather, it yields a much more modest conclusion of the form ―There 
are at least some corresponding X‘s missing for at least some of these Y‘s I observe.‖ I 
specifically formulated 20/20-CORNEA to target that more careful sort of inference and 
thus it places no constraint on the less sophisticated standard variety noseeum inference.  
So to see whether Case 3 can give us a counterexample to 20/20-CORNEA, let us 
revise the case so that it involves an inference of the sort that 20/20-CORNEA constrains. 
Suppose, then, that McBrayer were to make the following inference. . 
 
19)  I see no corresponding red-feathered coats for any crows C1...Cn.in my large 
and diverse sample of observed crows. 
 20 )It is likely that at least some of these crows C1...Cn have no corresponding   
red-feathered coats. 
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McBrayer is clearly justified in making this inference. For one thing, it is a much more 
modest inference than the already justified inference of the original red crow case. There, 
we granted that McBrayer was justified in using his noseeum grounds of never having 
seen a red crow to infer the bolder categorical claim ―Red crows do not exist,‖ whereas 
we are here imagining that he only infers the much more modest claim ―At least some of 
the crows I have observed were not in fact red.‖ That is a modest inference indeed. 
This time, however, our working CORNEA principle gives us the correct result. 
All 20/20-CORNEA requires for McBrayer‘s inference in this case to be justified is that 
he have ample justification for expecting that if all the crows he has observed were 
actually red, then he would have noticed that for at least some of them. And surely, 
McBrayer has justification for that. It seems equally obvious that had McBrayer not had 
justification for expecting he would have noticed the redness of at least some of those 
crows if in fact they were all red (imagine, for example, that McBrayer knew himself to 
be colorblind), then he would not, as 20/20-CORNEA would correctly dictate, have 
justification for believing that some of the crows he has observed are not red on the basis 
of his not having seen any red crows.
40
 In other words, McBrayer would have to consider 
himself utterly incompetent at detecting the redness of crows if he is to refrain from 
taking his failing to see any redness in such a large sample of crows as sufficient 
evidence for thinking redness was missing somewhere in that sample. 20/20-CORNEA, 
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at least when applied to this case, looks to be common sense.  
 The fact that 20/20-CORNEA fares so well in this case, however, does not 
completely substantiate my claim that we should view CORNEA as innocuous. The 
principle might of course appear less commonsensical in other contexts. There is a 
particular sort of case that a couple of commentators on an earlier draft of this chapter 
thought might pose a problem for 20/20-CORNEA. Below I will construct a case of that 
sort and then show why I do not think it ultimately poses a threat to 20/20-CORNEA. 
Imagine that you are watching a play in a large auditorium full of people and, try 
as you might, you cannot perceive any way in which any of the audience members are 
being causally acted upon by telepathic aliens. Could you then be justified in making the 
following inference? 
 
21) I perceive no corresponding alien interferences for persons P1...Pn.in my large 
and diverse sample. 
 22) It is likely that for at least some of these persons P1...Pn, there are  
no corresponding alien interferences. 
 
According to 20/20-CORNEA, you are justified in making this inference only if you 
could have reasonably expected to detect alien interference somewhere in that room had 
it been the case that every single one of those folks was being interfered with by a 
telepathic alien. Arguably, though, this is something you could not have reasonably 
expected to detect. There are lots of different ways, after all, that telepathic aliens could 
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interfere with us. Some of these would produce observable behavioral effects (e.g., an 
audience member suddenly ripping off his clothes; another going into an exotic trance; 
another screaming out ―The mother ship is coming!‖). Other possible forms of 
interference, however, would produce no observable effects whatsoever (e.g., inciting an 
audience member to have a daydream of puppies; causing another to recall a memory 
from her childhood.) So, even if it were the case that everyone‘s mind was being 
interfered with, you (arguably) could not have reasonably expected to detect interference 
anywhere in that room since it could have all just been the sort of interference that does 
not cause observable effects. If so, you cannot meet the condition 20/20-CORNEA 
requires of you before making the above inference. But given that you are, as seems 
imminently plausible, nonetheless justified in believing that there were at least some 
people in that room who were not being controlled by telepathic aliens, it may appear that 
20/20-CORNEA has been counterexampled. 
 There are two problems with this counterexample as it stands. First, in order to 
grant that you could not have reasonably expected to detect any effects of audience-wide 
alien interferences, we must assume that the likelihood of aliens interfering with 
everyone in a large auditorium in solely non-detectable ways is at least as great the 
likelihood of aliens interfering with everyone in a large auditorium in at least some 
detectable ways. Perhaps I have seen too many science fiction movies, bus this far from 
accords with my intuition of how discreet interfering aliens would likely be. But suppose 
we grant this assumption anyway. The present version of the case still cannot constitute a 
counterexample to 20/20-CORNEA, because 20/20-CORNEA only puts a necessary 
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condition on when noseeum evidence of a certain sort can justify accepting the relevant 
sort of conclusion. Following Wykstra, this is to say that the noseeum evidence must 
constitute ―levering evidence‖ that would justify you in moving from a state of non-belief 
in the conclusion to a state of belief in the conclusion. And while I most certainly want to 
agree that you would be justified in accepting the claim that happens to constitute the 
conclusion of the above inference, I do not at all think you would be justified in accepting 
that claim on the basis of your noseeum evidence. 
Think of the matter this way: even if you had your eyes and ears closed during the 
whole play, and so, were unable to acquire any legitimate ―noseeum‖ evidence of the 
audience members, you would already be justified in thinking it likely that at least some 
people in the room are not being interfered with by telepathic aliens. That is just the sort 
of thing (given Occam‘s Razor and/or other background beliefs) we have no good reason 
to believe in in the first place. So our sense that we are justified in accepting the 
conclusion of that inference has nothing to do with the strength of the inference itself. 
Hence the present case cannot really count as a counterexample to 20/20-CORNEA, 
which restricts itself only to noseeum inferences in which one‘s noseeum evidence is 
supposed to be the deciding factor in what one is justified in believing. 
Even so, I must admit that this sort of case could theoretically be revised such that 
the noseeum evidence does justifiably push one from a state of non-belief in the 
hypothesis that at least some audience members are not interfered with to a state of belief 
in that hypothesis. This is due to the fact that the noseeum evidence in this case raises the 
probability of that hypothesis by some amount, and so, it would seem possible to 
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construct the case such that you were already almost justified in accepting it prior to 
acquiring the boost from this noseeum evidence to push you into a state of justified 
belief. The reason that the noseeum evidence must raise the probability of the hypothesis 
to some degree is due to (a) the open possibility (however slight) that the hypothesis is 
false prior to acquiring the noseeum evidence—i.e., the open possibility that aliens really 
would interfere with everyone in the room, and (b) the component possibility within that 
possibility that aliens would interfere with at least some audience members in detectable 
ways. Hence it follows that when the noseeum evidence rules out this component 
possibility, the overall possibility of the hypothesis being false (of which that component 
was a part) is decreased. Given this, there must in theory be some way to revise this case 
such that this confirming effect on the original hypothesis is strong enough to get you just 
over the hump from a state in which you would not have been justified in accepting the 
conclusion before acquiring this evidence and into a state in which you would be justified 
in accepting it after acquiring the evidence.  
Revising the details of the case to fit this schema would require some significant 
imaginative efforts. We would have to somehow imagine that before going to the 
auditorium you had a good bit more reason than you do in the actual world to worry that 
telepathic aliens would interfere in some way—i.e., whether detectably or undetectably—
with the minds of at least some audience members. Indeed, we would have to imagine the 
case such that you had just enough reason to worry about this such that it would just 
barely have been unjustifiable for you to squarely accept the belief that no members of 
that audience would be interfered with. It is difficult to image exactly how those details 
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might go, but really, it does not matter; the generic description above is enough to prove 
that a proposed counterexample along these lines is available.  
Fortunately for 20/20-CORNEA, avoiding that counterexample would require 
only a simple fix. Indeed, I expect the ―fix‖ was already implicit in Wykstra‘s discussion 
of CORNEA all along given the context of the overall debate in which he was writing. 
All we need is a qualification in 20/20-CORNEA such that it places a constraint on 
noseeum inferences (of the relevant sort) only in epistemic situations where the 
conclusion of that inference is not already rendered rather likely by some prior body of 
evidence. And given the context of the debate within which CORNEA is offered, this 
would be far from an ad hoc qualification to get us around the present threat of 
counterexample. CORNEA, after all, was intended to stop Rowe‘s evidential argument 
from evil, and Rowe‘s argument is that the world‘s many inscrutable evils are sufficient 
to be one‘s primary source of evidence for thinking gratuitous evils. Hence it is not 
presumed by Rowe‘s argument that we are already almost justified in believing gratuitous 
evils exist and just need the evidence of inscrutable evils to get us over the hump. So we 
can, in good faith, understand the constraint posed by 20/20-CORNEA to apply only in 
similar contexts.   
In sum, 20/20-CORNEA places a very modest constraint only on certain noseeum 
inferences, which are themselves quite modest relative to standard variety noseeum 
inferences. It claims merely that whenever you are in a situation of not observing any X‘s 
corresponding to a large set of observed Y‘s, you cannot properly regard that noseeum 
data as your primary evidence for believing that some of those Y‘s lack corresponding 
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X‘s unless you could have reasonably expected to observe some X‘s corresponding to 
Y‘s if all those observable Y‘s have X‘s. 20/20-CORNEA, I conclude, is innocuous. As it 
applies it to the Noseeum Inference in particular, it merely dictates that we cannot be 
justified in believing that gratuitous evils exist primarily on the basis of our inability to 
detect, among our very large and diverse set of inscrutable evils, any non-gratuitous ones 
unless we could have reasonably expected to detect at least some non-gratuitous members 
among that set had it in fact been composed solely of non-gratuitous members. That is 
still a mouthful, but it seems obviously true nonetheless. I submit, then, that we 
henceforth regard Wykstra‘s CORNEA principle—when properly focused—as a 
harmless, commonsensical epistemic constraint. 
 I trust my reader will be wondering at this point, though, why we could not have 
reasonably expected ourselves capable of detecting any non-gratuitous evils in our set of 
inscrutable evils if in fact it had been composed solely of non-gratuitous evils. Why, to 
put it another way, should we think it at all likely that there would be so many necessary 
connections between an omniscient, omnipotent being‘s allowances of various evils and 
the attainments of greater goods that elude our grasp? We are, after all, fairly intelligent 
creatures, are we not? How, then, could we fail to see for so many of the world’s various 
evils¸ why their allowances by an omniscient, omnipotent being would be necessary for 
greater goods?  
This, I think, is precisely the issue we should be pressing when evaluating 
Wykstra‘s CORNEA-strand of skeptical theism. Claiming that the Noseeum Inference 
cannot meet the 20/20-CORNEA constraint seems to commit oneself to a rather severe 
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skepticism of the relevant human competency. And given that extreme skepticisms must 
be powerfully motivated (an assumption shared by most analytic philosophers today at 
least), there is a major question as to how this skepticism can be sufficiently motivated. 
The Challenge of Motivating Wykstra’s Skepticism 
The most common way that Wykstra and other skeptical theists attempt to 
motivate their skepticism is by drawing an analogy between the omniscient being/human 
relationship and some other relationship in which one member is significantly 
incompetent relative to the other. Two such analogies have been prevalent in the 
literature. The first is the parent/child analogy according to which we should not expect to 
be able to understand an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s justifying reasons for allowing 
various evils any more than we can expect a child to understand her parents‘ justifying 
reasons for allowing some unpleasant experience (i.e., a shot from the doctor). It is often 
suggested that the difference in competence between an adult human and an omniscient 
being would be at least as great as the difference between the competence of an adult 
human and a child. As Wykstra puts it, ―That we should discern most of [an omnipotent, 
omniscient being‘s justifying reasons for allowing suffering] seems about as likely as that 
a one-month old should discern most of his parents' purposes for those pains they allow 
him to suffer—which is to say, it is not likely at all.‖41 The second prevalent analogy, due 
to William Alston, is the chess master/chess novice analogy. As Alston puts the point, 
―Having only the sketchiest grasp of chess, I fail to see any reason for Karpov [a chess 
master] to have made the move he did at a certain point in a game. Does that entitle me to 
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conclude that he had no good reason for making that move?‖42 The answer to Alston‘s 
question is clearly ‗No,‘ and he claims that the difference in competence between an adult 
human and an omniscient being would be at least as great as the difference in competence 
between a chess master and a chess novice. Arguably, then, these analogies give us reason 
to accept a strong skepticism of our ability to detect necessary connections between an 
omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of evils and greater goods due to the sizable 
gap between our own minds and an omniscient mind.  
 These analogies are interesting but, to my mind, seriously incomplete. We can all 
grant that there would be a sizable gap between what is grasped by an omniscient being 
and what is grasped by even the sharpest human, but the skeptical theist needs to give us 
reason to think there is a significant gap between what the omniscient being would grasp 
and what the human can grasp in the particular domain at issue, namely the domain of 
necessary connections between an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of evils 
and the attainment of greater goods.43 Here is a trivial example to make this point: I 
consider myself pretty competent at counting pencils, and I just came up with the 
conclusion that there are eight pencils in my desk drawer. I can grant that an omniscient 
being would have a much larger grasp of reality than I do, but that gives me no good 
reason to think he would have a much greater grasp of the number of pencils in my desk 
drawer; we would very likely detect the exact same number of pencils there. Hence the 
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fact that being A is omniscient and being B is far from it does not automatically give 
being B reason to be skeptical of his competency in a given domain. 
Now, obviously, the domain of facts about which sufferings an omnipotent, 
omniscient being would need to allow for greater goods is a much more complex domain 
than domain of facts about how many pencils are in a desk. Still, even in many relatively 
complex domains, we humans can reasonably take ourselves to have things more or less 
―figured out.‖ For example, we nowadays have a very impressive and sophisticated 
ability to detect the presence or absence of sufficient levels of many essential nutrients 
and minerals in the bloodstream; this competency was not an easy one to attain evidenced 
by the fact that a host of generations before us lacked it. Numerous intellectual 
achievements in the advancement of medical science and technology afforded this 
competence to us. Using a blood test, we can now say with virtual certainty whether, for 
example, someone lacks a sufficient level of iron. Our recognition that an omniscient 
being would have a grasp of reality that in many ways far outstrips ours gives us no 
reason to lose confidence in our competence to make detections of iron-deficiency. Thus 
recognizing the general gap between omniscience and human intelligence is not sufficient 
to warrant a skepticism of a human competency across a particular domain even if that 
domain is rather complex. 
Lest one think it might be easy for a skeptical theist to show that the domain of 
facts about which sufferings an omnipotent, omniscient being would need to allow for 
greater goods is a far more complex domain than medical science, we must remember 
that he must also show that there is reason to think we are seriously incompetent in that 
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domain. Remember, the carefully formulated Assumption of Sufficient Competence says 
only that we can reasonably take ourselves to not be so clueless in that domain such that 
we would fail to notice all of the justifying reasons that being would have for allowing 
the world‘s inscrutable evils. Given my working assumption in this dissertation that a 
great deal of the world‘s suffering is inscrutable, it follows that we need reason from 
skeptical theists to think it rather likely that there is a whole lot we do not understand in 
this domain. I think that arguing effectively for this would be a tall order since it would 
require providing compelling reason to think that all of the connections between an 
omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of E1…En and greater goods would be such 
that they would elude even the brightest moral thinkers among us in the way that much 
about the nature of black holes still eludes the brightest astrophysicists among us today. 
Only then would we have reason to see ourselves in this domain as children who cannot 
grasp their parents‘ good reasons or as chess novices bewildered at the moves of the chess 
master.44  
I will have more to say about the difficulty in motivating the skepticism inherent 
in skeptical theism, but I wish to turn now to an explication of the other major strand of 
skeptical theism that has been developed independently of the CORNEA approach. This 
second strand of skeptical theism seeks to place a different epistemic constraint on the 
Noseeum Inference for gratuitous evils. I will show, though, that the end result is much 
the same: an acceptable epistemic constraint is being offered but without with sufficient 
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reason to think the Noseeum Inference fails to meet that constraint.  
Bergmann’s “Representative Sample” Skeptical Theism 
The second prominent strand of skeptical theism is due to the work of Michael 
Bergmann and starts with the observation that noseeum inferences are justified, like all 
other inductive generalizations, only in cases where one can be justified in taking one‘s 
inductive base to be suitably representative of the larger population to which one is 
generalizing. To see just what a reasonable epistemic constraint this is, let us unpack the 
notion of ―suitable representation‖ at issue. First, ―representation‖ here stands for a 
comparative property between some sample population S and a broader target population 
TP. Second, to say that a sample S suitably represents TP is to say that the proportion of 
S‘s members that have (or lack) the property in question Q is roughly equivalent to the 
proportion of TP‘s members that have (or lack) Q. But just how equivalent these 
proportions must be presumed to be will depend on how precise the conclusion of the 
inductive inference needs to be in a given case. If one is moving from the premise, for 
example, that the percentage of Q‘s in S is 50% to the conclusion that the percentage of 
Q‘s in TP is also 50%, then a presumption of ―suitable representation‖ in that case 
amounts to the presumption that S is exactly representative of TP. If, however, one is 
moving from the premise that the percentage of Q‘s in S is 50% to the conclusion that the 
percentage of Q‘s in TP is somewhere between 40% and 60%, a presumption of ―suitable 
representation‖ amounts to a much looser presumption of correspondence in that case, 
though one would still need reason to think S will be a good bit like TP in the respect of 
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Q. None of this is controversial, and hence there is nothing remiss in Bergmann‘s 
requiring that the Noseeum Inference of gratuitous evils meet the constraint of a justified 
presumption of suitable representation. 
Let us now see why Bergmann suspects the Noseeum Inference runs afoul of this 
constraint. Bergmann has advanced three key ―skeptical theses‖ he thinks entail that the 
proponent of Rowe‘s argument cannot be justified in taking his inductive base to be 
suitably representative when moving to the conclusion that gratuitous evils exist. They 
are: 
 
(ST1) We have no good reason for thinking that the possible goods we know of 
are representative of the possible goods there are. 
(ST2) We have no good reason for thinking that the possible evils we know of are 
representative of the possible evils there are. 
(ST3) We have no good reason for thinking that the entailment relations we know 
of between possible goods and the permission of possible evils are 
representative of the entailment relations there are between possible goods 
and the permission of possible evils.45 
 
 A few clarifications on these three claims: The term ―possible good‖ in ST1 and 
ST3 was introduced in this context by Rowe to cover not only those goods that theists 
and atheists agree obtain in the actual world but also the sorts of goods that might obtain 
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in a deeply supernatural world such as ―experiencing complete felicity in the everlasting 
presence of God.‖46 It is in this sense that, according to ST1, we cannot justifiably 
suppose that the possible goods we are aware of are suitably representative of all there 
are. The term ―possible evil‖ is introduced in ST2 due to the possibility that an 
omnipotent, omniscient being might need to allow a given evil in order to prevent a 
worse evil that would have obtained otherwise. In what follows, I will not make much 
explicit mention of ST2, since I think it can be understood to be subsumed under ST1 by 
thinking of the prevention of one of these evils as a good in itself. ST3 is used to suggest 
that the entailment relations known to us between possible goods and the allowances of 
certain evils cannot be reasonably presumed to constitute a suitably representative sample 
even, I take it, if ST1 were false. That is, I suspect Bergmann takes ST3 to be 
overdetermined by ST1 itself and some additional fact about the limitations of our ability 
to identify entailment relations. If ST1 is true—i.e., if there are many possible goods we 
do not know of—then presumably there would be some entailment relations between 
those possible goods and allowing certain evils. But Bergmann also has in mind that there 
may be entailment relations beyond our grasp between known possible goods and the 
allowances of evils; hence the truth of ST3 does not depend on ST1 even if ST1 might be 
sufficient for ST3.47 
Let us now take a closer look at the overall logical structure of Bergmann‘s 
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argument. Considered at this level, the argument looks to be rather simple. 
 
Bergman’s “Suitable Representation” Argument for Skeptical Theism 
23) If (ST1)–(ST3), then we humans lack justification for thinking our sample of 
known entailment relations between allowing evils and obtaining greater 
goods is suitably representative to justify making the Noseeum Inference. 
24)  (ST1)–(ST3) 
 25) We humans lack justification for thinking our sample of known entailment  
relations between allowing evils and obtaining greater goods is suitably 
representative to justify making the Noseeum Inference. 
 
However, the argument is actually quite complicated once we specify what ―suitable 
representation‖ amounts to in this context. As I explained above, sometimes a 
presumption of suitable representation amounts to a very strong presumption of 
correspondence between the sample and target population, and other times it can require 
a much looser presumption of correspondence. Some work is needed to specify more 
exactly what Bergmann is asserting when he says proponents of the Noseeum Inference 
lack a suitably representative sample. As I will now show, the Assumption of Sufficient 
Competence constitutes a very modest resumption of correspondence, and so, 
Bergmann‘s claim that proponents of the Noseeum Inference cannot meet the 
representative sample constraint is far from obvious.  
Focusing again on the important difference between the standard-variety noseeum 
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inference and the sophisticated Noseeum Inference for gratuitous evils, let us compare 
the difference between their respective presumptions of suitable representation. In a 
standard-variety noseeum inference—i.e., ―I see no X; therefore there are no X‘s, the 
proportions of X‘s in the sample population and the target population must be presumed 
to be exactly equivalent. This is because an inference of that sort moves from the premise 
―There are no Q‘s among S‖ to the conclusion ―There are no Q‘s among TP,‖ where TP is 
the at-large population. Thus the proportion of Q‘s among the members of S and the 
proportion of Q‘s among the members of TP must be presumed exactly equivalent (i.e., 
exactly 0 / n in both cases).   
 That is a very strong presumption of correspondence for one to make. One must 
have reason to expect that the whole of the target population exactly mirrors the small 
slice of that whole one is able to observe for oneself. If such a strong presumption of 
correspondence lied behind the atheist‘s noseeum inference for the existence of gratuitous 
evils, matters would be easy for Bergmann. After all, it would be wholly unreasonable for 
the atheist to think there are no entailment relations between possible goods and evils that 
exist outside his own observable ―slice‖ of reality. Unfortunately for Bergmann, though, 
the Noseeum Inference for gratuitous evils does not even come close to making such a 
strong presumption of correspondence. 
To see this, let us clearly lay out the components of the Noseeum Inference‘s 
inductive generalization using Bergmann‘s terminology. They are as follows: 
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Sample Population 
the entailment relations known to humans between an omnipotent being‘s 
allowances of evils and greater (possible) goods. 
 
Target Population 
the entailment relations there are between an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s 
allowances of evils E1…En and greater (possible) goods. 
 
Unobserved Corresponding Entity (or Property) in Sample Population 
an entailment relation, for any of an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of 
inscrutable evils E1…En, between his allowance of that evil and a greater 
(possible) goods. 
 
Given these components, a presumption of exact correspondence between the sample 
population and the target population would yield the following conclusion. 
 
Conclusion Based on Presumption of Exact Correspondence  
 There are no entailment relations, for any of an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s 
allowances of evils E1…En, between his allowances of those evils and greater 
(possible) goods. 
 
An inference to this conclusion assumes that the proportion of entailment relations 
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between an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of E1...En and greater goods in 
the sample—i.e., 0 / n—is exactly equivalent to the proportion of entailment relations 
between an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of E1...En and greater possible 
goods in the at-large target population.  
I grant the skeptical theist that this is likely an unwarranted assertion for any 
human to make. But the proponent of the existence of gratuitous does not need to make 
that assertion. He can instead make a much weaker presumption of correspondence and 
draw the following alternative conclusion. 
 
Conclusion Based on Presumption of Modest Correspondence 
There are not entailment relations for all of an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s 
allowances of evils E1…En between his allowances of those evils and greater 
(possible) goods. 
 
No presumption of exact correspondence between sample and target population is needed 
to get to this conclusion. In fact, the degree of correspondence can be far less than exact. 
Rather than presuming that proportion of entailment relations that exist for E1…En is the 
same in the target population as it is in the sample—i.e.,0 / n in both cases —this 
inference need only presume that the proportion in the target population is something—
anything—less than n / n. This is because the more careful inference at work here is not 
claiming that there are no such entailment relations between E1…En and greater goods—
only that there are at least some evils among E1...En for which such a relation is absent. 
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And given that there are a lot of inscrutable evils making up E1…En, it looks to be a 
pretty modest assumption to say that the numerator of that fraction will be somewhere 
lower than its dominator.  
This underscores again why I think the skepticism in skeptical theism is difficult 
to motivate. The Assumption of Sufficient Competence requires only that we presume 
that our observational data of the entailment relations between allowing E1…En and 
greater goods does not completely and utterly misrepresent reality. To argue that this 
assumption is unreasonable, then, the skeptical theist must motivate a rather extreme 
skepticism. 
The Challenge of Motivating Bergmann’s Skepticism 
Recognizing that Bergmann‘s ST1-ST3 must be so bold, we can ask how he 
intends to motivate our acceptance of these highly skeptical views. For starters, in his 
2001 offering of ST1-ST3, Bergmann recites the before-mentioned parent-analogy 
argument. I already explained why I find that incomplete to motivate the CORNEA 
approach, and the same problem applies here. We need reason to think we are like 
significantly incompetent children relative to an omniscient ―parent‖ when it comes to 
appreciating the entailment relations between an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowing 
evils and attaining those goods. We do not bear the same cognitive relation to such a 
being in the domain of pencil-counting, for example, as an infant child bears to his 
parent. So, the image of the seriously incompetent child does not apply here without a 
compelling argument.  
Bergmann also suggests in that 2001 article, though, that we should be prepared to 
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accept ST1-ST3 based on their intuitive plausibility alone. For example,  
 
The skepticism recommended by ST1 is extremely modest and completely 
appropriate even for those who are agnostic about the existence of God. It is just 
the honest recognition of the fact that it wouldn’t be the least bit surprising if 
reality far outstripped our understanding of it‖48 [emphasis mine].  
 
Bergmann‘s appeal to intuition is far too quick and belies, I think, his failure to 
recognize how modest an assumption of competence one can get by with in making the 
Noseeum Inference. It is no doubt reasonable to think that reality considered as a whole 
would far outstrip our grasp of it, and Bergmann is right to think that no one should be 
surprised if that turns out to be the case. But as I pointed out earlier, there are some 
domains of knowledge within that larger whole for which it would be very surprising if 
reality far outstripped our grasp of it. If, for example, I somehow learned that the number 
of pencils in my desk far exceeds the number I counted, that would be very surprising. It 
would also be very surprising if medical professionals suddenly came to learn that 
numerous anemias were escaping their sophisticated methods of detection. Or consider 
the domain of facts about the colors of crows. If a skeptical theist were to remind us that 
we are only humans with a grasp of reality that is highly incomplete, I seriously doubt 
that should motivate us to think, ―Oh, I suppose it would not be the least bit surprising 
then if lots of the crows I have observed were red after all even though I could not tell.‖ 
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The point here is that Bergmann must give us reason to think that the domain of 
connections between an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of evils and greater 
goods is a particular domain for which it would not be surprising if reality far outstrips 
our grasp.  
Moreover, in light of my argument above concerning the very modest degree of 
competence required by proponents of the Noseeum Inference, it becomes clear that 
Bergmann seriously underestimates just how surprised many folks would be if it turned 
out we were not that competent after all. To stick with the language of ―surprises,‖ 
Bergmann will have to assert that it should not be ―the least bit surprising‖ if it turned out 
that an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of all of E1…En evils would be 
necessary for greater goods in ways we cannot grasp. But I think that should strike us an 
incredibly surprising turn of events. ―Really?‖ we might wonder: ―Who could have 
guessed we‘d be this incompetent?‖  
More recently, Bergmann has defended his skeptical theses by appeal to the 
consequential complexity of the ways in which an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s 
allowances of various evils could contribute to greater goods. This approach has already 
been debated by other commentators, but I will focus here on what Bergmann has to say 
about it.49 He claims that his skeptical theses are ―focused on our ability to make 
informed judgments about how considerations of consequences would (if God existed) 
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factor into God‘s decisions about what is the best thing to do.‖50 While this move seems 
to saddle Bergmann with a deeply consequentialist moral theory and all its means/end 
baggage, Bergmann attempts to head off this worry by suggesting that his view is 
consistent with broadly non-consequentialist ethical theories since ―non-consequentialist 
ethical theories have no trouble allowing for considerations of consequences to play a 
role in moral decision-making.‖51 In any event, it seems quite dubious to me to speculate 
that more than a modest amount of an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of 
E1…En could plausibly be justified by virtue of consequential outcomes. It seems much 
more plausible to me to think that if all of an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances 
of E1…En were necessary for greater goods, then a good portion of those goods would be 
deontological goods such as upholding certain obligations of non-interference (whatever 
they might be).  
Perhaps Bergmann and other skeptical theists could find a way to mount an 
argument for thinking these obligations would be rather likely. Peter van Inwagen has 
suggested, for example, that it is likely enough that an omnipotent, omniscient creator 
could not (literally) have created a rich natural world without allowing natural evils 
comparable to those in our world due to certain causal limitations inherent in logically 
possible natural worlds.52 If so, then perhaps such a being could be morally exonerated 
for allowing the various evils in our world by virtue of his upholding the value of a 
naturally ordered universe. But even if we grant that there is great value in having a 
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naturally ordered cosmos, I do not agree that we should think it at all likely that it is 
logically necessary that any rich, natural universe an omnipotent being could create 
would produce such wide-scale, horrendous suffering as ours does. I doubt there is much 
to say by way of arguing for why we should not think this obvious. As Richard Gale 
points out, folks like van Inwagen seem to simply have different basic modal intuitions 
on such matters than others of us, so there is likely little that can be done to argue for the 
superiority of certain intuitions over others. 53 But since it is the burden of the skeptical 
theist to argue that atheists are being irrational in accepting the Assumption of Sufficient 
Competence, intuitions like van Inwagen‘s will not be very helpful to their cause. 
In sum, I think skeptical theists have thus far failed to motivate the significant 
degree of skepticism their view must urge us to take toward the relevant human 
competency. To put it bluntly, they will need to go well beyond their current arsenal of 
loose analogies, misplaced intuitions about the general gap between human and 
omniscient minds, and the citing of dubious consequential possibilities to seriously 
challenge our degree of confidence in the carefully-qualified and highly plausible 
Assumption of Sufficient Competence. 
Other Objections to Skeptical Theism 
I think my finding in this chapter helps explain why skeptical theism is so 
vulnerable to the prominent worry that it entails certain obviously pernicious forms of 
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skepticism. Indeed, the most common way to attack the skepticism in skeptical theism in 
the literature is via its alleged skeptical implications outside the domain skeptical theists 
are directly concerned with. I will briefly survey these attacks below, but I want to note 
first that I think my previous discussion provides a more direct explanation for why 
skeptical theism seems to have unacceptable skeptical implications; it is because it is a 
highly skeptical view of our human competence, and such a highly skeptical view can be 
expected to have undesirable skeptical implications. Below, then, are the pernicious 
skepticisms that skeptical theism is accused of entailing. I call these ―bleeding 
skepticism‖ objections. 
Bleeding Skepticism Objections 
The most prominent bleeding skepticism objection by far to skeptical theism is 
that it is inconsistent with our having justified beliefs about what we ought to do in 
response to suffering. The basic idea is simple: if we cannot be justified in thinking that 
an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of various evils are not necessary for the 
attainment of greater goods, then we cannot ever be justified in thinking that we ought to 
intervene to prevent evils ourselves. Accepting skeptical theism, then, arguably commits 
one to a paralyzing moral skepticism.54 
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Another bleeding skepticism objection alleges that any theist who accepts 
skeptical theism commits himself to a deep theological skepticism about divine 
revelation. As Erik Weilenburg cogently argues, the skeptical theist is committed to 
maintaining that, for all he knows, there would be a necessary connection between God‘s 
deceiving him in any putative revelation of truth and the attainment of some greater 
good.55 In that case, a skeptical theist is rationally prevented from believing that what 
God says is true.  
It has also been argued along these same lines that accepting skeptical theism 
commits one to global skepticism since there might, for all we know, be a necessary 
connection between God‘s putting us in a globally deceptive skeptical scenario and the 
attainment of some greater good.56 Hence a theist in the literal sense (and perhaps an 
agnostic as well) would not be able to believe with much confidence that he does not 
exist in such a scenario.  
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The Unfalsifiability Objection 
I want to mention one final objection to skeptical theism of a different sort that 
seems to me to be particularly pertinent. It seems to have been overshadowed in the 
literature by the bleeding skepticism objections but not as a result of its merits. It 
concerns the way in which skeptical theism seems to prevent us from being able to 
identify any possible evils that an omnipotent, omniscient being would not be able to 
allow. The objection appears very briefly in a published exchange on skeptical theism 
between Rowe, Bergmann, and Howard-Snyder. There, Rowe argues as follows:  
 
Since we don‘t know [according to the skeptical theist] that the goods we know of 
are representative of the goods there are, we can‘t know that it is likely that there 
are no goods that justify God in permitting human and animal life on earth to be 
nothing more than a series of agonizing moments from birth to death. But such a 
view is unreasonable, if not absurd.57  
 
Derk Pereboom agrees with Rowe, adding, ―[I]f a skeptical theist strategy works equally 
well no matter what the degree of evil in a world, one is thereby given reason to doubt its 
value.‖58 
Ian Wilks has recently picked up on this problem and has developed it into an 
extremely cogent attack on skeptical theism. He argues that the real problem here is that 
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 Daniel Howard-Snyder, Michael Bergmann and William Rowe, ―An Exchange on the Problem of Evil,‖ 
in God and the Problem of Evil, ed. William Rowe (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001): 156-7. 
58
 Derk Pereboom, ―The Problem of Evil,‖ In Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Religion, ed. William E 
Mann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 162. 
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skeptical theism makes theism empirically unfalsifiable (where unfalsifiable means 
―rendered unreasonable to believe‖) since it employs a strategy that, if allowed, would 
prevent any empirical state of affairs as counting as evidence against theism. As he puts 
it,  
 
Skeptical theism invokes the inscrutability of divine purposes without suggesting 
limits on how inscrutable those purposes are, or constraints on how extensively 
that consideration is to be employed. That consideration is therefore left free to 
operate as a confounding factor against all use of empirical evidence to test claims 
about God. Any such evidence against a claim can be undercut by appealing to an 
unknown purpose.59 
 
Imagine, for example, that the suffering in the world were 1,000 times more 
horrific than it currently is. Even then, Wilks would argue, we would have no empirical 
evidence against theism if skeptical theism is correct since there could just as well be 
entailment relations beyond our grasp between God‘s allowances of all that suffering and 
the attainment of greater goods. 
  In an unfortunate irony (unfortunate from the perspective of skeptical theists at 
least), Wilks cites theistic philosopher Keith Yandell who once provided exactly that sort 
of case in an effort to show—in response to objections—that religious theses like ―God 
loves us‖ are empirically falsifiable. And as James Sennett notes in commenting on 
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 Ian Wilks, ―Skeptical Theism and Unfalsifiability,‖ Faith & Philosophy 26, no. 1 (2009): 64-76. 
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Yandell‘s case (presented below), ―[I]t is quite apparent that this scenario would also 
count as some evidence, indeed very great evidence, against…the theistic God.‖60 
Yandell asks us to imagine a case exhibiting the following features. 
 
(a) Every sentient creature has, for every moment of his existence, been in such 
pain that were he to have felt more pain he would have lost consciousness. 
(b) This wretched condition is caused by biological features essential to the 
species. 
(c) Suicide is impossible and so is cessation of procreation, so that future 
generations will exist under the same conditions. 
(d) Insofar as intellectual life is possible under these circumstances, men rise 
above the level of imbecility only to record and roundly curse their plight. 
(e) Insofar as moral life is possible under these circumstances each man‘s deepest 
wish is to increase the sufferings of every other if this were possible.61 
 
Yandell argues that ―surely if our world were like this (and given that we could raise the 
question), we would have good reason to deny that God loves us—as good as we have, 
say, that cigarette smoking disposes [one] to lung cancer.‖62 Yandell would also 
presumably conclude, as Sennett suspects, that this scenario would give us good reason to 
think theism is false.  
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 James Sennett, ―Theism and Other Minds: On the Falsifiability of Non-Theories,‖ Topoi 14 (1995): 155. 
61
 Keith Yandell, ―A Reply to Neilson‘s Comments,‖ in God, Man, and Religion: Readings in the 
Philosophy of Religion, ed. Keith Yandell (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973): 242. 
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 Keith Yandell, ―A Reply to Neilson,‖ 242 
67 
 
 Wilks argues, however, that skeptical theists cannot agree with this result. For 
skeptical theism, at least in its current formulations, places no constraint on our inability 
to detect God-justifying entailment relations. Wilks notes that it is hard to see how 
skeptical theists could refine their skeptical arguments such that they clearly distinguish 
between conceivable scenarios in which the skeptical theist‘s response is rational and 
conceivable scenarios in which it is not. As he puts it,  
 
Arguments for skeptical theism need to license a certain level of discounting [the 
relevant human competency], and yet they need to be constrained not to license 
too much. But this latter requirement is not addressed in existing formulations of 
such arguments. Nor is it obvious that it can be addressed, since it appears to 
demand a position that would be impossibly nuanced.63 
  
To sum up, we now see that there are at least three tall obstacles standing in the 
way of the success of the skeptical theist approach to responding to Rowe‘s evidential 
argument. First, skeptical theists need to better motivate their skepticism of the relevant 
human competency—a skepticism that, as I have argued throughout this chapter, will 
have to be rather extreme given the relatively modest degree of competence presumed by 
the Assumption of Sufficient Competence (the assumption needed to make the Noseeum 
Inference for gratuitous evils). Second, skeptical theists need to somehow overcome the 
barrage of the bleeding skepticism objections being lodged on them in the literature. 
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Third, skeptical theists need to say something more definitive about why it is that the 
skeptical theist strategy would be unreasonable in some conceivable scenarios (like 
Yandell‘s) but not unreasonable in our actual situation in which we already observe a 
great many inscrutable evils. None of this looks to be very easy, and hence there is ample 
reason, I think, for theistic philosophers to consider a new strategy if one is available. 
Chapter Summary 
The recent debate over Rowe‘s evidential argument from evil has focused on the 
plausibility of the skeptical theist attack on the atheist‘s insistence that inscrutable evils 
justify belief in gratuitous evils. I have tried to show that neither the skeptical theist 
attack nor the ensuing debate has been sufficiently focused, however, on the most 
plausible formulation of that inference, namely my Noseeum Inference. A more 
deliberate focus on the Noseeum Inference reveals that skeptical theists will need to 
provide more compelling arguments to motivate our acceptance of their skepticism given 
that this inference appears to be an extremely modest one built on the very modest 
Assumption of Sufficient Competence. This problem of unmotivated skepticism 
combines with the bleeding skepticism objections and the falsifiability worry to 
constitute a most steep mountain for skeptical theists to climb. My goal in the rest of this 
dissertation is to carve out a new path for theistic philosophers who want an adequate 
response to the problem of inscrutable evils.  
In Chapter 2, I will have us take a step back to look at the debate between 
proponents of Rowe‘s evidential argument and skeptical theists from a meta-dialectical 
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perspective. After providing a framework for understanding the existing dialectical goals 
of these parties, I will argue that the dialectical goal of skeptical theism is much more 
aggressive than it needs to be. Instead of arguing as skeptical theists do that no one has 
justification for accepting the Assumption of Sufficient Competence, defenders of the 
rationality of theism against Rowe‘s evidential argument need only argue that theists can 
have special justifying grounds for rejecting it. This more modest dialectical goal yields 
to a much more palatable approach, I think, than skeptical theism. I will also show that an 
alternative approach along these lines is needed for independent reasons since skeptical 
theism, even if successful, would be inadequate to justify the theist‘s actual stance 
towards the relevant human competency—a position that goes beyond ―mere skepticism‖ 
of it. 
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Chapter 2: 
Reassessing the Theist’s Dialectical Goal:  
A Call for the Religious Trust Approach 
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Chapter Introduction 
In this chapter I take a broader look at the overall structure of the debate between 
proponents of the evidential argument from evil and skeptical theists. I will show that, as 
Rowe was himself aware in his original 1979 article, there are two very different 
dialectical goals that proponents of the evidential argument from evil can have in mind 
when advancing their argument. I will then show that there are two correspondingly 
different dialectical goals that theists can have in responding to that argument. I will 
argue that in advancing skeptical theism, theistic philosophers have likely chosen the 
wrong one. Specifically, I will argue first that the dialectical goal of skeptical theism is 
much more aggressive in an important respect than a theistic response to Rowe‘s 
argument needs to be. This, I claim, helps explain why skeptical theism runs into the very 
serious objections discussed in Chapter 1. Next, I will argue that the dialectical goal of 
skeptical theism is another important respect more modest than a satisfactory theistic 
response needs to be. Or, as I like to put all this, the dialectical goal of skeptical theism is 
too aggressive in its scope and too modest in its depth. I then show how theists would 
benefit from choosing the second of the two dialectical goals open to them. In keeping 
with that goal, I suggest an alternative approach to responding to Rowe‘s argument based 
on the epistemology of religious trust that avoids both defects in the dialectical goal of 
skeptical theism.  
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Some Varieties of Atheism and Rowe’s Dialectical Goal 
Consider again Rowe‘s evidential argument from evil: 
 
1) If God exists, gratuitous evils would not exist.  
2) Gratuitous evils exist.  
 3) God does not exist. 
 
What are proponents of this argument trying to show? The obvious answer is that 
they are trying to convince us all that God does not exist, seeing as how that is the stated 
conclusion of their argument. But there is a second, more modest goal some proponents 
of the argument might have in mind. Some may be purporting to offer this argument only 
as a justification of their own atheism, which is to say they want to show that they (and 
like-minded folks) are justified in accepting atheism because they (and like-minded folks) 
are justified in accepting the argument‘s premises. Notice that an atheist taking this 
approach is free to leave open the question whether some other folks could be justified in 
rejecting one of those premises. Indeed, I will now show that Rowe himself made it very 
clear in his initial offering of this argument that he does not want to assert that no one is 
justified in rejecting his crucial premise that gratuitous evils exist. So, I read Rowe as 
aiming to achieve only the weaker of these dialectical goals, namely that of providing a 
sufficient justification for his own atheism (and the atheism of other like-minded folks). 
It is ironic that this dialectical distinction seems to be largely overlooked in the 
debate over Rowe‘s argument given that his original publication of it came with the 
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conjunctive title, ―The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism‖ [emphasis 
mine]. It is in the ―varieties of atheism‖ bit that Rowe emphasizes his intention to pursue 
only the more modest goal outlined above. There, he classifies the possible answers a 
proponent of his evidential argument can give to the question of whether some folks 
could be justified in believing that God exists in spite of it. As he puts it, the atheist—i.e., 
a proponent of his evidential argument—can give one of three answers to that question, 
which he labels ―unfriendly atheism,‖ ―indifferent atheism,‖ and ―friendly atheism.‖ Here 
is what each of those three atheists will say on the matter: 
 
The Unfriendly Atheist:  
―No one is justified in believing that God exists in the face of Rowe‘s evidential 
argument.‖ 
 
The Indifferent Atheist:  
―I make no claim as to whether any one is justified in believing that God exists in 
the face of Rowe‘s evidential argument.‖ 
 
The Friendly Atheist:  
―Some folks are likely justified in believing that God exists even in the face of 
Rowe‘s evidential argument.‖1 
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 I have adapted these construals of the varieties of atheism from Rowe‘s own third-person construals. See 
his ―The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,‖ 340. 
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As I will be adopting these monikers in what follows, it is important to keep in 
mind that they have nothing whatsoever to do with the behavioral dispositions of atheists 
towards theists. An ―unfriendly atheist‖ in Rowe‘s stipulative sense can be a perfectly 
friendly neighbor to the theist in the usual sense, and a ―friendly atheist‖ in Rowe‘s sense 
might be a generally nasty person. The unfriendly atheist should also be distinguished 
from the so-called ―new atheist‖ who seeks to actively rid folks of their religious beliefs. 
Unfriendly atheism, in this context, is just a philosophical view about the epistemic status 
of theism; it is neither a behavior nor an agenda.  
Rowe himself espouses friendly atheism in that article, not because he we worries 
that his evidential argument from evil is insufficient to justify his atheism but because he 
suspects some theists can reasonably take themselves to have an even better case for the 
existence of God than they have for the existence of gratuitous evils. The ―reasonably 
take themselves‖ qualifier is important here; it is not as if Rowe thinks there actually are 
better reasons to believe in God than there are to believe in gratuitous evils. After all, he 
is convinced of the existence of gratuitous evils and hence the falsity of theism. As he 
puts it, the friendly atheist is only committed to the view that ―the theist has rational 
grounds for his belief, a belief the atheist rejects and is convinced he is rationally justified 
in rejecting.‖2 Given this, he expects it is within the epistemic rights of some theists to 
reject the crucial premise in the evidential argument—i.e., the premise that gratuitous 
evils exist—by making a move he calls the ―G.E. Moore Shift‖ (hereafter, the ―Moorean 
Shift).  
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The Moorean Shift 
In a famous attempt to defeat arguments for skepticism, G.E. Moore turned the 
skeptic‘s argument on its head.3 The general strategy of the skeptic is to argue as follows.  
 
4) If a certain epistemic principle is true (e.g., the principle that knowledge  
requires certainty), then we do not have knowledge of the external world. 
5) That epistemic principle is true. 
 6)  We do not have knowledge of the external world. 
 
Moore thought he could reject this argument simply by arguing that the negation of (6) is 
more obvious than the truth of (5), and he used the example of a pencil to make his point. 
Moore reasoned as follows: 
 
4) If a certain epistemic principle is true (e.g., the principle that knowledge   
      requires certainty), then we do not have knowledge of the external world. 
          ~6)  We do have knowledge of the external world (e.g., We do know this pencil     
exists). 
       ~5) That epistemic principle is not true.4 
 
                                                 
3
 Gerald Edward Moore, ―Hume‘s Theory Examined,‖ in Some Main Problems of Philosophy (New York: 
Humanities Press, 1953): 108-26. 
4
 Moore, ―Hume‘s Theory Examined,‖ 119-21n 
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Thus Moore accepts the conditional premise of the skeptic‘s argument but ―shifts‖ the 
ultimate outcome of the argument in his favor by asserting (~6) instead of (5), from 
which it follows that (~5) 
 Moore‘s response skepticism received strongly mixed reactions, particularly since 
he was unable to offer much in the way of a supporting argument for the negation of the 
skeptic‘s conclusion. Whatever the merits of Moore‘s particular argument, however, 
there is nothing inherently wrong with the Moorean Shift strategy in general; it functions 
simply by arguing, as is typical in philosophical dialogue, that one proposition is more 
plausible than another. When presented with an argument of the form 
 
If p then q. 
P. 
Therefore, q. 
 
a Moorean Shift responds by accepting the conditional premise and arguing that ~q is 
actually more plausible than p from which it follows that ~p. This provides one grounds 
against accepting the premise that p in the original argument. Since there is nothing 
wrong with arguing that one claim is more plausible than another, there is nothing 
inherently wrong with the Moorean Shift strategy. A successful Moorean Shift requires 
only that its proponent have a more compelling case for the negation of his opponent‘s 
conclusion than his opponent can provide for her crucial premise.  
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 Rowe suggests that the theist might attempt to apply the Moorean Shift in 
defending theism against his evidential argument by reasoning as follows. 
 
7) If God exists, there would be no gratuitous evils. 
8) God exists. 
 9) There are no gratuitous evils.  
 
As Rowe points out, if the theist can have grounds for God‘s existence that are stronger 
than the grounds inscrutable evils give us for the existence of gratuitous evils, then the 
theist can be justified in rejecting his evidential argument.  
But what grounds could the theist have for being more confident in the existence 
of God than they are in the existence of gratuitous evils? Rowe suggests that the theist 
could, 
 
[E]ndeavor to justify his belief by appealing to one or more of the traditional 
arguments: Ontological, Cosmological, Teleological, Moral, etc. Second, he might 
appeal to certain aspects of religious experience, perhaps even his own religious 
experience. Third, he might try to justify theism as a plausible theory in terms of 
which we can account for a variety of phenomena.
5
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Rowe obviously does not find any of these grounds for theism—i.e., the grounds afforded 
by natural theology, the appeal to religious experience, and the appeal to explanatory 
power—compelling enough to justify belief in theism for him. His question, though, is 
whether atheists have any reason to think some theists do have such justifying grounds 
for their own theism.  
It is at this juncture that Rowe explains his reason for preferring friendly atheism 
over indifferent atheism and unfriendly atheism.  
 
Although an atheist must hold that the theistic God does not exist, can he not also 
believe, and be justified in so believing, that some of these ―justifications of 
theism‖ do actually rationally justify some theists in their belief that there exists a 
supremely good, omnipotent, omniscient being? It seems to me that he can.‖6  
 
Rowe first points out that it would be absurd to deny that at least someone in the history 
of humanity has been in an evidential situation that rendered theism justifiable for her.  
 
If we think of the long history of theistic belief and the special situations in which 
people are sometimes placed, it is perhaps as absurd to think that no one was ever 
rationally justified in believing that the theistic God exists as it is to think that no 
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one was ever justified in believing that human beings would never walk on the 
moon.
7
 
 
This is a rather trivial point, though, as Rowe notices. He goes on to make clear 
that he does not want to extend his friendly atheism only to cases like these in which 
religious believers would be non-culpably ignorant of the various compelling objections 
to theism he himself is aware of.  
 
But in suggesting that friendly atheism is preferable to unfriendly atheism, I don‘t 
mean to rest the case on what some human beings might reasonably have believed 
in the eleventh or thirteenth century. The more interesting question is whether 
some people in modern society, people who are aware of the usual grounds for 
belief and disbelief and are acquainted to some degree with modern science, are 
yet rationally justified in accepting theism. Friendly atheism is a significant 
position only if it answers this question in the affirmative.  
 
In what follows, I will refer to the sort of theist Rowe has in mind in that quote as 
an ―ably-informed‖ theist. Rowe extends his friendly atheist sensibilities to ably-
informed theists as well, noting that his view is not without an air of paradox. As he puts 
it,  
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It is not difficult for an atheist to be friendly when he has reason to believe that 
the theist could not reasonably be expected to be acquainted with the grounds for 
disbelief that he (the atheist) possesses…Friendly atheism becomes paradoxical, 
however, when the atheist contemplates believing that the theist has all the 
grounds for atheism that he, the atheist, has, and yet is rationally justified in 
maintaining his theistic belief. But even so excessively friendly a view as this 
perhaps can be held by the atheist if he also has some reason to think that the 
grounds for theism are not as telling as the theist is justified in taking them to be.
8
 
 
I gather from this quote that despite self-identifying as a friendly atheist towards 
ably-informed theists, Rowe is not prepared to assert this position with much confidence. 
Suffice it to say, though, he does seem confident that something between indifferent 
atheism and friendly atheism is the appropriate response to take. In other words, he thinks 
unfriendly atheism is uncalled for, and that seems to be the more important point in 
establishing his overall dialectical goal. Rowe does not wish to pursue the more 
aggressive dialectical goal of offering his evidential argument from evil as a decisive case 
against the rationality of theism. His is the more modest goal of purporting to show only 
how it is that he and other like-minded folks who lack good reason to believe in theism 
can be justified in believing that God does not exist on the basis of inscrutable evils.  
                                                 
8
 Rowe, ―The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,‖ 340. 
81 
 
 
Some Varieties of Theism and the Skeptical Theist’s Dialectical Goal 
Somewhat astonishingly, theists (by and large) chose to respond to Rowe‘s 
argument not by attempting to validate his ―friendly‖ suspicion that they can be justified 
in rejecting it by way of a Moorean Shift
9
 but rather by advancing a position that is just as 
―unfriendly‖ to atheists as the unfriendly atheism shunned by Rowe is to theists. That 
position is the immensely popular skeptical theism discussed in Chapter 1. To see why 
skeptical theism is unfriendly to atheists, let us look at three parallel ―varieties of theism‖ 
that can be drawn to Rowe‘s three varieties of atheism. 
Upon being presented with Rowe‘s evidential argument from evil, the theist can 
take one of three positions on how successful they think that argument is as a justification 
of atheism. 
 
The Unfriendly Theist:  
―No one is justified in accepting atheism on the basis of the evidential argument.‖ 
 
The Indifferent Theist: 
 ―I make no claim as to whether one can be justified in accepting atheism on the 
basis of the evidential argument.‖ 
                                                 
9
 In fact, I have noticed only a couple of brief mentions of the Moorean Shift in the literature. See Michael 
J. Murray and Michael Rea, ―Anti-Theistic Arguments,‖ in An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 165-67; McBrayer, ―Skeptical Theism,‖ p. 621, note 5; 
and Trent Dougherty, ―Recent Work on the Problem of Evil,‖ Analysis Reviews 71, no. 3 (2011): 565. 
Rowe himself expresses surprise at the course the debate over his argument has taken in William Rowe, 
―Friendly Atheism, Skeptical Theism, and the Problem of Evil,‖ International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion 59, no. 2 (2006): 80-81. 
82 
 
 
The Friendly Theist: 
 ―Some folks are likely justified in accepting atheism on the basis of the evidential 
argument.‖ 
Why the Skeptical Theist’s Dialectical Goal is Too Aggressive in Scope 
 Notice now the remarkable irony that has transpired in the debate over Rowe‘s 
argument. Whereas the originator of the evidential argument himself espoused a friendly 
atheism, his argument has been met by an onslaught of unfriendly theistic attacks. 
Skeptical theists argue that no one (at least no one who is privy to the skeptical 
considerations they offer) is justified in taking inscrutable evils as sufficient evidence for 
gratuitous evils. Hence, they argue, no one (again, at least no one who is privy to 
skeptical theism) is justified in accepting atheism on the basis of Rowe‘s evidential 
argument. 
 Recall that skeptical theism attempts to undercut the atheist‘s grounds for 
believing that gratuitous evils exist by rebutting the atheist‘s crucial assumption, namely 
the Assumption of Sufficient Competence.10 Here, again, is that assumption properly 
formulated. 
                                                 
10
 The distinction between ―undercutting‖ and ―rebutting‖ defeaters I allude to here is now commonplace in 
epistemology and was introduced in John Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (Totowa, N.J.: 
Rowman Littlefield, 1986), 37-39. An undercutting defeater is one that renders a person‘s grounds for a 
belief inadequate to justify that belief. A rebutting defeater is one that affords one justification for thinking 
the belief is false. For a helpful discussion on the defeasibility of beliefs see Michael Bergmann, 
―Defeaters,‖ in Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, USA, 2006), 153-77. 
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 The Assumption of Sufficient Competence  
We humans can justifiably consider ourselves sufficiently competent about the 
ways in which an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of evils would be 
needed to contribute to greater goods such that our inability to identify for any 
member of a very large and diverse sample of evils E1…En a way in which his 
allowing that evil would be necessary for some greater good justifies our believing 
that his allowances of at least some of E1…En would not necessary for greater 
goods.  
 
According to the skeptical theist no humans can justifiably consider themselves 
sufficiently competent in the sense specified by this assumption. The CORNEA strand of 
skeptical theism alleges this is so because purely philosophical reflection shows that we 
cannot reasonably expect to have epistemic access to the relevant entailment relations. 
The representative-sample strand of skeptical theism alleges it is because purely 
philosophical reflection shows that we cannot take ourselves to have a suitably 
representative sample of the relevant entailment relations. Since these skeptical 
considerations have the same weight for all parties, skeptical theists conclude that no one 
is justified in making the Assumption of Sufficient Competence in light of them. Hence 
the skeptical theist‘s dialectical goal is very aggressive in scope; it attempts to provide 
everyone with a defeater for the Assumption of Sufficient Competence, and so, to 
undercut even the atheist‘s justification for the crucial premise that gratuitous evils exist. 
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 It is worth stressing that, unlike the Moorean Shift strategy Rowe proposes on 
behalf of theists, the skeptical theist‘s case for rejecting Rowe‘s argument makes no 
appeal whatsoever to the theist‘s positive grounds for accepting theism. According to the 
skeptical theist, we should all reject Rowe‘s evidential argument for atheism, not because 
any of us have good reason to believe that God actually exists, but because of the 
supposedly unreasonable presumption of competence required to accept Rowe‘s crucial 
premise that gratuitous evils exist. But if, as I argued in Chapter 1, that presumption of 
competence does not seem so unreasonable once it is carefully articulated, skeptical 
theism becomes a very hard sell indeed. It should not be surprising, then, that skeptical 
theism has run up against the flurry of powerful objections in the philosophical literature 
surveyed in Chapter 1. Pursuing such an aggressive dialectical goal is bound to get one 
into a good amount of philosophical trouble. 
Why the Skeptical Theist’s Dialectical Goal is Too Modest in Depth 
I want now to raise a second problem I find with the dialectical goal of the 
skeptical theist approach. This problem is independent of the first, so those who do not 
share my view that theists should grant the proponent of the evidential argument his 
Assumption of Sufficient Competence will still have a reason, on my view, to think that 
skeptical theism is an inadequate theistic response to the argument. In advocating for a 
skepticism of the human competency to detect any God-justifying reasons for the world‘s 
many inscrutable evils, skeptical theists neglect defending the theist‘s actual doxastic 
attitude towards that competency. The theist is in no position to take a merely skeptical 
view of that human competency—the sort of ―for all we know, we could be that 
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incompetent‖ attitude endorsed by the skeptical theist. Rather, her positive commitment 
to the existence of God, and consequently, her positive commitment to the non-existence 
of gratuitous evils commits her to a positively dismissive view of that competency. That 
is, she is required to maintain that given the vast amount of inscrutable evil in our world, 
we must really be that incompetent. It is here that the unfriendly atheist can seek to have 
the upper hand even if skeptical theists somehow prove able to motivate their skepticism. 
For even then, the unfriendly atheist may allege that—skepticisms aside—the theist is 
nonetheless unjustified in being so utterly dismissive of the relevant human 
competency.
11
  
In other words, the theist then cannot rest satisfied with a response to the 
evidential argument from evil that leaves her merely with reason to think that an 
omniscient, omnipotent being might well need to allow all the world‘s inscrutable 
sufferings for greater goods. Rather, she needs reason to think he really would need to 
allow them. The fact that there are so many inscrutable evils thus commits her to thinking 
that we truly are seriously incompetent in the relevant domain—not just that we might be.  
It is here that I think the theist is in a particularly vulnerable epistemic position. 
This is compounded if she grants, as I have argued she should, that the Assumption of 
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 Movie buffs will recognize the distinction I am drawing between ―mere skepticism‖ and ―dismissivism‖ 
from the way in which Neo, the protagonist of the Matrix series, transitions from being merely skeptical of 
his competency to form reliably true beliefs about the external world via his senses to being positively 
dismissive of that competency. Early in the movie, Neo begins to notice certain oddities in his surroundings 
that cause him to suspect that he might well be in some sort of deceptive scenario. At this stage, he is 
merely skeptical of that competency. While he certainly has more reason to fear being in a systematically 
deceptive scenario than the average person, and so, more reason to suspect his incompetence, he does not at 
this point have so much reason that it would justify his being positively dismissive of that competency. 
Later, however, the truth of the Matrix world is revealed to Neo, and he consequently has reason to be 
positively dismissive about his competency to reliably form true beliefs via sense perception whenever he 
is knowingly plugged into the Matrix.  
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Sufficient Competence is an otherwise plausible assumption for one to make in the first 
place. She might feel (and perhaps ought to feel) the weight of the world‘s many 
inscrutable evils eroding her confidence that God is truly trustworthy to prevent 
gratuitous evils. She needs reason to go on trusting God in the face of these inscrutable 
evils. Even if the skeptical theists can convince her that skepticism of that competency is 
appropriate, she will need more. She seeks to maintain her trust in God, but she 
recognizes that this commits her to thinking that all the world‘s inscrutable sufferings are 
actually non-gratuitous in ways we cannot perceive. Noticing that this commits her to 
confessing a significant degree of incompetence that is rather unexpectable, she wonders 
if her trust in God is not hopelessly naïve.  
A New Dialectical Goal for Theists: The Religious Trust Approach 
 Thus I submit that if theistic philosophers want to offer her an adequately deep 
response to the evidential argument from evil—i.e., if they want to defend the rationality 
of the theist‘s outright ―dismissivism‖ of the relevant competency—they will have to 
abandon skeptical theism in favor of the Moorean Shift approach. I propose, though, that 
they frame the Moorean Shift strategy a bit differently from the schema Rowe proposed 
on her behalf. Rowe suggests that the theist start with the truth of theism as her major 
premise and consequently deduce the non-existence of gratuitous evils. The sort of 
religious believer I have in mind, though, does not so much feel herself assenting to the 
proposition that theism is true in the face of inscrutable evils as much as she feels herself 
trusting a person. She trusts her ―God,‖ and while this commits her to assenting to 
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various propositions—e.g., the proposition 'inscrutable evils are non-gratuitous,‘ and 
consequently, the proposition ‗we are seriously incompetent in the relevant domain‘—the 
overwhelming phenomenology of her cognitive situation is one of clinging to a person as 
a devoted follower rather than clinging to a proposition in the face of counterweighing 
evidence. Her Moorean Shift, then, runs roughly as follows. 
 
10) If God is trustworthy to prevent gratuitous evils, then gratuitous evils do not 
exist. 
11) God is trustworthy to prevent gratuitous evils. 
 12) Gratuitous evils do not exist. 
 
 My suggestion, then, is that to properly evaluate the rationality of the theist‘s 
belief that inscrutable evils are non-gratuitous and her subsequent dismissivism of the 
relevant human competency, one must ultimately evaluate the rationality of the trust that 
leads her to hold these beliefs. If the rationality of her trust in God can be adequately 
defended, unfriendly atheism would be defeated. Let us call the approach to responding 
to Rowe‘s evidential argument that focuses on defending the rationality of the theist‘s 
trust in God the ―religious trust‖ approach.  
 In addition to offering the theist a way of defending the rationality of her actual 
position on the Assumption of Sufficient Competence in a way that skeptical theism 
cannot even purport to do, the religious trust approach would also have the comparative 
advantage of resonating much more deeply, I think, with the believer‘s own doxastic 
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practices. The typical believer does not look at the vast array of inscrutable evils in the 
world and ask the skeptical theist‘s question, ―Does my inability to see how God‘s 
allowances of these evils are necessary constitute evidence that they are gratuitous?‖ 
Rather, she jumps straight to the question, ―Can I—should I—trust my God to have a 
good and loving purpose here?‖ If she ends up concluding that those inscrutable evils 
must be non-gratuitous in ways she cannot perceive, it will not likely be because she has 
reflected on the various skeptical considerations that call her own competence into 
question but because she has decided to go on trusting God.  
 A further and most crucial advantage of the religious trust approach over the 
skeptical theist approach is that the religious trust approach need not be at all unfriendly 
to atheists. To defend the claim that theists can obtain a defeater for the Assumption of 
Sufficient Competence from her grounds for trusting God does not at all entail that the 
atheist also has a defeater for that assumption. Hence the religious trust approach would 
stand to be a good bit more dialectically palatable to proponents of the evidential 
argument from evil.  
 It is not as if I think defenders of religious trust should make use of the religious 
trust approach‘s ability to avoid unfriendly theism solely in the interest of dialectical 
prudence; it seems to me that friendly theism is genuinely the most reasonable of all the 
varieties of theism to espouse given that (a) the theist cannot reasonably expect her 
crucial grounds trusting God to be shared by all non-theists and (b) is prepared to grant, 
as I think she should, that the Assumption of Sufficient Competence is a reasonable 
assumption for a non-theist to make. I have said enough at this point about why I think 
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skeptical theists have not shown it unreasonable for the non-theist to accept the 
Assumption of Sufficient Competence. I now want to explain why I think defenders of 
religious trust should expect that the religious truster‘s own defeating grounds for that 
assumption (assuming for the moment she have such grounds) could not be used in an 
argument for thinking non-theists should also give up that assumption. 
To provide the non-theist with a defeater for the Assumption of Sufficient 
Competence by way of the religious trust approach, the theist would need to make a 
compelling case as to why the non-theist should also trust God to prevent gratuitous evils. 
This would presumably require advancing the various arguments for theism that make up 
the project of natural theology. This is essentially what Richard Swinburne attempts to do 
in his The Existence of God.
12
 Swinburne argues (unlike the skeptical theist) that the 
argument from evil does, in itself, count noticeably against the probability of theism but 
that the theistic proofs are, when considered as a collective whole, strong enough to 
overcome the evidence from evil and render theism overall probable. He calls this his 
―cumulative case‖ for theism. While I do not want to suggest that a quick dismissal of 
Swinburne‘s dense and important contribution to the philosophy of religion is in order, I 
advise against formulating the religious trust approach in these terms for the following 
reasons. 
First, it is widely recognized that two of the main players in natural theology—
i.e., the cosmological and teleological arguments—can at best establish the existence of a 
highly powerful, personal creator and sustainer of the universe but can offer no evidence 
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 Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, 2nd ed. (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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for thinking that deity is overall benevolent. Hence those arguments can afford us no 
reason for trusting him to prevent gratuitous evils. Indeed, the only arguments from 
natural theology I am aware of that can purport to offer evidence of God‘s supreme 
trustworthiness are the ontological argument and certain versions of the moral argument. 
In short, the cumulative case for a trustworthy God would not be so cumulative after all.
13
  
But even supposing some theists are justified in accepting the natural theologian‘s 
arguments that would support the existence of a trustworthy God, it would be 
unreasonable, or at the very least highly imprudent, for theistic philosophers to press 
these arguments as a defeater for the non-theist‘s Assumption of Sufficient Competence. 
After all, arguing that everyone should accept the ontological and/or moral argument for 
the existence of God is not much less aggressive than arguing that we should all reject the 
Assumption of Sufficient Competence on skeptical grounds. So, this is not at all what I 
have in mind in calling for an alternative to skeptical theism. 
It is best, I think, for the theist to move away from the unfriendly theist‘s goal 
altogether and seek only to defend the rationality of (some of) those who already find 
themselves trusting God. And even here, I do not think an appeal to natural theology is in 
the theist‘s best interest, as it could stand to achieve little in defending the rationality of 
actual religious trustings. It is the rare theist indeed whose trust in God is based on her 
appreciation of the ontological argument. As I see it, the goal of the philosopher of 
religion who wishes to defend the rationality of religious trust should be to offer an 
                                                 
13
 Peter van Inwagen concurs: ―None of the ‗theistic‘ arguments that are currently regarded as at all 
promising is, therefore, really an argument for theism.‖ [original emphasis]. From ―The Problem of Evil, 
the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence,‖ Philosophical Perspectives, 5 (1991): 138.  
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account that does not have as its best-case outcome that only a few of the world‘s most 
brilliant philosophers (if there are any) who can successfully overcome the dense 
objections to natural theology‘s arguments for a perfect deity can be justified in trusting 
God.
14
 This, then, is my final reason for thinking the religious trust approach should not 
be subsumed under the project of natural theology: an account of how it is that a believer 
can plausibly be justified in trusting God in the face of inscrutable evils should aim to 
extend to (at least some) layperson religious trusters as well as professional 
philosophers.
15
  
 This gives rise to an important question: On what do religious believers tend to 
base their trust in God in the face of inscrutable evils? Obviously, this answer will vary 
from believer to believer, so I will focus my discussion on the sort of grounds for trust in 
God that I am most familiar with from within the Judeo-Christian theistic tradition. A 
good number of those believers will make an appeal in one way or another to their own 
experience of God as a good and trustworthy being. I will have more to say about this in 
Chapter 5, but I note here that I do not think these will be the sorts of grounds they could 
plausibly expect to serve as a defeater for the atheist‘s Assumption of Sufficient 
Competence. The best they can hope for is that those grounds are strong enough to serve 
as a defeater of that assumption for them. And given their recognition of the weight of 
inscrutable evils, many of them might well confess that this is far from a guarantee. 
                                                 
14
To be fair, a proponent of the natural theology strategy I am dismissing could argue that the justified trust 
possessed by these philosophical experts could extend to other religious believers by way of their ―expert‖ 
testimony to other religious believers, but this point does not seem much worth pursuing. 
15
This is not, of course, to say that we should aim at an account that will show that all believers are justified 
in trusting God. Some believers might have good reasons for trusting him, but it is to be expected that many 
will have quite paltry reasons. 
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Some Preliminaries for the Religious Trust Approach 
Thus far I have explained that the religious trust approach will seek to defend the 
rationality of the believer‘s trust in God and that it will steer clear of unfriendly theism in 
the process. But there is a further question to ask about the intended goal of ―defending‖ 
the rationality of religious trust. One way to pursue this goal would be to argue that some 
religious trusters are indeed justified in trusting God. This, in other words, would be to 
argue that Rowe was right to choose friendly atheism over indifferent atheism. A more 
modest way to defend the rationality of religious trust would be to argue that it is 
plausible enough to think that some (sufficiently informed) religious trusters are justified 
in trusting God such that it would be unwarranted for the proponent of the evidential 
argument to assume that none of them are. This, in other words, would be to argue that 
Rowe is correct in thinking unfriendly atheism is unacceptable. This latter goal is a good 
bit more modest than the former. One way to achieve this more modest goal would be to 
show that there is some significantly underexplored territory in the epistemology of 
religious trust that looks promising enough for the epistemic status of religious trust to 
render unfriendly atheism too hasty. Success on that point could at least assure the theist 
that there need be nothing demonstrably irrational about her trust in God in the face of 
inscrutable evils. No doubt she would prefer to see the stronger defensive goal achieved 
as well, but success in achieving this weaker goal would at least be a step in defending 
her actual position (i.e., dismissivism of the relevant competency), which is something 
skeptical theism cannot do for her.  
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I hope my reader will not be too disappointed that I intend to pursue only the 
weaker of these two defensive goals in this dissertation. More specifically, I will argue 
that there is a good bit of underexplored territory in the epistemology of religious trust 
(and the epistemology of trust in general) and that there are a number of points on which 
the theist might well be able to develop a claim to justified trust in God. This, I argue, 
does seem to make unfriendly atheism too hasty. I will stop well short, though, of 
claiming that the epistemic status of religious trusters has been vindicated by my brief 
investigation into this underexplored territory. Perhaps, though, my discussion will at 
least get the ball rolling for others who might wish to pursue that goal.  
Having selected my own dialectical goal as the project of arguing that unfriendly 
atheism—in its claim that no one is justified in trusting God to prevent gratuitous evils—
is a bit too hasty, my next order of business is to clarify how I intend to use the concept 
―God‖ in the rest of this project. It is typical in the philosophy of religion for ―God‖ to 
stand as an honorific title for ―the omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent being of 
standard Western monotheisms.‖ I do not, however, wish to use ―God‖ in this way in 
what follows. This is because I want to focus on questions about the rationality of trusting 
God that do not presuppose from the outset that God is wholly trustworthy.
16
 I find the 
questions I have in mind most pertinent given that most reflective religious believers 
would assent to the possibility that the deity they worship may turn out to be less than 
                                                 
16
 This is not to say that there are not interesting philosophical questions to ask about trusting a being that 
one considers to be wholly trustworthy. For this see Marcel Sarot, ―Why Trusting God Differs from 
Trusting Others,‖ Sophia 35, no. 1 (1996): 101-15; Sheela Pawar, Trusting Others, Trusting God: Concepts 
of Belief, Faith, and Rationality, (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009); and most recently Joseph J. Godfrey, 
Trust of People, Words, and God: A Route for Philosophy of Religion (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2012).  
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worthy of their devotion after all.
17
 In other words, the sort of religious believer I have in 
mind recognizes that she is taking a significant epistemic risk in trusting God that goes 
beyond the possibility that the object of her trust does not exist at all (e.g., as in the 
possibility that naturalism is true). She recognizes the further daunting possibility that 
though God exists, he is not as trustworthy as she takes him to be. Indeed, many believers 
will feel the weight of this second possibility more so than the first when trying to make 
sense of their personal religious experiences (which convince them of a loving 
supernatural agent) in light of the world‘s vast array of inscrutable evils (which call his 
trustworthiness into question). For them, the question of what it would take to be justified 
in trusting God is a real and pressing question and one I think philosophers of religion 
ought to address. Interestingly, though, the question does not seem to have gotten much 
focused treatment among analytic philosophers. This dissertation seeks to begin 
remedying that. 
To best focus my project on addressing this question, I ask my reader to make a 
rather generous assumption for the sake of argument. Let us grant that (some) religious 
believers are justified in believing that there is some supernatural being that suitably 
serves as the referent of their term ―God.‖ By ―suitably serve‖ I mean that the being 
possesses at least some of the distinguishing qualities of the ―God‖ of standard theism—
let us say that, at minimum, he possesses personhood, agency, and tremendous causal 
powers over the natural universe. My concept ―God‖ can thus be construed as an 
                                                 
17
A philosophically sophisticated theist might prefer to say that she assents only to the epistemic possibility 
that her God might not be perfect so as to avoid making any metaphysical modal claim on the subject. 
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honorific title for a being that possesses at least these baseline divine properties,
18
 and we 
will be assuming for the sake of convenience that religious believers can be justified in 
believing that there is an actual being that stands as the referent of this concept. Thus 
(and more to the point) ―God‖ will also stand as a proper name for the object of their 
religious beliefs, and more importantly, the object of their devoted trust.
19
  
I recognize that not everyone will see much reason to think this working 
assumption is actually true, but it is important to note that nothing in the evidential 
argument from evil rules it out. That argument, after all, is an argument for atheism and 
not naturalism. So the unfriendly atheist who wants to argue that theists are not even 
justified in believing this much would be going well beyond the bounds of Rowe‘s 
argument from evil. For what it is worth, my own view is that there is a respectable 
amount of evidence from natural theology (beyond the personal evidence of religious 
experience) to support the assumption that God (so defined) exists, but it would be well 
beyond the scope of this dissertation to defend the merits of those arguments. Even so, I 
think committed naturalists who would resoundingly reject such arguments can 
nonetheless take interest in the question of whether—and if so, how—a person who is by 
hypothesis justified in believing that such a being exists could also be justified in trusting 
this being to such an enormous extent that she can confidently rely on him to ensure that 
the world‘s inscrutable evils are non-gratuitous and is thereby willing to consider herself 
                                                 
18 Coincidentally, this is essentially what Graham Oppy recently argues is required in being ―God.‖ See his, 
―Gods,‖ in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion: Volume 2, ed. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009): 231-50. 
19
 This, after all, is the name most religious believers use to reference him. 
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and all her fellow humans seriously incompetent in the relevant moral domain.
20
 We are 
thus looking here at a very radical trust in God. Is there any reason to think it plausible 
that such a radical trust could be justified—i.e., justified in a sense that would enable one 
to have an epistemically appropriate belief that no inscrutable evils are gratuitous? That is 
our question going forward. 
Chapter Summary 
 I have argued in this chapter that the dialectical goal of skeptical theists is amiss 
for two reasons. First, it is much more aggressive in its scope than a theistic response to 
Rowe‘s evidential argument needs to be. Skeptical theism attempts to provide all parties 
to the debate with a defeater for the Assumption of Sufficient Competence on purely 
philosophical, publicly-shareable grounds. But given that it seems reasonable for a person 
to think the Assumption of Sufficient Competence is a rather modest assumption of 
competency, this makes the skeptical theist‘s task of motivating skepticism of it for 
everyone quite ambitious. Instead, theists need only claim that they have a defeater for the 
Assumption of Sufficient Competence. I have suggested that they appeal to the grounds 
they have for trusting God as a defense of this position—grounds they cannot expect all 
parties to the debate to share. Second, the dialectical goal of skeptical theists is too 
modest in its depth to defend the rationality of the theist‘s actual stance towards 
                                                 
20
To those who are disposed to think that modern science has in some way rendered belief in a supernatural 
creator irrational in the first place, I think my question could still be interesting when posed with an eye to 
history. Could folks who existed prior to the major developments in cosmology and biology of the last few 
hundred years—say in the larger part of theism‘s existence—have had good reason to trust in God? 
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gratuitous evils. Theists are committed to maintaining that we really are significantly 
incompetent in the relevant domain; hence the ―mere skepticism‖ advocated by skeptical 
theists—even if successfully motivated—could not defend their actual position on the 
matter. Here again, I think theists must make an appeal to their grounds for trusting God; 
it is their trust in him that, for better or worse, leads them to think we are significantly 
incompetent about the reasons an omnipotent, omniscient being would need to allow the 
world‘s many inscrutable evils. 
A Look Ahead 
As I already stated, the question of whether and how a religious believer could be 
justified in trusting God to prevent gratuitous evils is not much discussed in the 
philosophy of religion. Perhaps one reason for this is that the phenomenon of trust itself 
received little attention in the at-large contemporary philosophical literature until rather 
recently. It was not until Annette Baier‘s influential article ―Trust and Anti-Trust,‖ 
published in 1986, that contemporary analytic philosophers began to take a hard look at 
trust.
21
 As Karen Jones, another prominent thinker on the topic of trust, notes,  
 
Where prior to ―Trust and Anti-Trust,‖ there were at most a few scattered remarks 
[about trust] to be found in the philosophical literature, nowadays there is a whole 
menu of theories for someone interested in philosophical perspectives on trust to 
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 Annette Baier, ―Trust and Anti-Trust,‖ Ethics 96, no. 2 (1986): 231-60. 
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choose from. All new encyclopedia projects contain entries on trust, as do indexes 
in books on political theory, moral philosophy, and epistemology.
22
 
 
The discussion over trust has continued to pick up steam after Jones penned those words 
in 2004. Trust was given an entry in the now widely-used Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy in 2006 and was most recently featured in Oxford‘s popular ―A Very Short 
Introduction‖ series with a 2012 installment by Katherine Hawley.23 
My research of this budding philosophical discussion has led me to at least one 
firm conclusion on the topic of trust: trust is a surprisingly complex phenomenon, 
yielding a wide array of conceptual and evaluative puzzles for philosophers to debate. 
That said, I hope to show that enough progress has been made on some of these issues to 
yield some potentially fruitful contributions to our question about religious trust that 
philosophers of religion have yet to explore.
24
 
 I will focus my next two chapters on addressing two pressing questions about 
trust being discussed in the contemporary philosophical literature. Chapter 3 focuses on 
the nature of trust. What distinguishes a state of genuinely trusting a person from various 
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 Karen Jones, ―Trust and Terror,‖ in Moral Psychology: Feminist Ethics and Social Theory ed. Peggy 
DesAutels and Margaret Urban Walker, (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield Press, 2004): 3. 
23
 Carolyn McLeod, "Trust,‖ in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), ed. 
Edward N. Zalta. URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/trust/; Katherine Hawley, Trust: 
A Very Short Introduction, (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
24 
I am aware of two works that do make explicit applications from the literature on trust I will be 
examining to the issue of trusting God. These include the previously cited Sheela Pawar, Trusting Others, 
Trusting God; and Joseph J. Godfrey, Trust of People, Words, and God. These projects are quite distinct 
from mine, though, in that (i) they examine trust in God within contexts that presuppose that God is by 
definition fully trustworthy whereas I do not, and (ii) they are largely unconcerned with evaluating whether 
and how a person can be justified in trusting God in the face of inscrutable evils, whereas that is the central 
issue of my project. For a case in point, consider that Godfrey‘s 498-page volume—certainly the most 
extensive study on trusting God I am aware of—devotes only four pages to a section entitled ―Evil and 
Trusting Directed Towards God‖ in which he makes his only explicit comments about the problem of evil. 
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states of non-trust? As we will see, philosophers have had quite a difficult time 
definitively answering this question. I will survey their attempts to answer this question 
before offering an original analysis of trust that I think avoids the problems facing extant 
analyses. Chapter 4 then focuses on a particular difficulty in the epistemology of trust 
having to do with the way in which we tend to be biased in our doxastic assessments of 
the abilities and characters of those we care about, and so, are prone to trust them in ways 
that more impartial observers often would not. Of particular interest to me will be the 
way that friends and lovers tend to handle counterevidence that threatens to speak against 
the trustworthiness of their loved ones. I will argue there that it is at least plausible to 
think that handling such counterevidence in a partial way can be epistemically justifiable. 
Having explored both the nature of trust as well as the potential epistemic value of these 
partial biases, I will be in better position in Chapter 5 to address the epistemology of 
religious trust in particular. There I will make my case for thinking it is at least plausible 
enough that the religious truster‘s own way of handling the counterevidence of 
inscrutable evils—i.e., giving up the Assumption of Sufficient Competence rather than 
her trust in God—could be epistemically justifiable so as to render unfriendly atheism too 
hasty. 
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Chapter 3: 
An Analysis of Trust 
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Chapter Introduction 
In this chapter, I attempt to arrive at an analysis of trust. An initial disclaimer 
about this project is in order. There are numerous ways the word ―trust‖ is used in the 
English language. We most often use the word ―trust‖ in reference to people but we 
sometimes extend it to talk of inanimate objects as in ―I trust my car to get me where I 
need to go.‖ In talk of trusting people, we use such various locutions as ―trusting them 
with,‖ ―trusting them to,‖ ―trusting them in,‖ and ―trusting in them.‖ We sometimes even 
use the word ―trust‖ as more or less a synonym for the word ―presume‖ as in ―I trust that 
you slept well.‖ It is thus highly unlikely that our ordinary usages of the word ―trust‖ are 
all trying to latch onto the same phenomenon. This means that a philosophically 
interesting analysis of trust will really have to be an analysis of something that is not 
captured by all these utterances.  
This is not all bad, though. Some of our common-language utterances about trust 
are probably more loosely connected to ―real trust‖ than others. For example, I agree with 
the vast majority of philosophers who have looked at trust that there is a sense in which 
our talk of trusting people is a much purer usage of the word than our talk of trusting 
inanimate objects. Still, it is likely inevitable that an interesting analysis of trust as such 
is going to cut against some usage of the term that seems apt enough to other thinkers to 
count as ―pure‖ or genuine. For example, I lean heavily, as we will soon see, towards the 
view that a good bit of talk about trusting people to do things would be more precisely 
expressed with the language of entrusting them with certain tasks. This is because we 
often entrust people with tasks that we—in a very clear sense—do not really trust them to 
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complete. Because the latter sense of trust—i.e., its doxastic sense—has been largely 
neglected in the philosophical literature and because it (I confess) seems the most 
fundamental sense of trust to me (and because it is most relevant to the epistemology of 
religious trust), the analysis of ―trust‖ I will offer in the latter stages of this chapter will 
focus on it. Even so, I recognize that others will think the phenomenon I prefer to call 
―entrusting‖ is just as fundamental a form of trusting (if not more so) than that which I 
analyze as ―trusting.‖ That is fine with me so long as in the end, we all at least recognize 
the distinction I want to make between those two phenomena.  
As another disclaimer, I focus here only on trusting people to do specifiable tasks. 
I recognize that there are likely other, more general forms of interpersonal trust in which 
we trust folks in ways we cannot exactly specify relative to certain tasks. Even so, the 
literature on trust in which I situate my discussion focuses on arriving at an analysis of 
trusting a person to do something specifiable. This fits nicely with my overall project 
anyway of looking at the theist‘s specifiable trust in God to prevent gratuitous evils. After 
surveying this literature on trust, I will subsequently offer an analysis of trusting a person 
to do something that sees it as fundamentally a matter of having a particular sort of belief 
about that person—or, as I like to put it, having a certain sort of confidence in that person. 
The Distinction between Trust and Mere Reliance 
 A fixture in contemporary philosophical discussions of trust is the view that 
trusting someone to do something is distinct from merely relying on them to do it. This 
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was one of the basic insights of Baier‘s initial study of the topic.1 We can rely on 
inanimate objects to behave predictably, but it would be misplaced (in a philosophical 
analysis at least) to say that we genuinely trust inanimate objects. In a similar way, we 
can rely on other persons to behave predictably for us without actually trusting them to 
do anything. I will use the term ―mere reliance‖ to refer to cases of relying on someone to 
do something in the absence of trust.  
Baier‘s central example of mere reliance revolves around the issue of food-
tampering in grocery stores (which apparently was a popular American fear at the time of 
Baier‘s writing in the late 1980‘s). Baier says we can rely on others to avoid 
contaminating our food even when we suspect some of them would like to poison it, 
because we know that security measures and the threat of sanctions are in place to 
influence those folks to avoid doing what they would otherwise like to do. Since our 
reliance on these people to behave in predictable ways is compatible with our staunch 
distrust of them with respect to the handling of our food, it seems to follow that reliance 
can occur in the absence of trust.
2
  
 This case has not been universally considered successful. Richard Holton, for one, 
argues that it does not make sense to say we are relying on any actual persons in such a 
case. Rather, Holton thinks we are relying only on impersonal states of affairs just as we 
are in cases of relying on inanimate objects to behave predictably. To rely on a person, 
for Holton, is to rely on her to behave out of a motivation that is ―sufficiently self-
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 Baier, ―Trust and Anti-Trust.‖ 234-35. 
2
 Baier, ―Trust and Anti-Trust,‖ 234. 
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generating.‖3 The would-be poisoners avoid poisoning our food only because of external 
pressures that have been placed on them and not, says Holton, out of the right sort of 
internal motivations required for reliance on the would-be poisoners themselves. Holton 
suggests that to think otherwise would be akin to thinking we rely on prisoners to stay in 
prison, which he finds absurd.  
I agree with Holton that we do not (at least typically) rely on prisoners to stay in 
prison. I also agree that the reason for this is that we rely on factors external to the 
prisoners and not on the prisoners themselves. But I think we can grant Holton those 
points without joining him in rejecting Baier‘s example of mere reliance. Holton‘s 
intuition in that case seems to belie too high a threshold in his conception of ―sufficient‖ 
self-generation. To see this, consider an ordinary case of reliance on an inanimate 
object—i.e., my relying on my car to get me to work. The car‘s movement is determined 
by a combination of its internal capacities (i.e., its mechanical components working 
together) and the external pressures acting on it (i.e., my foot on the gas), but it does not 
seem to matter to my state of ―relying on the car‖ what percentage of the overall causal 
process we attribute to the car‘s doings relative to my own doings. There are all sorts of 
imaginable vehicles on the ―degree of self-propulsion spectrum‖ from a Flintstone car 
that is literally foot-propelled to a futuristic craft that moves via voice command, but no 
matter what vehicle on this spectrum we imagine me riding to work in, I think I can be 
properly said to be relying on it just so long as I am counting on it to do some of the work 
in getting me where I need to go. Thus I submit that to rely on an object is just to count 
                                                 
3
 Richard Holton, ―Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe,‖ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1994): 
66. 
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on it to perform some causal role—however small—in bringing about the desired state of 
affairs. By extension, I submit that all that is required for relying on a person is to count 
on that person (acting in accordance with her own internal desires) to play some causal 
role—however small—in bringing about a desired state of affairs.  
To back up a step, I have not said exactly what I mean by relying on or ―counting 
on‖ a person to perform her causal role. I am inclined to think that this is a sufficiently 
intelligible notion to stand as is, but I recognize that others might like to be more precise. 
I am comfortable borrowing a phrase from Holton and thinking of relying on someone to 
do something as, more precisely, ―working the supposition that it will happen into one's 
plans.‖4 The difference between my analysis of reliance and Holton‘s, then, is just his 
added stipulation that the person‘s action be performed in the absence of strong external 
pressures. For Holton, I cannot truly work into my plans the supposition that the would-
be-poisoners will not poison my food; all I can work into my plans is the supposition that 
external constraints are in place such that my food will not be poisoned. I find that odd, 
and think it makes perfect sense to say I can work into my plans the supposition that they 
will not poison my food since I recognize that the external pressures are not sufficient to 
guarantee their behavior. 
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 Richard Holton, ―Deciding to Trust,‖ 68. I do have one issue with this notion if it has the implication that 
Katherine Hawley takes it to have in her Trust, Distrust, and Commitment,‖ Nous (forthcoming). She says 
that ―to rely on someone to X is to act on the supposition that she will X: this can fall short of believing that 
she will X, though it is incompatible with outright belief that she will not X‖ [emphasis mine.] That 
italicized claim seems to be shared by Facundo Alonso in his ―Shared Intention, Reliance, and 
Interpersonal Obligations,‖ Ethics 119 (2009): 452-56. 
I think it makes perfect sense to say, though, that I can choose (or even be compelled) to rely on a 
person or thing even if I believe that person or thing will not come through for me. (Indeed, a case of this 
sort will feature prominently in the conclusions I draw in this chapter.) If such a stance is incompatible with 
Holton‘s notion of reliance as ―working the supposition into my plans that the person or thing will come 
through for me,‖ then I would be eager to look for an alternative analysis of reliance. 
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I find my conception of reliance to be much simpler than Holton‘s and more 
intuitive. It also paints a sharp—and I think accurate—contrast between Baier‘s case of 
the would-be poisoners and Holton‘s case of the prisoners. The would-be-poisoners 
clearly have a role to play in bringing it about that my food is not poisoned—i.e., they 
have to submit to the external pressures being placed on them. Thus on my analysis of 
reliance, Baier and the vast majority of her commentators are right to think I do rely on 
would-be poisoners not to poison my food. But when it comes to prisoners remaining in 
prison, we do not typically count on them to play any causal role in staying there. It is not 
as if we rely on them to submit to the confines of the prison. Instead, we rely solely on 
the external constraints in place to keep them there.
5
 Hence we can share Holton‘s 
intuition about the prisoner case without dispensing with Baier‘s classic example of mere 
reliance and without accepting his dubious analysis of reliance. 
 Supposing though that my objection to Holton‘s analysis of reliance is mistaken, 
we could still recognize the distinction between trust and mere reliance if we were to 
accept his analysis. Indeed, Holton‘s own goal in discussing those examples is not to 
deny the distinction Baier draws but to draw it in a different place. Unfortunately, 
Holton‘s own favored example of mere reliance is not definitive for independent reasons 
I shall discuss later. To better suit my present purposes I will mention a couple of cases 
from Kathleen Hawley that I think rather clearly demonstrate that there is such a thing as 
merely relying on a person.  
                                                 
5
 I say ―typically,‖ because it is possible to imagine a case where I do rely on a prisoner to stay in prison. 
That will be a case in which I have reason to believe that the prisoner has, and recognizes that he has, a 
genuine possibility of escape but I nonetheless rely on him to choose not make the escape attempt. Such a 
case is also consistent with my analysis of reliance since, in that case, I am relying on the prisoner to play 
some causal role in his remaining in prison.  
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First, Hawley asks you to suppose you know that a street busker tends to perform 
at a particular spot in town on a certain weekday and that you decide to work the 
supposition that he will perform next week at that place and time into a plan to pull off an 
easy pickpocket while the crowd is distracted by his performance. It would seem 
extremely odd to say that you trust the busker to perform that day. Hence you seem to be 
merely relying on him.
6
 Second, Hawley asks us to imagine that she prepares several 
meals for her and her husband over the course of several days without ever being asked to 
do so. While her husband might naturally come to rely on her to have dinner ready on a 
given night, it would be misplaced for him to trust her to do so. Indeed, Hawley says she 
would be OK with him working the supposition that she will make dinner into his plans 
but would positively resent her husband making this a matter of trust.
7
 I think we can 
safely conclude from these two cases that Baier and most all the commentators on trust 
who have followed her are correct in thinking there is such a thing as mere reliance. 
  The really interesting question, then, is not whether there is a distinction between 
trusting a person and merely relying on a person but why there is a distinction. I will now 
discuss five prominent views of trust that seek to answer this question. I will argue that 
none of them are adequate—at least when it comes to capturing a very fundamental and 
intuitive notion of trust (and distrust). I will then offer my own analysis of trust in an 
effort to fill this gap in the literature.  
                                                 
6
 Hawley, Trust, 5. 
7
 Katherine Hawley, ―Trust, Distrust, and Commitment,‖ Nous (forthcoming). 
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Five Views on Trust 
The Goodwill View  
 The goodwill view was introduced by Baier in ―Trust and Anti-Trust.‖ According 
to Baier, trusting someone to do something requires ―reliance on their good will toward 
one, as distinct from their dependable habits, or only on their dependably exhibited fear, 
anger, or other motives compatible with ill will toward one, or on motives not directed on 
one at all.‖8 Thus for A to trust B to do X, A must expect B to do X out of goodwill 
towards A. This, according to Baier, explains why we feel betrayed when someone does 
not act in the way we trusted them to act, whereas we feel merely disappointed when 
someone does not act in the way we merely relied on them to act. For example, ―Kant's 
neighbors who counted on his regular habits as a clock for their own less automatically 
regular ones might be disappointed with him if he slept in one day, but not let down by 
him, let alone had their trust betrayed.‖9 When Kant‘s neighbors relied on him to indicate 
the time of day, they did not ―trust‖ him to do this, because they were not expecting him 
to take their welfare into account in his actions. Hawley forms the same conclusion about 
her street busker case: ―You don‘t expect to benefit from the goodwill of the crowd or the 
busker, or for them to care about your needs or feelings, you‘re just hoping to benefit 
from their presence. And that‘s why this doesn‘t amount to trust.‖10 
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 Baier, ―Trust and Anti-Trust,‖ 234. 
9
 Baier, ―Trust and Anti-Trust,‖ 235. 
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 Hawley, Trust, 5. 
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There are a number of problems with the goodwill view of trust. First, it does not 
easily accommodate cases of third-party trusting where the truster relies on the trusted to 
take care of a third party‘s good. Such trustings are especially pertinent to my project, 
since the religious believer trusts God to ensure not only that her own inscrutable evils 
are non-gratuitous but that everyone else‘s are as well. The expectation in such cases that 
the trusted will act out of goodwill towards the truster seems unnecessary.
11
 I would even 
add that such an expectation would often belie a moral failing on the part of the truster. 
For example, a father who trusts a doctor to provide good care to his child would seem to 
be unduly narcissistic if he expects the doctor to be consciously motivated to take care of 
the child out of goodwill towards him. But clearly a father can genuinely trust the doctor 
to take care of his child without having this narcissistic expectation. Likewise, it would 
be misplaced for me to expect God to manage others‘ sufferings properly out of his 
concern for me. It would be better in both cases to expect the trusted to be motivated out 
of concern for the party whose good is primarily at stake. And such an expectation seems 
perfectly compatible with trust.  
One might attempt to save the goodwill view from this worry by amending it so 
that trusting in such cases requires the expectation that the trusted will be motivated out 
of goodwill to at least the third party. But I do not think this will do either, since it seems 
possible to imagine a case of trust where the truster does not expect the trusted to act out 
of a sense of goodwill toward either the truster or the third party. As an extreme case, I 
think I can trust my veterinarian to take good care of my dog even if I know she despises 
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This point is made by Holton in ―Deciding to Trust,‖ 5. 
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both me and my poorly-behaved dog and would rather the two of us live quite unpleasant 
lives.
12
 If I know her to be an excellent vet, I may nonetheless decide to rely on her and 
her sense of professionalism to act in spite of her ill will toward us and provide the care 
my dog needs, and in so doing, I think I would be trusting her.  
This reveals a more fundamental problem with the goodwill account. The 
expectation of goodwill does not seem to be necessary for trust even in ordinary two-
party trusting relations. Consider that I can trust my grouchy mechanic to take good care 
of my car out of his own sense of professionalism without expecting him to give my well-
being a second‘s thought. And since my car does not have a ―well-being‖ in the relevant 
sense, it seems that an expectation of the trusted 's acting from Baier's goodwill is not 
needed in two-party trustings either.  
There is also reason to think that reliance plus the expectation of goodwill is not 
sufficient for trust. Holton‘s own principle case of mere reliance, which I have hitherto 
put off discussing, is meant to demonstrate this. Holton asks us to imagine a ―confidence 
trickster‖ who relies on your goodwill towards him in order to con you out of your money. 
Holton thinks the confidence trickster cannot be said to truly trust you, and so, Holton 
concludes that the goodwill view of trust is mistaken.
13
 I am skeptical of Holton‘s claim 
that genuine trust is absent in this case for reasons I wish to defer to even later on in my 
discussion. Even so, I think he is quite right in thinking that reliance plus the expectation 
of goodwill can fall short of trust. Consider again Hawley‘s example of her husband 
relying on her to make dinner. If we add to the case that Hawley has been preparing all 
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 Fortunately, in reality my dog is wonderful, and his vet loves him.  
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 Holton, ―Deciding to Trust,‖ 65. 
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those meals simply out of the goodwill she has towards her husband (this may well have 
been implicit in her original case anyway), then her husband could work into his plans 
that Hawley will cook dinner tonight because of her goodwill toward him without, again, 
making this a matter of trust.
14
 
We have seen that the expectation of the trusted‘s goodwill is neither necessary 
nor, when conjoined with a situation of reliance, sufficient for trust. Thus we would do 
well to consider alternatives to the goodwill account.  
 
The Affective View 
 Karen Jones (at least in her early work on trust) accepts Baier‘s goodwill 
component as necessary condition for trust but argues for independent reasons from those 
I gave above for thinking that reliance plus the expectation of goodwill is insufficient for 
trust.
15
 She thinks an analysis of trust must also make appeal to its ―affective‖ qualities. 
Jones thinks trusting involves having a particular sort of affective state, which she 
describes as ―an attitude of optimism about [the trusted‘s] goodwill.‖16 She views this 
state of optimism as functioning like an emotion. She notes that emotions are ―partly 
constituted by patterns of salience and tendencies of interpretation‖17 and thinks of trust 
in the same way. So beyond the mere doxastic expectation of the truster‘s goodwill, there 
is, for Jones, also an evidence-filtering optimism involved in trusting. 
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 Both Hawley and I agree that what is missing in this case is the belief that Hawley has a commitment to 
cook him dinner. I will have more to say on this theme later in the chapter. 
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 She renounces the requirement that an expectation of goodwill is necessary for trust in Jones, ―Trust and 
Terror.‖ 
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 Karen Jones, ―Trust as an Affective Attitude,‖ Ethics 107, no. 1 (1996): 5. 
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An emotion suggests a particular line of inquiry and makes some beliefs seem 
compelling and others not, on account of the way emotion gets us to focus on a 
partial filed of evidence. Emotions are thus not primarily beliefs, although they do 
tend to give rise to beliefs; instead they are distinctive ways of seeing a 
situation…the claim being advanced here is that the attitude of optimism 
constitutive of trust is a distinctive way of seeing another. This way of seeing the 
other is constituted by a distinctive trusting cognitive set, which makes one‘s 
willingness to rely on the other seem reasonable.
18
 
 
I think Jones is onto something important here. As we will see in Chapter 4, there 
is a great deal of anecdotal evidence to suggest that people often look less objectively at 
the behavior and motivations of people they trust. I think Jones is mistaken, though, to 
view this affective state as a component of trust itself. As I have already shown, it seems 
easy enough to imagine a case where I trust someone without expecting them to act out of 
goodwill towards me. In such a case it follows a fortiori that I am being less than 
optimistic about the prospect of their acting out of goodwill toward me.  
Suppose, though, that we loosen Jones‘ requirement so that there does not need to 
be an affective optimism about the trusted‘s goodwill in particular, but only an affective 
optimism that he will do the action we are relying on him to do. I do not think we should 
accept such a view either. It seems to me that trust can occur in the absence of affective 
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optimism altogether. For example, I can trust my mechanic in the case above without 
having any sort of evidence-filtering optimism about what he is going to do. Instead, my 
trust can be based on a purely rational assessment of his track record in the profession. If 
I have good evidence for thinking he takes his job seriously, then I can trust him. There 
does not need to be anything markedly emotional or biased in my assessment of his likely 
behavior or motivations. 
I wish to emphasize again that there is much left to discuss about the way in 
which our affections are often involved in our trustings. Indeed, I think a consideration of 
the role of affect in trust will prove particularly pertinent to a discussion of religious trust, 
since believers often feel compelled by their affections toward God in maintaining their 
trust in him. I will wait until Chapters 4 and 5 to discuss this issue. For now, it is enough 
to say that I view the affective phenomenon Jones describes as a frequent accompaniment 
of trust rather than as an essential component of it. 
The Participant-Stance View 
 The participant-stance view originated with Holton and has come to be perhaps 
the most popular view in the literature. On this view, trusting a person is a matter of 
relying on her while taking the participant stance towards her a la Strawson‘s ―participant 
reactive attitudes.‖19 To take the participant stance towards another is basically to be 
vulnerable to incurring the attitudes of betrayment or gratitude in response to their 
behavior. Numerous commentators have agreed with Holton that taking the participant 
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 P. F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment (London: Methuen, 1974), 1-25 cited in Holton, ―Deciding to 
Trust,‖ 66. 
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stance is at least a necessary condition for trust,
20
 but it is Holton‘s own view that trusting 
just is relying from the participant stance—i.e., it is necessary and sufficient for trust. As 
he puts it, ―When you trust someone to do something, you rely on them to do it, and you 
regard that reliance in a certain way: you have a readiness to feel betrayal should it be 
disappointed, and gratitude should it be upheld.‖21 This, for Holton, is why the 
confidence trickster does not truly trust you despite the fact that he relies on you and your 
goodwill: he does not take the participant stance towards you. Rather, he treats you 
merely as a tool in the same way he would treat a relied upon inanimate object. As such, 
you stand to be the source of his pleasure or disappointment but not a catalyst of his 
gratitude or betrayment.
22
  
I do not think we should accept this view of trust either. First, this account also 
seems, like the goodwill view, to be rather unaccommodating of cases of third-party trust. 
It seems I can genuinely trust a person to take care of a third party without being prepared 
to feel that the trusted has betrayed me.
23
 If it turns out, for example, that God has 
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 See Bernard Lahno, ―On the Emotional Character of Trust,‖ Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 
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 Holton, ―Deciding to Trust,‖ 67. 
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 Or as Stephen Wright puts it, ―This added disappointment or gratification is what raises the stakes in 
cases of trust…these raised stakes give trust the separate status of being something more than reliance.‖ 
Wright, ―Trust and Trustworthiness,‖ 617. 
23
 Hawley is also aware of this problem for the participant-stance view. See her ―Trust, Distrust, and 
Commitment,‖ (forthcoming). There, she describes a case where you rely on your daughter‘s friend to give 
your daughter a ride. ―On the one hand, it is natural to think of your attitude towards your daughter‘s friend 
as trust: you are disposed to hold many of the trust-related reactive attitudes towards your daughter‘s 
friend…On the other hand, it is natural to think it is only your daughter who is betrayed if her friend breaks 
her promise to her.‖ Hawley appears to give her all-things-considered conclusion on this case when she 
says, ―It seems more plausible to say that the only person betrayed is the person to whom the commitment 
is made.‖  
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allowed millions of children to starve to death without a justifying reason, God has not 
thereby betrayed me even though I have trusted him to have his reasons for allowing all 
that suffering.
24
 Similarly, I think it makes sense to say that I trust my friend to be faithful 
to his wife even though I would not consider an act of marital unfaithfulness on his part 
to be a betrayal against me. Thus I conclude that taking the participant stance is not 
necessary for all trustings. 
Nor do I agree that relying on another while taking the participant stance towards 
her is sufficient for trust as such. Hawley has recently provided the grounds for what I 
think can amount to a decisive case for this point. (Ironically, the objection I am about to 
build from Hawley‘s work also seems to challenge her own preferred view of trust as we 
will see in the next section.) Hawley points out that taking the participant stance towards 
another is compatible with distrusting him. She writes, ―[W]here we distrust, rather than 
trust, someone in a particular respect, this marks no diminution in our tendency to hold 
reactive attitudes towards that person. Indeed, attitudes such as resentment are to the fore 
                                                                                                                                                 
One would expect, then, that Hawley does not think the participant stance is necessary for trust, 
but then she continues to endorse the necessity of the participant stance throughout her work on trust. I am 
not sure what to make of this. She says that the case at hand ―weakens, though does not break, the 
connection between trust and betrayal.‖ But as I see it, either the participant stance—understood as 
preparedness to feel betrayal or gratitude—is necessary for trust or it is not. And if Hawley has given us a 
case in which trust need not involve taking the participant stance, then the participant stance is not 
necessary for trust. If I had to guess, though, I suspect Hawley really wants to propose a revision to our 
understanding of what is required in taking the participant stance. Since she says, ―you are disposed to hold 
many of the trust-related reactive attitudes towards your daughter‘s friend‖—presumably attitudes like 
sadness, moral outrage, and/or pangs of empathy towards your daughter—despite your recognition that 
your daughter‘s friend cannot betray you. So, I suspect Hawley is thinking that a preparedness to feel 
betrayal is not part and parcel of taking the participant stance. 
24The word ―thereby‖ is crucial here. I would certainly feel betrayed by God if it turns out that he lets 
millions of children suffer without an exonerating reason, but that is not simply because he let them suffer 
(which, in itself, is only an offense to them and not to me). Rather I would feel betrayed because I feel God 
has additionally actively elicited my trust in him. And if God has actively elicited my trust in him and then 
does not come through on that trust, that makes his mismanagement of others' sufferings a betrayal to me as 
well.  
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in situations of distrust.
25
 In other words, Hawley thinks it obvious that we can find 
ourselves open to experiencing betrayal and gratitude in cases of distrust just as in cases 
of trust. After all, she notes, ―Jesus knew that Judas would betray him. Yet trust is 
impossible in such a situation so betrayal does not require trust.‖ [emphasis mine]26  
It is worth noting that not everyone would agree with Hawley on this point. 
Compare what Carolyn McLeod has to say about a case involving female employees 
working under a sexist boss. ―The female employees might know that their perverse 
employer treats them well only because he fears social sanctioning. In that case, he could 
not betray them, although he could disappoint them‖27 [emphasis mine]. McLeod thus 
views distrust as incompatible with taking the participant stance, and so, would think it 
impossible for Jesus to truly feel betrayed by Judas. We seem to have here a case of 
diverging basic intuitions between Hawley and McLeod. I do not know of any other way 
to resolve this conflict except to say that I find McLeod‘s intuition bizarre, and so, side 
with Hawley.
28
 It seems quite natural to me that a woman would feel betrayed by an 
employer who takes advantage of his position of power over her to treat her in a sexist 
fashion even if (like Jesus) she saw it coming.  
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 Hawley, ―Trust, Distrust, and Commitment,‖ (forthcoming). 
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 Hawley, ―Trust, Distrust, and Commitment,‖ (forthcoming).  
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 McLeod, ―Trust.‖ This case is originally due to Nancy Potter; see her How Can I be Trusted? A Virtue 
Theory of Trustworthiness, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 5. 
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 In fairness to McLeod, it is not exactly clear from the context of her comment whether this is a view she 
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believe that she likely endorses it. Here is the relevant quote in context from McLeod, ―Trust‖:  
Many would argue that while this person's behavior is predictable or reliable, it is not trustworthy 
in any genuine sense. These theorists might distinguish mere reliability from trustworthiness on 
the grounds that people known or considered to be trustworthy have the power to betray us, 
whereas people known or considered to be merely reliable can only disappoint us. The female 
employees might know that their employer treats them well only because he fears social 
sanctioning. In that case, he could not betray them, although he could disappoint them. And if that 
were true, he would not be trustworthy for them. 
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Assuming Hawley is correct in thinking that taking the participant stance is 
compatible with distrust, all we need to see that Holton‘s participant-stance view of trust 
is mistaken is to notice that people can also rely on those they do not trust while taking 
the participant stance towards them. The case of the female employees may already give 
us such a case, since it seems plausible to imagine they were relying on their boss to treat 
them properly in some meaningful sense (and maybe the same could be said of Jesus too), 
but I think I can make my point more definitively with the following simple case of 
distrust in which the aspect of reliance is quite clear.  
Suppose Jones is a young lawyer seeking to be a partner at his firm. A named 
partner recently informed Jones that the firm is seeking to add one new partner and that if 
Jones can win the case he is currently working on, the firm will vote to make him a 
partner. The only problem is that Jones knows he cannot win this particular case without 
finding someone to help him sift through a large body of tax codes, as he lacks both the 
time and the specific expertise in that area to win the case. As it turns out, his colleague 
Smith is the only available person with the necessary competence. Smith knows of 
Jones‘s predicament and helpfully offers to take care of the tax code portion of the case. 
Jones is wary to accept Smith's help, however, since he and Smith have never been close, 
and Jones knows that Smith is also seeking partnership at the firm and would 
consequently have incentive to make Jones look bad. These considerations lead Jones to 
take a stance of marked distrust toward Smith in this matter. Nonetheless, Jones sees this 
as his best opportunity to make partner and, knowing Smith is his only hope to win the 
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case, he determines that his best possible move is to rely on Smith for the success of his 
case despite his staunch distrust of him. 
Some may want to resist my characterization of this case and will want to say 
instead that Jones is begrudgingly ―deciding to trust‖ Smith after all for lack of a better 
option, meaning this is not actually a case of distrust. I grant that we often talk of trusting 
in this way, a way that essentially reduces Jones‘ ―trusting‖ Smith to his willingly taking 
on a position of reliance on Smith. That is fine as far as it goes, but I do not think it 
removes the very clear sense in which Jones so obviously continues to distrust Smith in 
this case.  
I think this suggests that there really are two fundamentally different things that 
go by the name of interpersonal ―trust.‖ There is a doxastic state of having a certain sort 
of confidence in a person that he or she will actually come through for one. That is the 
sense in which Jones so clearly distrusts Smith. Then there is a sort of ―accepted-
vulnerability‖ sense of trusting in which Jones can be said to be (begrudgingly) ―trusting‖ 
Smith. As I foreshadowed at the beginning of this chapter, it is perhaps not worth 
haggling over which of these senses of ―trust‖ is more deserving of the term. But many 
commentators on trust seem to think the accepted-vulnerability sense of trust is the 
fundamental sense of trust, and I think this is wrong. I will have more to say about this 
distinction later in the chapter and will offer at least some reason for thinking doxastic 
trust must be every bit as deserving of the name ―trust‖ (if not more so) than accepted-
vulnerability trust.  
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For now, we can note that the Jones-Smith case shows at least a clear sense in 
which Holton‘s participant-stance view does not capture the meaning of trust. Insofar as 
distrustful reliance from the participant stance is possible, relying from the participant 
stance is not sufficient for trust in a very basic sense. And in Jones‘ case, I think it makes 
perfect sense that he can rely on Smith from the participant stance whilst distrusting him 
in a very basic way. Suppose, for example, it turns out that Smith does not come through 
for Jones. Even though this is the result Jones (in distrusting Smith) predicted all along, it 
would surely still make sense for Jones to feel betrayed by Smith. And supposing instead 
that Smith does come through for Jones, it would make perfect sense for Jones to feel 
grateful towards Smith—perhaps even especially so given the incentive Smith had to 
betray him. This shows that a person can simultaneously (a) rely on another to do X, (b) 
take the participant stance towards the other with respect to doing X, and (c) nonetheless 
fail to trust (in a very basic sense) the other to do X. Hence, relying on someone from the 
participant stance is not what distinguishes all genuine trusting relations from situations 
of mere reliance. 
The Obligation View 
Phillip Nickel offers an alternative view of trust according to which trusting 
someone to do X is a matter of relying on her to do something you think her morally 
obligated to do.
29
 A major objection to Nickel‘s view is that it seems possible to trust 
someone to do something you think him obligated not to do. For example, it seems I can 
                                                 
29
 See Phillip J. Nickel, ―Trust, Staking, and Expectation,‖ Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 39, 
no. 3 (2009): 345-62; and op cit ―Trust and Obligation-Ascription,‖ Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10, 
no. 3 (007):309-19. 
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genuinely trust a friend to help me cover up an act of infidelity even if I recognize that he 
really ought not do that. If he agrees to help me, then it can be perfectly coherent, I think, 
to say that I can trust him to help me cover up my indiscretion.
30
  
But I think an even more decisive objection against Nickel‘s view comes from the 
phenomenon of distrustful reliance as exhibited in the Jones and Smith case above. 
Clearly, it makes sense for Jones to think Smith is morally obligated to do a good job of 
assisting him on the case especially since Smith willingly offered to do the work. But 
Jones‘ decision to rely on Smith to meet that obligation (which, again, is just a result of 
his lack of a better option) is nonetheless compatible with Jones‘s staunch distrust of 
Smith in a very clear sense.  
The Commitment View 
 The newest view of trust on the scene is Hawley‘s own proposal, which differs 
only slightly from Nickel‘s. According to Hawley, ―To trust someone to do something is 
to believe that she has a commitment to doing it, and to rely upon her to meet that 
commitment.‖31 Hawley does not offer an analysis of commitment itself, but she does 
make clear that she considers it in a rather broad sense that will not reduce to just cases of 
                                                 
30
 Amy Mullin offers an interesting case that could serve as a second counterexample. ―[I]f we were thieves 
in crime making common cause, we might trust our confederates even if we and they share the belief that 
thievery is morally wrong…‖ This case appears in Amy Mullin, ―Trust, Social Norms, and Motherhood,‖ 
Journal of Social Philosophy 36 no. 3 (2005), 320.  
My own intuitions about this case are not so clear. I am inclined to think we need to know more 
about the motives the thieves are expected to act from. If they can be relied on to do their part only because 
you know they want the loot, then I am inclined to classify this as a case of mere reliance. If, however, they 
can be relied upon to do their part because of their sense of loyalty to the group, then I am more inclined to 
classify this as a case of trust. I will discuss the importance of anticipating motives in trusting later in this 
chapter.  
31
 Hawley, ―Trust, Distrust, and Commitment,‖ (forthcoming). 
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explicit promising.
32
 My own view is that it makes sense to think of ―commitments‖ here 
in the broadest sense possible as encompassing the commitments of both one‘s explicit 
promises and all of one‘s overall moral obligations. An advantage of such a view is that it 
would accommodate cases like my infidelity case above. If my friend explicitly commits 
to helping me cover up the infidelity, that does seem to help make sense of my trusting 
him to do so. If one worries that this leads to a paradox in that I must therefore think my 
friend simultaneously has a commitment to help and a commitment not to help me, I 
reply that this is no paradox. I do think he has a commitment (of some form or other) to 
do each of those things, but I only expect him to meet one of those commitments—
namely help me cover up my indiscretion. That is the thing I trust him to do. A paradox 
would occur only if I somehow expected him to fulfill both of these commitments, which, 
of course, is not what I would be doing in such a case. 
 One possible objection to the commitment view, which Hawley addresses, could 
be based on Holton‘s confidence trickster case. Suppose you gave an explicit promise to 
the trickster to hand over your money. If Holton is right that the confidence trickster does 
not truly trust you in such a case, then Hawley‘s view is in trouble. Hawley‘s reply to this 
case is to argue that ―Although you don‘t realize it you do not have a genuine 
commitment, the trickster recognizes this, and this is why he does not trust you. You have 
issued a ‗promise‘ under a misapprehension, indeed to the very person who has deceived 
you about your situation, and such ‗promises‘ do not bind.‖33 In other words, the trickster 
                                                 
32
 ―Promising is one clear way of acquiring the relevant sort of commitment, though explicit promising is 
not the only route to commitment.‖ See Hawley, ―Trust, Distrust, and Commitment,‖ (forthcoming). 
33
 Hawley, ―Trust, Distrust, and Commitment,‖ (forthcoming). 
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does not truly take you to have a commitment in either the broad sense or the narrow 
sense. 
 But no matter whether Hawley‘s reply to the confidence trickster case is adequate 
and no matter how we parse her notion of commitment, her view (understood as an 
analysis of trust as such) nonetheless falls victim to cases of distrustful reliance just as 
the participant-stance and obligation views did. After all, Smith has a commitment to 
help Jones in both the broad sense—i.e., he is morally obligated to help Jones—and in the 
narrow sense—he told Jones he would help. But the fact that Jones chooses to rely on 
Smith to meet that commitment does not, as we have seen, entail that Jones trusts Smith 
to meet that commitment (in a very clear sense). Hence the phenomenon of distrustful 
reliance once again proves crucial to understanding the nature of trust as such. 
Distrustful Reliance and “Deciding to Trust”  
I want to turn now to explaining why it is that many commentators have left out 
the doxastic sense of trust in their analyses. Many seem to treat the accepted-vulnerability 
sense of trust as the fundamental sense. This leads them in turn to explicitly deny that 
trust (presumably, real trust) requires having any doxastic expectation of compliance on 
the part of the trusted. The basic argument for their position goes as follows: we 
sometimes decide to trust via a direct act of the will, whereas we cannot decide what to 
believe via a similar act of the will; hence trusting cannot be a matter of holding a belief 
that a person will act in a certain way.  
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Holton focuses much of his paper on trust making this argument. He describes a 
well-known team-building exercise in which participants are asked to allow themselves 
to fall from a dangerous height whilst relying on other participants to catch them.  
 
If you are like me,‖ Holton observes, ―there is a moment at which you weigh up 
whether or not to let yourself fall. How does it feel at that moment? It feels as 
though you are deciding whether or not to trust. I think we should take this feeling 
at face value: there are circumstances in which we can decide to trust.‖34  
 
But Holton does not think you could ever actually choose to believe that the other 
participants are going to catch you. Notice how he keeps belief out of the decision to trust. 
 
Does my decision to trust the others entail that I believe that they will catch me? If 
it does, does this in turn mean that when I decide to trust them, I also decide to 
believe that they will catch me? I think not. In order to trust I do not need to 
believe. Certainly my trust involves a certain state of mind; but it does not seem to 
me that it always involves a belief. Mightn't I be most uncertain that I will be 
caught, but decide to trust anyway? Mightn't I decide to trust thinking it as likely 
as not that you will let me fall?
35
 
 
                                                 
34
 Richard Holton, ―Deciding to Trust,‖ 63. 
35
 Holton, ―Deciding to Trust,‖ 63. 
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Those who agree with Holton that trust is possible in the absence of a doxastic 
expectation often also cite the phenomenon of ―therapeutic trust‖ as further evidence of 
their view.
36
 We trust someone therapeutically when we do not yet think them likely to 
come through for us, but we want to give them opportunities to do so in order that they 
might have opportunities to develop trustworthiness. Parents often engage in this sort of 
practice. A mother might ―decide to trust‖ a teenage daughter to bring the car home on 
time even before the daughter has proven that she is likely to comply as a way to take a 
shot at fostering more trust in their relationship. 
Again, I grant that this is all a very natural way of talking about trust. There are at 
least a few problems, though, with thinking it captures the fundamental notion of trust. 
The first of these is that, building on what I said earlier, it does not accord well with our 
ordinary notion of distrust. If ―deciding to trust‖ someone to do something essentially 
involves deciding to allow oneself to be vulnerable to her behavior, then what becomes of 
distrust? Would we say that you also ―decide to distrust‖ someone to do something when 
you choose not to make yourself vulnerable to their behavior? That seems to me to be a 
mistake. I might choose not to rely on my wife to proofread my work, for example, 
without its being true that I distrust her to do a good job; maybe I just want to spare her 
the boredom. To distrust her with respect to proofreading my work, in the most obvious 
sense, I would have to expect either that she would fail to proofread it or that she would 
do a shoddy job. So distrust, in its most obvious sense, is a doxastic state—a lack of 
confidence in the one distrusted. In Jones‘ case, he does expect Smith to do a shoddy job 
                                                 
36
 See, for example, Victoria McGeer, ―Trust, Hope, and Empowerment,‖ Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 86, no. 2 (2008): 241-42; and Phillip Petit, ―The Cunning of Trust,‖ Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 24, no. 3 (1995): 202-25. 
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for him even though he decides to rely on him for lack of better options. I think it is very 
natural, then, to say he relies on Smith even though he positively distrusts him. We can 
say something similar about Holton‘s case; he decides to rely on the people below him to 
catch him even though he lacks confidence that they will. The only difference is that his 
confidence in the people below him does not seem to be as severely lacking as was Jones‘ 
confidence in Smith; hence I think we should say Holton is not in a square state of 
distrust, but his confidence is low enough such that he does at least fail to be in a state of 
square trust in that very same sense. While we can still call Holton‘s and Jones‘ 
willingness to rely on others in these cases a form of ―trusting,‖ that does not change the 
fact that there another very intuitive sense in which trust is noticeably absent in these 
cases.  
Hieronymi on Trusting Versus Entrusting 
I have at least one ally on this point in Pamela Hieronymi who has written an 
excellent recent paper on this distinction. I can do no better than to quote her at length: 
 
Suppose that, in the morning, you and I agree to meet for dinner at a certain time 
at a certain restaurant to plan an upcoming event. Later in the day you learn that 
all my friends have decided to go to my favorite restaurant to celebrate a surprise 
promotion bestowed on one of them. You now doubt whether I will keep my 
engagement with you. You are not certain I will not, but then you are not certain I 
will, either. You are in a state of doubt. In the face of your doubt, you decide to go 
to the restaurant and wait for me. When I show up, you tell me of your anxiety 
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and your subsequent decision to come to the restaurant, even in the face of your 
doubts. Upon hearing your story, I am less impressed with your overcoming your 
doubt by your decision to ‗trust‘ me and more concerned with the lack of trust 
expressed in the doubt itself. Certainly your actions are somehow more trusting 
than those of someone who, in the face of such doubt, did not come to the 
restaurant at all. Nevertheless, I could rightly complain that your lack of 
confidence betrays a lack of trust. In this case, Holton‘s analysis of trust, as a 
decision to rely from a participant stance that does not entail a belief, picks out 
something considerably less than what we want to call trust.
37
 
 
I find Hieronymi‘s point highly intuitive. If you do not actually believe I will be 
where I tell you I will be, then you do not really trust me (in a very intuitive sense) to be 
there even if you are nonetheless willing to show up and give me an opportunity to prove 
myself. But what of the sense in which Hieronymi grants that your actions are ―somehow 
more trusting‖ than someone who would not even bother to go to the restaurant in similar 
epistemic circumstances? For Hieronymi, this can be captured well with the language of 
―entrusting‖ instead of ―trusting.‖ That is, you can choose to entrust your time and energy 
to me in such a case without actually trusting me to be at the restaurant. Hieronymi 
describes the decision to let yourself fall in Holton‘s case in the same way.  
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 Hieronymi, ―The Reasons of Trust,‖ 218. 
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As you hesitate and weigh up, you may find that you are uncertain whether or not 
they will catch you. You have no definite beliefs on this point, and, what is more, 
you cannot come to any. You are in a state of doubt. From this state of doubt, you 
must now decide whether to fall. You may then decide to entrust yourself to them, 
and let yourself fall.
38
 [emphasis mine]  
 
Hieronymi‘s reading of Holton‘s case seems right to me. And I would say the same about 
the cases of so-called therapeutic ―trust;‖ a mother can choose to entrust to her daughter 
the opportunity to prove herself responsible by coming home on time without actually 
trusting her daughter to do so. 
Hieronymi‘s discussion provides at least one way to suggest that the doxastic 
sense of trust is actually more fundamental—a more genuine type of trust—than the 
accepted-vulnerability sense, given that we could just as easily describe the latter in the 
language of ―entrusting‖ rather than ―trusting.‖ Even so, I do not want to insist that 
entrusting without doxastic trust should not count as ―genuine trust.‖ The important point, 
here, is just that there are two distinct phenomena going by the name of ―trust‖ that must 
be acknowledged. Insofar as extant analyses of trust leave out the doxastic sense, they fail 
as analyses of trust as such. Since the doxastic sense has been largely neglected in the 
literature, I want to focus in the rest of this chapter on developing an analysis of trust in 
that sense.  
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 Hieronymi, ―The Reasons of Trust,‖ 217. 
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To keep the two senses of trust distinct in what follows, I will simply employ 
Hieronymi‘s terminology and use the word ―trust‖ to refer to the doxastic phenomenon 
(i.e., that which is acutely missing in cases of distrust) and the word ―entrust‖ to refer to 
the act of putting yourself (or something you value) under the causal control of another. It 
is not crucial to appreciating this distinction that my notion of doxastic trust be accepted 
in any way as the notion of trust even though I do happen to think it plausible that it is 
more fundamental than that which Hieronymi captures with the language of entrusting.  
With this in place, some further terminological distinctions will be helpful here. 
Sometimes we entrust things to people we trust—i.e., sometimes we trustingly entrust. 
To trustingly entrust someone to do something is just to (a) place something under their 
causal control and (b) have an expectation that the other will manage it properly. Other 
times, we agnostically entrust—i.e., we entrust something to the other despite being 
unable to form an expectation either way whether the other will come through for us. Still 
other times we distrustingly entrust—i.e., we entrust something to the other despite 
having an expectation that other will not come through for us. This is what Jones chose to 
do in handling his high-stakes law case; he entrusted a crucial portion of the case to 
Smith while nonetheless distrusting Smith to handle it properly. This was Jones‘ one shot 
at making partner, and he was going to have to rely on Smith—i.e., entrust that case to 
Smith—come what may.  
Not only is it possible to distrustingly entrust, it is sometimes perfectly reasonable 
to do so. Both pragmatic reasons (as in Jones‘ case) and moral reasons can properly 
compel us to entrust something to those we distrust. The mother who recognizes that she 
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ought to afford her coming-of-age daughter more responsibility need not be acting 
unreasonably in any sense—including flouting any epistemic duties—if she decides to 
entrust her daughter with a task that she predicts her daughter will not perform. This 
makes an important point, as it means that the justifying conditions for trustings are quite 
distinct from the justifying conditions for entrustings. Trusting, as I am now thinking of it, 
is a doxastic state; thus it is properly subject to epistemological evaluations. Entrusting 
(understood as taking on a position of reliance or vulnerability with respect to something 
one values), on the other hand, is taking on a sort of submissive social state, and so, is 
more properly subject to pragmatic and moral evaluations. In all cases, the act of 
entrusting—of so to speak ―letting go‖ so that the other can have control—is distinct 
from the doxastic trusting that may or not may not exist in each of those cases.  
 Reliance in the face of distrust is perhaps atypical of interpersonal reliance, but I 
do not think it especially rare. Our strong desire for realizing some state of affairs can 
easily enough make us willing to rely on those we distrust. Indeed, it is not hard to 
imagine cases where people have no choice but to rely on those they distrust for meeting 
even their most basic needs (e.g., impoverished citizens relying on corrupt governments 
for sustenance.)  
Trust without Reliance 
Cases of distrusting reliance reveal only one way in which doxastic trust and 
reliance can come apart. I will now show that just as there can be reliance without trust, 
there can be cases of trust without reliance. This means that the five views of trust 
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above—insofar as they were being offered as analyses of genuine trust—were built on 
the false pretense that trust is by its very nature a ―reliance-plus‖ state. 
Recall that the five views of trust we examined were all formulated with an eye 
towards explaining why relying on a person does not always amount to trusting that 
person. Each view thus offers a ―reliance-plus‖ account of trust to make sense of this—
e.g., trust is reliance plus expectation of goodwill; reliance plus taking the participant 
stance; reliance plus thinking the other has a commitment; etc. While I certainly agree 
with their observation that reliance does not always amount to a situation of genuine trust, 
these commentators tacitly leap to a conclusion I find unwarranted, namely that reliance 
is therefore only partially constitutive of real trust. There is another available explanation 
for why reliance does not always amount to trust. That is to simply say that reliance is 
consistent with—but not constitutive of—trust.  
Consider the following simple case. I want a neighbor to collect my mail for me 
while I am away on vacation. As I have neighbors living on either side of me, I have to 
choose which neighbor I will rely on to collect it. I view Bob, who lives to my left, and 
Jim, who lives to my right, both to be honest men who seem perfectly capable of carrying 
out the task. I decide to rely on Bob instead of Jim, because I remember doing the same 
favor for Bob last month, and it seems natural to call on him to return the favor. Suppose 
Jim notices my departure and wonders why I did not ask him to collect my mail. He 
approaches me upon my return and asks whether I made any arrangements for my mail. I 
inform him that I indeed made arrangements with Bob. Suppose Jim responds to this 
news by asking, ―Why, John? Didn‘t you trust me to do it?‖ I would be taken aback by 
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the egregious fallacy implicit in his question. ―Poor Jim,‖ I might respond. ―The fact that 
I chose not to rely on you in no way suggests that I did not trust you to take care of my 
mail. I did trust you, and still do. But I also trust Bob, and I chose to rely on him instead 
of you for reasons that had nothing to do with trust.‖  
I think this case makes clear that reliance is not constitutive of trusting (in all 
fundamental senses of ―trusting‖) in the way the five views above suggest. Others might 
disagree; they might claim that in not relying on Jim I did not really trust him to take care 
of my mail; instead, I simply believed he was trustworthy with respect to taking care of 
my mail. In response, I want to claim that these locutions are more or less equivalent 
once we come to appreciate the doxastic sense of trust.
39
 If we draw a sharp distinction 
between trusting a person and believing the person is trustworthy, we create the 
undesirable result of making trust (and distrust) causally inept in our decisions about who 
to rely on. I think it both natural and analytically precise to say that we often choose to 
rely on people because we trust them and that we often choose not to rely on people 
because we distrust them. As such, any analysis of trust that wants to allow for trust‘s and 
distrust‘s obvious motivational-causal link in our decisions about whether to make 
ourselves vulnerable to others will have to leave reliance out its analysis.  
For a case in point, look at how causally inept trust and distrust become on 
Hawley‘s reliance-plus account.  
 
                                                 
39
 I say ―more or less‖ equivalent, because I see room for a sort of case in which one recognizes that one 
has sufficient evidence for being confident in another person but cannot, for whatever reason, actually bring 
oneself to beconfident in that person. In such a case, I would say one recognizes that the person is 
trustworthy without its being the case that one trusts the person. 
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To trust someone to do something is to believe that she has a commitment to 
doing it, and to rely upon her to meet that commitment. To distrust someone to do 
something is to believe that she has a commitment to doing it, and yet not rely 
upon her to meet that commitment.
40
  
 
Because Hawley makes actual reliance on someone to meet a commitment a required 
component of trust, the existence of the commitment itself becomes a prerequisite for 
trust or distrust.
41
 But I think it evident that our trust and distrust in others plays a causal 
role in which commitments we ask others to take on. If I distrust my neighbor with 
respect to taking care of my mail, I will not ask him to take care of it (assuming I have a 
better option), and hence, he will incur no commitment to take care of it. On Hawley‘s 
analysis, though, I could not even be said to distrust him to take care of my mail since he 
does not have a commitment to take care of it. That seems very odd to me.  
Again, I am still happy to grant that there is the other sense of ―trust‖ in which 
choosing to make oneself vulnerable to another is itself an instance of ―trusting.‖ But 
since that sense of ―trusting‖—which I prefer to call ―entrusting‖—is not compatible with 
distrusting in its most intuitive sense—i.e., the doxastic sense—I am led to analyze trust 
in doxastic terms as well. And as we have just seen, thinking of trust in doxastic terms 
accords nicely with the obvious sense in which trust often motivates our decisions to rely 
on others. In the case of my neighbors, I trusted both men perfectly well to take care of 
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 Hawley, ―Trust, Distrust, and Commitment,‖ (forthcoming). 
41
 This last point is deducible from the above quote, but it is also explicitly stated elsewhere in Hawley‘s 
paper. ―I propose that it is appropriate to trust or distrust someone to do something only if that person has 
an explicit or implicit commitment to doing it.‖ 
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my mail and hence—i.e., because of my trust in them—would have been pleased to rely 
on either of them to perform the task. 
Notice next that because there can be trust without reliance, there can also be trust 
(in the doxastic sense) without any of the ―reliance-plus‖ ingredients proposed by the 
philosophers above. I trusted Jim to take care of my mail but chose not to rely on him to 
do so. It follows that I did not literally expect him to be motivated to take care of my mail 
out of goodwill towards me since, after all, I did not expect him to take care of my mail at 
all. Likewise, I did not take the participant stance towards Jim with respect to his taking 
care of my mail, as I made myself vulnerable to Bob‘s betrayal rather than his. Nor did I 
think Jim obligated to take care of my mail; after all, I never even asked him to do so. I 
did not think Jim had a commitment to take care of my mail for the same reason. Thus 
none of these reliance-plus ingredients are in the end necessary for genuine trusting (once 
we recognize the two types of ―genuine‖ trusting) for reasons independent of any 
arguments I made against each of them earlier.  
The need to accommodate cases of trust in the absence of reliance in our 
understanding of trust cannot be easily overstated, for such cases are extremely familiar. 
We choose not to rely on people to do things we nonetheless trust them to do for all sorts 
of reasons. Sometimes, as in the case of me and Jim above, it is because there are other 
third parties whom we think specially obligated to help us instead. Other times, it is 
simply more convenient to rely on someone else. For example, suppose I chose to rely on 
Bob instead of Jim only because I already had Bob's phone number programmed in my 
phone, and so, could get in touch with him quicker. Sometimes it is because we prefer to 
134 
 
do things ourselves. Still other times, we choose not to rely on those we trust for moral 
reasons. While I might trust two friends equally well to take care of my dog for the 
weekend, I might choose to rely on one over the other because I know the latter is 
stressed from work and would benefit from a more relaxing weekend. None of these 
decisions to refrain from relying on others belie an absence of trust (in the very intuitive 
doxastic sense) between us.  
The Confidence View 
I will now diverge from the extant reliance-plus views of trust to focus on 
analyzing trust in its basic doxastic sense. On my view, to trust is to have a certain sort of 
confidence in the trusted. I will thus call my view the ―confidence view‖ of trust. I will 
need to make some important refinements to the confidence view, as not just any form of 
confidence in another should count as trust, but I will first restate it here in analytical—
though unrefined—form. 
 
The Confidence View (unrefined version) 
A trusts B to do X = def. A has confidence that B will (or would if called upon) 
do X. 
 
 While my confidence view is a significant divergence from the standard approach 
among philosophers who work on the topic of trust, it is very close in an important 
respect to the way in which prominent social scientists have conceived of trust. Diego 
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Gambetta, for example, summarizes (and endorses) the consensus view of trust among 
contributers to his edited volume on trust as follows:  
 
Trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the subjective probability 
with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a 
particular action, both before he can monitor such action (or independently of his 
capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a context in which it affects his own 
action.
42
  
 
Similarly Russell Hardin, who is perhaps the most prolific scholar on trust in the social 
sciences, puts it simply: ―To say that I trust you in some context is just to say that I find 
you trustworthy in that context.‖43 Gambetta and Hardin thus view trust as a purely 
doxastic confidence that the trusted will act in a certain way.
44
  
But the view I want to propose diverges sharply from Gambetta‘s in that I do not 
wish to recognize just any state of confidence that another will behave in a way that will 
affect me as a case of trust. We have already seen numerous cases of mere reliance—i.e., 
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 Diego Gambetta, ―Can We Trust Trust?‖ in Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, ed. 
Diego Gambetta (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988): 217. 
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 Russell Hardin, Trust (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 1. Hardin also begins in his edited volume on 
distrust by saying,  
Most of the contributions to this book assume, either explicitly or implicitly, that trust is cognitive, 
that it is a de facto an assessment of the trustworthiness of the potentially trusted person or group 
or institution. If on your own knowledge, I seem to be trustworthy to some degree with respect to 
some matter, then you trust me [to some degree] with respect to that matter. 
See op cit, ―Distrust: Manifestations and Management,‖ in Distrust, ed. Russell Hardin (New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation, 2004): 3. 
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 I notice, though, that Hardin qualifies his view in the opening line of an earlier publication saying, 
―Usually, to say that I trust you in some context simply means that I think you will be trustworthy toward 
me in that context‖ [emphasis mine]. See Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, (New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation, 2002). Perhaps that qualification was meant to recognize the way in which we can trust in 
the accepted-vulnerability sense without trusting in the doxastic sense. 
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reliance in the absence of trust—that can easily meet Diego‘s conditions without 
deserving to be called cases of trust in either of the two fundamental senses. For example, 
I can be confident that Baier‘s would-be-food-poisoners will not poison my food without 
its being true that I trust them not to poison my food. Hawley‘s husband can likewise be 
confident that Hawley will have a meal ready for him, and that confidence certainly 
affects his own actions without trusting her to do so.  
And while my view of trust as confidence more or less accepts Hardin‘s equation 
of trusting a person with believing him to be trustworthy, he and I have quite different 
views of what it means to be trustworthy. Hardin explicitly endorses an ―encapsulated 
interest‖ view of trustworthiness according to which ―A is worthy of B‘s trusting A to do 
x if and only if it is reasonable for B to think A has an interest in continuing his 
relationship with B in such a way that would require A to encapsulate B‘s interests for 
doing X into his own interests.‖ But I have insisted throughout this chapter that room 
must be made in an analysis of trust for third-party trust. Hence I reject Hardin‘s 
requirement that it is necessary that the truster believe the trusted is interested in 
continuing a relationship with him—i.e., the truster.  
Furthermore, there is reason to think Hardin‘s encapsulated interest condition is 
not sufficient for trustworthiness either. McLeod offers a compelling variation of the 
sexist employer case to show this. She asks us to imagine that the sexist employer enjoys 
seeing and then fantasizing about his female employees so much that he is willing to 
encapsulate enough of their interests into his own in order to keep their working 
relationship intact. An employee who knows this about him could be quite confident that 
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he will not make demeaning sexist comments towards her but without, it seems, trusting 
him to so refrain.
45
 I agree and want to respect such boundaries in preserving the notion 
of trust, and so, will seek to have a refined confidence view that requires more than 
simply being confident that the trusted wants to do what he has to do to keep the truster 
around. 
 My first step, then, is to refine the view in such a way that, unlike Gambetta‘s, it 
captures the distinction between genuine doxastic trust and the sort of confidence we 
have in cases where we ―merely rely‖ on people to behave in ways we are confident they 
will behave. My inclination here is to find a way to assimilate the best of the existing 
theories on the difference between the accepted-vulnerability sense of trust and mere 
reliance into my confidence view. Two such approaches seem very plausible to me. One 
approach is to assimilate Nickel‘s obligation view such that to trust a person to do X (in 
the doxastic sense) is, roughly, to be confident that she will do X, where X is an action 
the truster takes the trusted to be obligated to perform. I say ―roughly‖ here since the 
view would need to be further refined to accommodate cases in which the truster need not 
actually believe that the trusted is obligated to do the action—just that he would do it if 
obligated. The second approach assimilates Hawley‘s commitment view into my 
confidence view such that to trust a person to do X is, roughly (see previous), to be 
confident that she will do X, where X is an action the truster takes the trusted to have a 
commitment to do. I am most attracted to Hawley's commitment view due to its ability to 
easily accommodate cases in which a person can trust someone to do something he thinks 
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that person is morally obligated not to do, and so, will employ a version of the second of 
these accounts in what follows. It is worth stressing though, that we can agree that there 
is a distinction between genuine trusting confidence and non-trusting forms of confidence 
while disagreeing on what sort of thing exactly (e.g., obligations, commitments, etc.) it is 
that trusters are confident the people they trust will (or would) do.  
With this in mind, here is an updated look at my analysis of trust with the present 
refinement in place. 
 
The Confidence View (somewhat more refined version) 
A trusts B to do X = def. A has confidence that B would do X if B had a 
commitment to do X. 
 
Before I make the further refinement needed to more clearly distinguish my view from 
Hardin‘s, I want to explain why I formulated it here in the subjunctive tense. This is the 
best way I know of to clearly accommodate cases of trust in the absence of reliance, 
which I argued is a requirement of an acceptable analysis of trust. My subjunctive 
analysis makes sense of the fact that I can genuinely trust Jim to take care of my mail 
without thinking he actually has a commitment to take care of it. When I trust him, I am 
confident that he would do it if he had a commitment to do it. My analysis should not be 
read, however, as making trust a necessarily ―counterfactual‖ matter in the literal sense. 
In cases where the truster takes the trusted to already have a commitment to do the act in 
question, then the truster's trust will, of course, amount to the confidence that the trusted 
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will perform the action. Even so, I take it that the philosopher who wants a unified 
analysis of trust is free to describe that confidence in subjunctive tense so long as it is 
understood that such a description need not be truly counterfactual.
46
 
 Next, I want to refine my confidence view so that it is clearly distinguished from 
Hardin‘s view. I do not want to say that A trusts B to meet his commitment to do X if and 
only if A thinks B has an interest in doing X in order to maintain a relationship with A. 
Not only does this rule out third-party trust, but McLeod‘s fantasizing employer case can 
be used to show that you can expect someone to have an interest in doing what he has a 
commitment to do without really trusting him to do it. It is easy to imagine that the 
employer has a commitment both in the broad and narrow sense to refrain from making 
degrading sexist comments to his employees. He clearly has a moral obligation not to 
make such comments, and so, has a commitment to refrain from making them in the 
broad sense. And we can also easily imagine that he signed a company-wide code of 
ethics that prohibits sexist comments, and so, has a commitment in the narrow sense as 
well. But if the only reason an employee has for being confident that he will meet this 
commitment is that he does not want his employees to get upset and leave lest he be 
unable to peer at them, then I do not think she truly trusts him to meet his commitment.  
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 There are further interesting question to raise about the extent to which trust can be a counterfactual 
matter. Do we want to say, for example, that A trusts B to do X even in cases where A has not even 
considered whether B would likely do X (if B obtained a commitment to doing X) so long as it is 
counterfactually true that A would be confident that B would do X if the question were raised in A‘s mind? 
A related question is whether we should make the state of ―having confidence‖ itself consistent with a sort 
of counterfactual, dispositional state such that A can ―have confidence‖ that B would do X so long as A 
would be disposed to expecting that B would do X if the question were raised in A‘s mind. For example, 
was I confident yesterday that my wife would keep a secret of mine from her best friend even though it 
never even occurred to me to share the secret with my wife in the first place? And did I trust her to keep 
that secret? I am inclined to say it makes sense to speak of confidence and trust in this way, but I do not 
wish to broach such issues here, and so, will focus on the less controversial occurrent—i.e., consciously 
opaque—cases of trust. 
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The issue, as I see it, is that trusting involves expecting people to act from a 
higher motive. Consider again Baier's example of the would-be poisoners. This is another 
case in which we can expect people to do something they have a commitment to do 
without truly trusting them to do it. If we want to employ the narrow conception of 
commitment, though, we need to amend the case to see this. So suppose a few would-be 
poisoners are brought in by the police for questioning after being suspected of plotting a 
poisoning attack and that these would-be poisoners are subsequently released on the basis 
of insufficient evidence. On their way out, however, they feel compelled to make an 
explicit (and apparently sincere) promise not to poison anyone‘s food. Thus the would-
be-poisoners now have a commitment even in the very narrow sense to refrain from 
poisoning food. But it is clearly possible for anyone who is privy to this explicit 
commitment to maintain their staunch distrust of these weirdoes while nonetheless 
having a confident expectation that they will avoid poisoning food simply out of their 
fear of sanctions. If I am right, then distrust here amounts to the belief that the would-be 
poisoners will not do what they have a commitment to do out of the right sort of motive. 
Interestingly, Hawley—the originator of the commitment view that I have 
assimilated into my own analysis—seems to outright deny that anticipating motives plays 
a role in trusting. ―To be trustworthy in some specific respect, it is enough to behave in 
accordance with one‘s commitment, regardless of motive.‖47 But Hawley‘s view is highly 
problematic as the cases at hand demonstrate. Furthermore, Hawley‘s argument for 
adopting this position is clearly flawed. Working in the context of her commitment view 
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she says, ―You may trust me to do something because you believe both that I have a 
commitment to do it, and that I will do it, without believing that I will do it because of 
my commitment. Maybe I am motivated by pure enthusiasm.‖ She concludes from the 
premise that since there is a motive besides the desire to meet one‘s commitment (i.e., 
enthusiasm) that can suffice for trustworthiness that therefore, ―to be trustworthy in some 
specific respect, it is enough to behave in accordance with one‘s commitment, regardless 
of motive.‖48 I agree with her premise but think the fallacy in moving from that premise 
to her conclusion is evident.  
First, let me say why I agree with Hawley‘s premise. After showing that the 
fantasizing employer and the would-be poisoners can be relied upon to do certain actions 
they have commitments to do in the absence of trust, I could have advanced the following 
version of my confidence view to explain this.  
 
 The Confidence View (the “motivated by commitment” version) 
A trusts B to do X only when (i) A is confident that B would fulfill his 
commitment to do X if B had a commitment to do X and (ii) A is confident B 
would be motivated by the fact that he has a commitment to do X. 
 
But while such a view may help make some sense of why the fantasizing employer and 
would-be poisoners are not to be trusted (since they do not seem to care much that they 
made commitments), I do not think this will do as a general requirement on trust. The 
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problem here is strongly akin to a familiar problem facing Kantian ethics. Just as most 
philosophers think it a mistake for Kant to make acting out of a sense of duty a necessary 
condition for moral behavior, it seems a mistake to make expecting someone to act out of 
a sense of commitment-meeting a necessary condition for trusting. Sometimes, for 
example, I trust my wife to keep her commitments to me without expecting the weight of 
her commitments to play a motivational role in her actions. I often simply expect her 
loving affections for me to suffice. 
Indeed, trust seems consistent with a broad range of anticipated motives—e.g., 
acting from love, goodwill, a sense of duty or professionalism, wanting to be a person of 
integrity, etc.—but it would be fallacious to conclude along with Hawley that anticipating 
motives is therefore completely irrelevant to trusting. We should be led instead to the 
conclusion that while many anticipated motives are sufficient for trusting, not just any 
motive will do.  
So which anticipated motives are compatible with trusting and which ones are not? 
This is a difficult question, and I purport to only make one suggestion that I think points 
the way forward. I suspect the key to understanding the difference between trusting a 
person to meet his commitment and merely expecting him to meet his commitment in a 
non-trusting way (because of incompatible motivation) lies in the way in which we often 
speak of trust and confidence as having trust and confidence in others. That is, there 
seems to me to be an important difference we are able to capture by saying of a person 
that we have confidence in her that she will do what she has a commitment to do versus 
being able to say only that we have confidence that she will do it.  
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So what are we getting at when we talk about being confident in persons? Since 
persons are often distinguished from non-persons by their capacities for moral agency, I 
think it makes sense to conceive of this as our having a certain expectation of their moral 
characters. Thus I think that to be confident in a person that she will meet her 
commitment is to have an expectation that she will be motivated to meet her commitment 
out of one of her positive moral character traits as opposed to just her fears, lusts, 
obsessions, and the like.
49
 Trusting a spouse to be faithful because you know she loves 
you; trusting a mechanic to provide good service because you know him to be a serious 
professional; trusting a stranger to provide honest directions because you have strong 
inductive evidence of the general goodwill of strangers in such circumstances—all of 
these trustings involve an expectation that the trusted will act out of various positive 
character traits. I suspect this is why it makes sense to say that you are trusting in them.  
I think we can say even in the case where I trust my friend to cover up my 
infidelity that I would be expecting him to do so out of his concern for me and/or out of 
concern to keep his promises. And since I take it that the disposition to be concerned for a 
friend and the disposition to keep one‘s promises are in themselves positive character 
traits, I think it makes sense to say I trust in him to help me if those are the sorts of 
attributes I anticipate he will act out of. But in the cases of the fantasizing employer and 
the would-be poisoners, we can be confident they will do the actions they have 
commitments to do only because of dispositions like lust or fear and hence not out of any 
markedly positive moral attributes. So, I think it would not make sense to say we are 
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confident in such persons to meet those commitments. We are confident that they will do 
certain actions they have commitments to do, but we are not in any way confident in 
them as moral agents; hence, we do not truly trust them to meet those commitments. 
I recognize that this proposal for addressing the anticipated motive issue is rather 
fuzzy. For one thing, I have not said what exactly can and cannot count as a ―positive 
moral attribute.‖ But since I think it clear that anticipated motive plays an important role 
in distinguishing trust because this suggestion seems to me to be on the right track, I will 
include it my ―official‖ analysis of trust in this project. Here is that analysis: 
 
The Confidence View (official version) 
A trusts B to do X = def. A has confidence that B would do X out of a positive 
moral attribute if B had a commitment to do X. 
A Counterexample to the Confidence View? 
I can think of at least one type of case that arguably will not fit into this analysis. I am 
thinking of certain possible situations similar to Holton‘s confidence trickster case except 
they involve relying on others to keep commitments towards third-parties. Recall that 
Hawley‘s response to Holton‘s original case was to say that the confidence trickster 
cannot truly perceive you to have a commitment to handing him your money because 
your decision to hand it over was based on a deception that he himself is aware of. Since 
the view of trust I have endorsed assimilates Hawley‘s commitment component, I could 
respond to Holton‘s case in the same way. I could assert that because the confidence 
trickster does not take you to truly have a commitment to hand over your money, he is a 
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fortiori not confident you will meet a commitment to do so, and so, does not truly trust 
you. 
 But even if Hawley‘s move works in the confidence trickster case, there is a third-
party variant of that sort of case for which it certainly will not work. Suppose that you 
and I are coworkers and that I am desperate to get some cash before I leave the office so 
that I can stop on the way home to purchase drugs to feed my addiction. I know you carry 
cash, and I want it badly. But knowing I am not clever enough to obtain it by any 
confidence trick, I decide to try to steal it from you. Unfortunately, I notice that you are 
especially vigilant when it comes to protecting your cash. But while lurking behind your 
cubicle, I am lucky to overhear a conversation between you and a third coworker named 
Sally. ―I have the fifty bucks I owe you, Sally,‖ you say. To which she replies, ―Thanks, 
but I have no pockets, and I‘m in a rush for a meeting. Please just put it in my top desk 
drawer, and I‘ll get it before I leave.‖ ―Sure thing,‖ you tell her. Ah hah! Now I know 
how to get around your vigilance over your money; because I know you to be a person of 
high integrity, I can just wait for you to fulfill your promise to Sally and then snatch the 
money from her drawer. 
 I expect many readers would want to say that my relying on you to put the money 
in Sally‘s drawer is not really a matter of trust. I suspect this intuition stems from the 
same worry that Holton has in his confidence trickster case. There is just something off-
putting about saying such evil-doers are genuinely trusting their unwitting participants. 
Notice, though, that Hawley‘s way of explaining away Holton‘s confidence-trickster case 
will not work in my office thief case. We cannot say that trust is absent here because I do 
146 
 
not take you to have an actual commitment to put the money in Sally‘s drawer. You do 
have a genuine commitment, and I know you do. After all, I heard you promise Sally to 
put it there, and I have every reason to believe this was a genuine promise not made 
under any confidence-trickster-style pretenses of Sally‘s conniving. Thus if I do not truly 
trust you in such a case, it seems both my and Hawley‘s views of trust are mistaken.  
Before I propose a way around this difficulty, I think we should note that the 
problem likely generalizes to any case that meets the following two conditions: 
 
Condition #1:  
Person A is confident Person B will fulfill a commitment to a third party Person C 
out of a positive moral attribute. 
 
Condition #2:  
Person A relies on Person B to fulfill this commitment to Person C in order that 
he (Person A) can achieve some terrible end. 
 
On my analysis of trust, any case that meets Condition 1 is a case of trust by definition. 
Thus my analysis is in deep trouble if a case that meets Condition 1 and Condition 2 
somehow fails to be a situation of trust.  
It would be no use for me to try to argue that cases meeting Conditions 1 and 2 
are impossible, as the office thief case is a perfectly coherent—and even not very 
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farfetched—case.50 There thus seem to be only two options open to me. One is to add the 
stipulation to my analysis that a case cannot count as a case of third-party trust if 
Condition 2 is met. In other words, trust would be defined as the state of affairs 
consisting in meeting Condition 1 and not meeting Condition 2. The other is a much 
simpler (and likely less ad hoc) solution, and I propose we take it. I say we simply 
maintain that there is genuine trust in any case that meets both conditions. That is, I think 
it makes sense in the end to say I truly trusted you to put your money in Sally‘s drawer 
even though I grant there is something initially off-putting about the idea.  
I am inclined to think our aversion here can be explained away as a result of our 
tendency to fixate on more typical cases of trusting reliance where features that tend to 
accompany trust are present. Typically, for example, when I trust someone to do 
something that I am relying on him to do, I will quite naturally take the participant stance 
towards him even though it is not necessary for trusting reliance that I do so. Clearly, 
though, it would be utter nonsense for me to feel betrayed by you if you end up not 
putting the money in Sally‘s drawer as promised. But as I have already shown, taking the 
participant stance is not always necessary for trust. Recall that it makes good sense to say, 
for example, that I trust my friend to be faithful to his wife even though I would not 
ordinarily think an act of marital unfaithfulness on his part to be a betrayal against me.  
We should say the same thing, I think, about cases that meet Conditions 1 and 2. 
The only difference in such cases is the way in which the trust is used by the truster in the 
formation of his overall plans. When I trust my friend to be faithful to his wife, I do not 
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typically set out to use that confidence to achieve anything of particular benefit for 
myself,
51
 but I am using my confidence in you to keep your promise to Sally in the 
formation of my plan to do a very bad thing. So there is an understandable hesitation in 
calling this ―trust.‖ But upon reflection, I think it makes perfect sense to say trust is 
present in this case. Indeed, I think it makes sense to say that it is precisely because I 
trust you that I have decided to wait for the opportune moment when the money will be 
unguarded in Sally‘s drawer rather than trying to pickpocket you beforehand. I grant that 
it is a shame that an otherwise healthy trust in others can undergird a willingness to rely 
on them to unwittingly assist us in achieving our immoral ends, but I think it too real a 
shame to be defined out of existence by an analysis of trust. For this reason, I also think 
Hawley‘s attempt to explain away Holton‘s confidence trickster case is misguided. I 
think we should say, contra Holton, that the confidence trickster does trust you to keep 
your commitment to him so long as he has the sort of confidence in you that my analysis 
requires. If he uses that trust to take advantage of you, that is a shame, but it is still trust. 
Is the Confidence View at Odds with my Overall Project? 
I ended Chapter 2 by saying we should not evaluate the theist‘s belief that 
gratuitous evils do not exist and her belief that the Assumption of Sufficient Competence 
is false as ordinary cases of propositional assent. This, I said, is because the theist takes 
herself to be trusting a person and not merely holding beliefs. I have since offered an 
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analysis of trusting persons according to which trusting a person just is a matter of 
holding a belief—i.e., believing that a person will do what he has a commitment to do out 
of some positive moral attribute. I thus may seem to have reasoned my way to the 
conclusion that theist‘s phenomenological experience misleads her about her own 
doxastic state. I submit, though, that we can better account for why the theist does not 
feel like her trust amounts to merely holding a belief about God when we examine the 
role played by the various affective states that often accompany trusting beliefs. I think 
there is often something phenomenologically distinct about trusting a person and holding 
more ordinary beliefs because of the way in which our affections are often tied up in our 
trusting beliefs. A failure to trust one‘s loved one, for example, can feel like a failure to 
love. In Chapter 4, I will examine some interesting questions about the epistemic status of 
allowing our affections to undergird our trusts in this way. I will argue that it is at least 
plausible to think that it is sometimes justifiable to allow one‘s trusting beliefs to be 
―skewed‖ by one‘s affections. 
Chapter Summary 
I have argued in this chapter that, in a very basic sense, to trust another person to 
do something is just to have confidence in that person that he would do the act in 
question out of a positive moral attribute if he had a commitment to do it. While I did not 
offer an analysis of ―positive moral attribute,‖ nor an exhaustive list of positive moral 
attributes, I did argue that it is not necessary that the truster expect the trusted to act out 
of a feeling of goodwill in particular or out of an explicit concern for meeting her 
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commitments. I also argued in opposition to most contemporary thinkers on trust that 
genuine trusting (in either of the two core senses) does not require taking the participant 
stance towards the trusted. And perhaps most notable, I argued in opposition to all the 
prominent philosophical views of trust that it is not even partially constitutive of all 
genuine trustings that the truster rely on the trusted to do the action in question. Instead, I 
pointed out that doxastic trust—a most genuine form of trust— is often formed before we 
choose to position ourselves in situations of reliance on others. I also stressed the 
importance of recognizing that we can choose to rely on others even when do not trust 
them in the doxastic sense—and even when we positively distrust them. These choices 
will sometimes be due to our desperation for realizing some state of affairs and our lack 
of better options. Other times, we will have moral reasons to entrust things we value to 
those we distrust as in cases of therapeutic trust. I think an appreciation of these various 
phenomena is crucial in getting clear on how to evaluate the rationality of various trusting 
and distrusting stances on the one hand and various situations of reliance (e.g., 
entrustings) and non-reliance on the other. It should be informative, then, to our 
evaluations of the rationality of the various sorts of trustings and entrustings common in 
religious life in particular. 
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Chapter 4: 
Being Epistemically Partial in Trusting Those We Love 
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Chapter Introduction 
I argued in Chapter 3 that to trust another to do something is, in one primary 
sense, to have a certain type of belief. More specifically, it is to have a predictive 
expectation or ―confidence‖ that the other will (or would) fulfill a commitment out of 
some positive moral attribute. We saw that trust in this sense is not required for deciding 
to entrust things to others nor for choosing to rely on them to perform certain actions, as 
we will sometimes have pragmatic and/or moral reasons for making ourselves and/or 
goods we possess vulnerable to those we do not have confidence in.  
This is instructive for critics of religious followers; it is one thing to argue that it 
is irrational for religious folks to trust God in various ways and quite another thing to 
argue that it is irrational for them to rely on him to do certain things or to entrust certain 
goods into his care. I expect some critics of religious believers have overlooked this 
point. That is, I expect some have in mind that religious believers are being highly 
irrational in being willing to entrust various goods—e.g., their time, energy, life goals, 
etc.—to their ―God‖ and to rely on Him to meet certain needs in light of the evidence 
from inscrutable evils against this ―God‘s‖ trustworthiness.1 But even on the assumption 
that inscrutable evils really do render it epistemically unjustifiable to trust God, it does 
not follow that entrusting one‘s time and energy to him, for example, is irrational. Recall 
that the rationality of entrusting a valued good is often determined by pragmatic and/or 
moral considerations. So for it to be established that all religious entrustings are irrational 
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 I ask my reader to remember our working assumption that these folks can at least be justified in believing 
that God (as defined in the minimal sense of Chapter 3) exists. 
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(as opposed to religious doxastic trustings), it would need to be clear that all religious 
believers are always either forsaking some important pragmatic advantages or flouting 
important moral duties when they entrust something valuable to God. But it is certainly is 
not obvious that this is the case. If anything, many of their religious entrustings seem to 
provide them pragmatic benefits (e.g., piece of mind) and many seem morally admirable 
(e.g., spending time in petitionary prayer for the needs of others). Thus the unfriendly 
atheist does well to keep his critical sights set on doxastic religious trustings—the state of 
believing God will come through for one in various ways—when making his case for 
their being irrational.   
So the really interesting question is about the epistemology of religious (doxastic) 
trust. To rely on God to take care of us when there seems to one to be no other hope is 
one thing, but to actually believe that he takes adequate care of us is quite another. 
Surely, one might think, religious believers do not have sufficient reason to trust God to 
manage the world‘s sufferings properly given that the world contains so much inscrutable 
suffering.  
In order to evaluate whether this position is correct, it would help to articulate an 
account of the justification conditions for trust more generally. But given that to trust (in 
the relevant sense) is just to hold a certain type of belief, a full-blown account of its 
justification conditions would likely require a theory of epistemically justified belief as 
such. And it is certainly beyond the scope of this dissertation to solve that age-old 
problem. I think my time can be better spent, then, by focusing in this chapter on one 
particular difficulty that the epistemology of trusting beliefs faces that the epistemology 
154 
 
of many other beliefs does not. That difficulty can be expressed as follows: people tend to 
disproportionally trust those whom they have certain affections for. That is, the more you 
like a person, or the more you love a person, or the more devoted you are to her, the more 
your beliefs about her abilities and character seem to be skewed in her favor.  
The doxastic practice of forming beliefs that favor those you deeply care about 
has recently been dubbed by one philosopher as the practice of ―epistemic partiality,‖2 
and a budding conversation is emerging in the philosophical literature about whether the 
practice can be epistemically justifiable. I will survey that discussion here with the intent 
of advancing a modest thesis. I aim only to show that is at least plausible to think that 
epistemic partiality can be epistemically justifiable even when such partiality results in 
beliefs that are not proportioned strictly to the evidence. In advancing this thesis, I will 
make use of some arguments that my reader may well find less analytically rigorous than 
the arguments in my previous chapters. I ―trust‖ that my reader will afford me some 
leniency in that respect since the thesis I wish to substantiate here is modest and the 
territory I am treading has not yet been thoroughly explored. After arguing that it is at 
least plausible that these practices can be epistemically justifiable, I will be in position in 
my final chapter to argue that though this thesis is modest in its own right, its acceptance 
opens up a new and promising avenue for philosophers of religion who wish to debate 
whether religious believers can be justified in trusting God to prevent gratuitous evils.  
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 This term comes from Sarah Stroud, ―Epistemic Partiality in Friendship,‖ Ethics 116, no. 3 (2006): 498-
524. 
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Epistemic Partiality: Some Preliminaries 
When is trusting epistemically justified? One may expect that the answer to this 
question is no more challenging than the question of when any other sort of belief is 
justified. After all, to be justified in trusting a person on my analysis of trust would just 
mean that one is justified in holding certain beliefs about that person‘s commitments, 
abilities, and character traits, and such beliefs might seem to be rather ordinary sorts of 
beliefs to hold. Thus it might be natural to suspect that the justification for one‘s trusting 
beliefs would be obtained in the very same way that justification for other rather ordinary 
beliefs are obtained (however exactly that works) and would likewise be defeated by 
counterevidence in the very same way that other ordinary beliefs can be defeated by 
counterevidence. But there is a significant reason to think that trusting beliefs pose a very 
special problem for epistemologists. Trusting beliefs often occur within the confines of 
close personal relationships, and some philosophers have claimed that members of such 
relationships ought to be very careful about how evidence-centrically they approach the 
formation and sustaining of certain beliefs about their loved ones‘ abilities and 
characters. These philosophers argue that being a good partner in such a relationship 
often demands a form of epistemic partiality—i.e., a biasing of one's doxastic faculties in 
the partner's favor when it comes to forming and/or sustaining such beliefs. I will turn to 
a critical examination of reasons that have been offered for and against this thesis. 
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Trust and Affections in Intimate Relationships 
People in intimate relationships have strong affections for each other. These 
include affections like love (insofar as love is an affection), a passionate concern for the 
other‘s good, empathy, and an acute sense of loyalty and/or devotion. It should not be 
news to anyone that our affections often affect our judgments about people. When we 
really care about people (or even when we just like them), we tend to interpret data 
concerning them in their favor, and when we dislike someone, we may well interpret data 
in ways that are unfavorable to them. A typical college professor knows full well, for 
example, how difficult it can be to evaluate coursework ―objectively‖ when she simply 
likes some of her students more than others. It is rather easy for her to search for and 
―find‖ a favorable interpretation of a student‘s work when that student is very likeable. 
She looks at that unclear essay the young man has written and begins searching for the 
―elusive insight‖ he must have been trying to grapple with. That approach is much more 
difficult for her to take, though, when the unclear essay is written by a very annoying 
student. It is much easier in that case for her to catch herself thinking simply, ―This kid 
cannot write worth a damn!‖ and then cut the evaluation off there. This goes to show that 
both positive affections like affinity, love, admiration, and devotion and more ―negative‖ 
affections like hate, disgust, and annoyance all sway our cognitive faculties in various 
directions. It takes effort not to be biased by our affections. This, I take it, is a rather 
obvious point about human psychology. 
It is time to return, then, to the connection Karen Jones made between trust and 
the affections. Though I argued that Jones was mistaken in viewing affect as a necessary 
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condition for trust, I think she was quite right to emphasize the prominent role it plays in 
trusting relationships given the present observation that many trusting relationships are 
intimate relationships where affections have powerful sway. Indeed, I suspect many of 
our actual human trustings (but certainly not all of them) are undergirded by strong 
affections we feel towards those we trust. Thus I think the question Jones raises about the 
rationality of sustaining our confidence in others while under the sway of powerful 
affective biases towards them is crucial to arriving at an applicable epistemology of 
everyday trustings. A number of recent philosophers have tried to argue for the 
justifiability of this sort of doxastic biasing in close relationships. And though the recent 
philosophical discussion on the topic does not often talk explicitly about affections, I 
think we will do well to keep in mind that our affections are often the driving forces 
behind these biases. That way, we can easily connect questions about the rationality of 
biases in trusting back to the more general question about the rationality of arriving at 
any judgment under the influence of affection (not that I will be doing that here in this 
project). 
Baker on the Rationality of Trust in Friendship 
Backing up a step, Jones was not the first recent philosopher to notice the way in 
which our beliefs are often skewed in favor of those we care about. This phenomenon 
was the focus of Judith Baker‘s 1987 article, ―Trust and Rationality,‖ one of the first 
publications on trust in the philosophical literature after Baier‘s influential 1986 paper.3 
For whatever reason, Baker‘s paper seems to have been largely overlooked in the ensuing 
                                                 
3
 Judith Baker, ―Trust and Rationality,‖ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 68 (1987): 1-13. 
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scholarly conversation, but it shares much in common with the more recent work on 
epistemic partiality I will soon evaluate. Baker focuses her paper on the sort of trust that 
typically exists between close friends and inquires about the rationality of what seems to 
be a prevalent feature of trust in friendship: People often trust their friends in a way that 
is especially resistant to counterevidence about their friends‘ characters. Baker describes 
a hypothetical case to highlight this phenomenon—a case that, although perhaps more 
extravagant than need be for making her point, seems especially pertinent to the sort of 
connection I want eventually to draw to the religious believer‘s persistent trust in God in 
the face of inscrutable evils. Baker writes,  
 
Suppose I trust a friend who has been accused of wrongdoing, with an impressive 
amount of evidence brought against her…Suppose she is accused of selling 
secrets to a foreign government…If I trust her in such a situation, I do not merely 
stand by her, acting in ways that support her, either materially or emotionally. I 
believe she is innocent. I do not, however, come to believe she is innocent, despite 
the evidence…[W]hat others regard as evidence against her isn‘t considered by 
me as evidence at all. It is not that I close my ears to what people say, or refuse to 
look at, or repress, the facts. I believe that there is an explanation for the alleged 
evidence, for the accusation, which will clear it all up. In advance of hearing the 
case, I am prepared to believe that there is such an explanation. I am biased in 
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favor of my friend, in favor of her innocence. To put it another way, I am 
committed to her being innocent.
4
 
 
It is conceivable that Baker raises the stakes unnecessarily by constructing a case 
involving the daunting threat of being intimated with a person involved with government 
espionage, but we will soon see that more realistic cases are not hard to imagine that 
seem to corroborate Baker‘s claim that doxastic biasing of the sort she describes here is 
rather common in friendship. For now, I only want to note two things. First, it is clear 
that Baker is describing something very close to Jones‘s notion of ―affective optimism‖ 
discussed in Chapter 3. Baker is pre-committed to her friend‘s innocence in a way that 
prevents her from being swayed by what would otherwise be considered a substantial 
amount of counterevidence against her friend‘s trustworthiness. She is committed, as 
Jones would put it, to a ―distinctive way of seeing‖ her friend.5 Second, I think it is 
crucial to take seriously that Baker is talking about a genuine belief state here. That is, 
she is not just pretextually acting as if her friend is innocent; rather she believes her 
friend is innocent, and she believes it in a particularly resistant—one might even say 
―stubborn‖—way.  
This, of course, raises the question of whether such doxastic biasing is justifiable. 
Baker at least thinks it a good thing that she biases her beliefs in her friend‘s favor, and 
so, that it is at the very least morally justifiable. She points out that although this practice 
―runs counter to our general picture of what it is to be rational,‖ we nonetheless ―demand 
                                                 
4
 Baker, ―Trust and Rationality,‖ 3. 
5
 Jones, ―Trust as an Affective Attitude,‖ 11. 
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it of our friends, and we think well of people in general who manifest such trust.‖6 And 
while Baker admits that there are limits to how much evidence against our friends we 
should be willing to push to the side or explain away, she makes clear her view that it is 
characteristic of good friends that their confidence in their friends should not be 
determined solely by their evidence.  
This last point foreshadows a crucial debate in the more recent philosophical 
discussion of epistemic partiality: When asking whether these biases are epistemically 
justifiable, we might try to validate them by virtue of the evidence we have acquired of 
our friends‘ abilities and characters—evidence we do not possess for our non-friends. 
Baker, however, thinks our evidence is insufficient to justify our partialism. As she puts it, 
―Confidence in a friend may well grow as a result of experience, with the growth of the 
friendship itself. But at each stage of a friendship the confidence one has in one‘s friend 
leaps ahead of what we can think of as the evidence supporting it.‖7  
Thus Baker views this ―supra-evidential‖ bias towards her friend as part and 
parcel of engaging in genuinely close friendships. But the question remains: Does this 
mean she thinks that friends are morally obligated to form epistemically unjustified 
beliefs in such cases? While this might be a natural conclusion to draw from her view—
and indeed we will soon see that one recent philosopher draws this conclusion from the 
very same starting premise—Baker herself is averse to the idea that a plausible theory of 
―rationality,‖ by which I assume she means ―epistemic rationality,‖ would deem the 
practice necessarily irrational. This leads her to formulate a very unorthodox theory of 
                                                 
6
 Baker, ―Trust and Rationality,‖ 6. 
7
 Baker, ―Trust and Rationality,‖ 5. 
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rationality that I will discuss later on in this chapter. As we will see, other commentators 
also feel the need to expand our ordinary notions of epistemic norms in unconventional 
ways in order to accommodate at least some of the non-evidence-based epistemic 
partiality we have towards our loved ones. I myself will suggest an original approach 
along these lines at the end of the chapter. My contention at the end of the chapter is that 
these proposals show that it is at least plausible to think that epistemic partiality is 
epistemically justifiable. 
Stroud and Keller on Epistemic Partiality 
The more recent discussion on epistemic partiality began with two independently 
published papers in 2003 and 2004 by Sarah Stroud and Simon Keller respectively. They 
(like Baker) argue that friendship demands doxastic biasing in ways that are at odds with 
traditionally recognized epistemic demands. As Stroud puts it, ―[T]hese differential 
doxastic practices really do constitute partiality or bias and contravene the epistemic 
standards held up by mainstream epistemological theories.‖8 Likewise, for Keller, 
―[E]pistemic norms sometimes conflict with the requirements of a good friendship.‖9 
Their arguments for this view, while quite similar to Baker‘s, have for whatever reason 
caught much more attention from critics. After providing a brief synopsis of Stroud‘s and 
Keller‘s discussions, I will focus on some very recent critiques of their work by 
Katherine Hawley, Troy Jollimore, and Curtis Brown.  
                                                 
8
 Stroud, ―Epistemic Partiality in Friendship, 499. 
9
 Simon Keller, ―Friendship and Belief,‖ Philosophical Papers 33, no 3 (2004): 329 
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Stroud and Keller, like Baker before them, each rest their case on thought 
experiments in which the doxastic demands of a friend in a given situation are to be 
compared with the demands of non-friends. Stroud‘s and Keller‘s cases do have the 
advantage of being a good bit more ordinary than Baker‘s fanciful case. Stroud‘s primary 
case asks you to imagine you are told that your close friend Sam ―recently slept with 
someone and then cruelly never returned any of that person‘s calls, knowingly breaking 
that person‘s heart.‖10 Stroud then compares how an unbiased observer would approach 
that evidence against Sam with how you, as Sam‘s friend, would likely approach it. 
 
Others who hear that story might conclude [about Sam‘s behavior], ―that certainly 
was insensitive‖ or ―what an inconsiderate jerk‖…As a good friend, however, 
your conclusions will likely differ. As a good friend, you will tend to file this 
incident—and Sam‘s behavior generally—under other labels. Your reaction to 
this story might be, for instance, ―There‘s never any artifice with Sam. You know 
where you stand with him: if he doesn‘t want to see you, he makes that 
clear.‖…In a similar vein, what other people might classify as compulsive 
womanizing on Sam‘s part, you might see as irrepressible but fickle enthusiasm 
and appetite for female charm in all its many varieties.
11
  
 
 Stroud, just like Baker, finds this sort of response to counterevidence to be 
characteristic of a good friend. She is quick to note that these responses do not amount to 
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 Stroud, ―Epistemic Partiality in Friendship,‖ 504. 
11
 Stroud, ―Epistemic Partiality in Friendship,‖ 508. 
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total ―blindness‖ toward the new data; rather, she thinks the good friend ―sees the data, 
all right; she just puts a different cast on them…[T]he bias of a good friend will normally 
take the form of casting what she sees or hears in a different light, shading it differently, 
placing it in a different optic, embedding it in a different overall portrait of her friend.‖12 
So a good friend will allow her affections towards her friend to bias her assessment of 
this threatening counterevidence in a way that an unbiased observer would not. That is 
epistemic partialism at its essence. 
 Keller‘s primary case involves a young man named Eric whose good friend, 
Rachel, has asked him to attend her poetry reading at a local café. Eric was previously 
unaware that Rachel had any interest in poetry and has himself attended enough amateur 
readings at that particular café to know that the chances of hearing good poetry on a 
given night are quite low. But Keller thinks that Eric should not base his expectation of 
the quality of Rachel‘s work on this inductive evidence. He writes, 
 
If some stranger were about to give the reading, then Eric would believe that the 
poetry he is about to hear will probably be pretty awful…Seeing as he is 
Rebecca‘s good friend, though, and seeing as he is there to offer her support, he 
ought not, before she takes the stage, have those beliefs about her. He ought not 
be expecting that the poetry about to come out of Rebecca‘s mouth will be 
awful.
13
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 Stroud, ―Epistemic Partiality in Friendship,‖ 508. 
13
 Keller, ―Friendship and Belief,‖ 533. 
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 But not only does Keller think Eric should refrain from expecting Rebecca‘s 
poetry to be in keeping with the statistical norm of his inductive evidence base, Keller 
thinks Eric‘s loyalty to Rebecca ought to shape his assessment of the quality of her poetry 
once Rebecca begins to read it. 
 
If it were a stranger giving the reading, and if Eric were setting out to make an 
accurate judgment about the poetry‘s quality…then he would listen attentively 
and with an open mind, and then form critical and dispassionate 
judgments…Rebecca, however, is a friend, and that seems to be a reason for Eric 
to listen with a more sympathetic ear. In listening as a friend, he will allow the 
poetry to strike him in the best possible light; he‘ll actively seek out its strengths, 
and play down its weaknesses; he‘ll be disposed to interpret it in ways that make 
it look like a stronger piece of work…He should put himself into a situation under 
which it‘s more likely that he‘ll form certain beliefs, but his reason for putting 
himself into that situation is not one that bears upon the likelihood that those 
beliefs are true [emphasis mine].
14
 
 
Thus Stroud and Keller both agree with Baker that friendship requires that we allow 
factors other than evidential considerations to affect our beliefs about our friends. Notice 
that although Stroud and Keller do not explicitly mention trust, they have collectively 
argued that beliefs about our friends‘ characters and beliefs about our friends‘ abilities 
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 Keller, ―Friendship and Belief,‖ 332-3. 
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ought often be biased in our friends‘ favors. And since I have argued that trusting another 
is (in the relevant sense) a matter of holding a belief about her ability and character, their 
arguments will apply quite straightforwardly to concerns about the rationality of trust.  
In what follows, I will call any belief forming practice that aims at forming beliefs 
not solely on evidential grounds a supra-evidential belief-forming practice. Stroud, Keller, 
and Baker collectively claim there are at least three supra-evidential belief forming 
practices that friends ought to engage in. I think it will help to clearly list them: 
 
 Friend-1 ought to refrain from forming unfavorable beliefs about Friend-2‘s 
abilities until the evidence against Friend-2‘s abilities becomes overwhelming.  
 Friend-1 ought to actively seek favorable interpretations of Friend-2‘s behaviors 
as Friend-1 observes those behaviors. 
 Friend-1 ought to assume that a threatening body of counterevidence against 
Friend-2‘s character is defeated by some exonerating explanation even before 
Friend-1 discovers such an explanation (at least when that counterevidence is not 
overwhelming). 
 
It is important to keep in mind claim that the claim that a friend ought to engage in 
these practices does not in any way suggest that most of us will have to work very hard at 
being good friends in this respect. Rather, we often simply ―find ourselves‖ as it were 
with biased beliefs towards those we love. It is the sort of doxastic practice we would 
have to actively try to rid ourselves of if we deemed it undesirable. As John Heil notes, 
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―One simply does not draw certain conclusions about one‘s friends or loved ones in the 
way one draws conclusions about others. This need not be a matter of effort or deliberate 
calculation. Rather, it is, typically at any rate, perfectly natural and unselfconscious.‖15 
So to claim that these are practices we often ought to engage in is just to claim that our 
doxastic faculties are often working just as they should when we are being epistemically 
partial.  
With this in mind, I will now offer a succinct summary of the argument that Baker, 
Stroud, and Keller make about these norms up until the point that they diverge into their 
own disagreements about where to go next. Since the critics of this argument we will 
soon meet all focus on Stroud‘s and Keller‘s presentations of the argument, I will simply 
label it the ―Stroud-Keller Argument‖ in hopes that I have already done my part in 
stressing that Baker‘s presentation of the argument was just as noteworthy. 
 
The Stroud-Keller Argument 
1) Friends ought to engage in supra-evidential partial belief forming practices 
when arriving at or sustaining beliefs about their friends‘ abilities and/or 
characters. 
2) Mainstream epistemological theories do not allow for supra-evidential belief-
forming practices. 
 3) Mainstream epistemic theories do not allow for cases in which a friend  
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 John Heil, ―Believing What One Ought,‖ Journal of Philosophy 80, no. 11 (1983): 762. 
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epistemically ought to engage in supra-evidential partial belief forming 
practices when arriving at or sustaining beliefs about their friends‘ abilities 
and/or characters. 
 4) Either (a) the sense in which friends ―ought‖ to engage in supra-evidential  
partial belief forming practices on behalf of their friends is not an epistemic 
one, or (b) mainstream epistemological theories are mistaken in not allowing 
for supra-evidential belief forming practices such as those demanded by 
friendship.  
 
Baker, Keller, and Stroud all endorse this argument. They only differ on which 
horn of the dilemma expressed in (4) we should accept next. Keller accepts the bleaker 
horn (a) and concludes that we should simply sometimes be ―epistemically irrational‖ for 
our friends, whereas Stroud and Baker opt for horn (b) and look for alternative 
conceptions to the ―mainstream‖ epistemological theories that can accommodate the 
partial doxastic demands of friendship. But let us see first whether we need to make such 
a choice. 
Hawley’s Critique 
Katherine Hawley has very recently taken issue with both premises (1) and (2) of 
the Stroud-Keller argument.
16
 In her case against premise (1), Hawley makes clear that 
she does not want to deny that there are cases in which we ought to think more highly of 
our friends than we would of our non-friends, nor does she want to deny that there are 
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 Katherine Hawley, ―Partiality and Prejudice in Trusting,‖ Synthese (forthcoming).  
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cases in which we ought to handle counterevidence regarding friends and non-friends 
differently. She suggests, though, that these differences in our obligations are due merely 
to the additional evidence we would have in such cases regarding our friends‘ abilities 
and good natures relative to the evidence we would have regarding our non-friends. ―Put 
simply,‖ Hawley asserts, ―we already know a lot about our friends, and this can give us 
good epistemic reason for treating new information about our friends differently from 
new information about our non-friends.‖17 
 Stroud, however, anticipated this objection. She grants that ―an appeal to 
differential information can certainly do some work in explaining and vindicating 
differences in the conclusions we draw about our friends. But I am very doubtful that it 
can do all the work required under the strategy we are now considering.‖18 Stroud offers 
two considerations to support this response. First, she suggests that the objection simply 
fails to appreciate the way in which the demands of friendship call on us to handle 
evidence differently than impartial observers. An impartial observer, she suggests, could 
by hypothesis also have strong inductive evidence of your friend‘s good character but not 
feel the same obligation and drive to interpret the new, potentially contrary evidence in 
such a favorable light.
19
 Second, she calls into question the objectivity of the inductive 
―evidence‖ we generally have about our friends‘ characters. ―[T]hink of how much of 
that ‗knowledge‘ of your friend‘s character may already have been corrupted and slanted 
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 Hawley, ―Partiality and Prejudice in Trusting,‖ (forthcoming). 
18
 Stroud, ―Epistemic Partiality in Friendship,‖ 516. To be clear, by the ―strategy we are now considering,‖ 
Stroud is referring to the affective strategy of handling counterevidence against our friends in a favorable 
light. 
19
 I have taken some interpretive liberties to put Stroud‘s point here in succinct form. I encourage my reader 
to refer to her actual comments in Stroud, ―Epistemic Partiality in Friendship,‖ 515-17. 
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by the interpretive heuristics of the good friend.‖20 This exchange presents us with a core 
issue in the recent debate on epistemic partiality: Can the sort of epistemic partiality we 
ought to engage in within close relationships be justified solely on evidential grounds? 
Stroud has now given us two very compelling reasons to think it cannot. 
 Hawley does not offer a rejoinder, so far as I can tell, to the first of Stroud‘s 
preemptive replies to her objection—i.e., the reply that an equally informed non-friend 
need not be under the same obligation to seek a favorable conclusion as a friend would be. 
This is unfortunate, as this seems to be to be a very good reply to Hawley‘s objection. For 
what it is worth, I will now offer a rather speculative response on Hawley‘s behalf that 
some might find promising.  
 It is conceivable that there are ways in which a non-friend cannot even in 
principle be equally informed relative to a friend about certain aspects of a person‘s 
character. If this is true (and I will argue in a moment that it is plausible), then Hawley 
could claim that the friend‘s added drive to form favorable conclusions toward her friend 
in response to counterevidence might stem from the friend‘s being in the role of the 
privileged possessor of this special body of favorable evidence.  
 I do think it plausible to suspect that being in a close relationship with a person 
can provide a unique sort of evidence about her that could not even in principle be 
possessed by an impartial (i.e., uninvolved) third party. Here is a fanciful thought 
experiment that helps supports this suggestion. Imagine that some psychologist has used 
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 Stroud, ―Epistemic Partiality in Friendship,‖ 516. This second reply is quite similar to one Baker makes 
in anticipating Hawley‘s objection. Recall Baker‘s view that ―Confidence in a friend may well grow as a 
result of experience…But at each stage of a friendship the confidence on has in one‘s friend leaps ahead of 
what we can think of as the evidence supporting it.‖ Baker, ―Trust and Rationality,‖ 5. 
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me for the last decade as an unwitting subject in his research project on the development 
of romantic love. Knowing that I was a consummate bachelor back in my college days, 
he chose me then as a perfect subject for his project and managed to implant a teeny 
camera and microphone in my forehead one night after I passed out after a wild party.
21
 
He has closely monitored all of my social interactions ever since. Thus he was ―present‖ 
when I finally met my wife-to-be, and he has observed our interactions throughout all the 
moments we have shared together since. He ―saw‖ everything I saw and ―heard‖ 
everything I heard in interacting with her. Yet it seems plausible to me to say that there 
will be things about her that he has been unable to observe by virtue of his not being 
himself in a loving relationship with her.  
 Indeed, it seems plausible to me that the connection between me and my wife 
itself might enable me to see something important about her that he cannot see. No doubt, 
the psychologist might (as seems likely enough to me) begin to love my wife after his 
many years of close observation of her, but he still will not himself be in an active love 
relationship with her. I think it plausible, then, that he could thereby miss out on some 
private evidence about her that I am privy to no matter how closely he observed her. 
Furthermore, I suspect this private evidence could afford me a tacit knowledge about my 
wife‘s character that I could not even share with him if I tried (e.g., the knowledge that 
her character is inconsistent with her freely engaging in a certain sort of action). If so, 
then this knowledge about her would be in principle unobtainable from outside the 
bounds of a close relationship with her. 
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 If my mom should be reading this, I encourage her to look up what philosophers mean by ―thought 
experiments.‖ 
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 There are three primary steps in my case for thinking it plausible that a lover can 
obtain tacit evidence-based justification for trusting his beloved that an impartial observer 
could not even in principle obtain. First, it is widely recognized among epistemologists 
that there is a distinction between knowing a person as such and having propositional 
knowledge about a person.
22
 Second, the non-propositional content involved in knowing 
a person will likely often be tacit since it is hard to express non-propositional content in 
sentences.
23
 Third, it makes sense to me to think that some of this non-propositional 
acquaintance knowledge of a person can only be obtained via interactive acquaintance 
with that person within the context of a close relationship. So, it seems plausible to me 
that the psychologist in my thought experiment can fail to know my wife in certain 
relevant respects given that his acquaintance with her is only one-sided and hence fail to 
know that she is trustworthy in some respect. Putting all this together, then, we have at 
least one way to suggest that the added sense of obligation the lover feels to resist the 
weight of new counterevidence (even relative to a well-informed, neutral observer) could 
after all be based on his possession of additional evidence. Indeed, it may well be that 
something like this tacit awareness of private evidence is often behind the lover‘s 
common decree, ―If only you knew her like I do.‖ 
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 See for example Jeremy Fantl‘s opening line in Jeremy Fantl, "Knowledge How", The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), ed., Edward N. Zalta. URL = 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/knowledge-how/: 
It is common in epistemology to distinguish among three kinds of knowledge. There's the kind of 
knowledge you have when it is truly said of you that you know how to do something—say, ride a 
bicycle. There's the kind of knowledge you have when it is truly said of you that you know a 
person—say, your best friend. And there's the kind of knowledge you have when it is truly said of 
you that you know that some fact is true—say, that the Red Sox won the 2004 World Series. 
23
 I say ―often‖ instead of ―always‖ because I want to grant the possibility of communicating non-
propositional knowledge by way of telling stories and the like.  
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 Again, I recognize it is speculative to suggest that epistemic partiality can be 
grounded in these sorts of evidential considerations, but it is at least worth noting that if 
this speculation were sound, it would be rather important for the epistemology of trust, as 
it would seem to have the more general implication that impartial observers will 
sometimes (perhaps often) be ill-prepared to make certain types of character judgments 
about others if they have not themselves interacted with them in the context of a close 
relationship. The upshot would be that a certain amount of epistemic humility is called 
for when making judgments about the rationality of someone‘s trust in a person P when 
one has not personally interacted heavily with P. 
 Putting this speculation aside, let us return to Stroud‘s second reply to Hawley‘s 
objection. According to that second reply, we cannot ground epistemic partiality solely 
on our inductive evidence of our friends‘ abilities and characters, because the so-called 
―evidence‖ we have of them will itself be skewed by the demands of the friendship over 
time. Hawley does offer us a direct rejoinder to this reply. She claims that Stroud‘s move 
here, 
 
…seems to ignore the extent to which becoming friends is typically a gradual 
process. We have not always been friends with our friends, and only gradually 
take on the obligations—whatever they are—of the good friend. So earlier beliefs 
about our friend‘s behavior may have been less ‗corrupted and slanted‘, and thus 
can provide some grounds for our current opinions.
24
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 I suspect that even if we grant Hawley‘s claim that our evidence of our friends‘ 
characters is generally objective in the early stages of friendship, this will be insufficient 
to undermine Stroud‘s claim that our overall assessment of our friends‘ characters and/or 
abilities will often at some point become skewed in our friends‘ favors relative to the 
assessments an impartial observer would make to the same bodies of evidence we possess. 
Indeed, it seems clear to me that our beliefs about our friends and loved ones often are 
biased in this way. We often think we should trust our loved ones ―against the odds‖ so to 
speak—i.e., to trust them even when our trust is not proportioned strictly to the evidence. 
Thus I am much less eager than Hawley to attempt to justify epistemic partiality by 
explaining it away as an evidentially-based practice after all.  
 When we trust our loved ones ―against the odds,‖ we are singling them out as 
special. We are saying in effect, ―Yes, I recognize that people in evidential situations like 
mine are very often trusting people who turn out not to be trustworthy, but I still trust my 
loved one to be among the trustworthy.‖ And isn‘t that what we should do? Shouldn‘t we 
give our loved ones the benefit of the doubt so long as the evidence against them is not 
overwhelming? Failing to trust someone you deeply love and who deeply loves you when 
they have not actually wronged you is extremely unfortunate. I can imagine my wife, for 
example, being innocent of some charge against her and then discovering with dismay 
that I did not trust her to be innocent due to some body of evidence that was sufficient to 
garner distrust in her by an impartial observer. That is a painful thought for me. I want 
her to know that my trust in her is stronger than that—that I am able to keep trusting her 
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even if there is evidence out there that would compel an impartial observer not to. And I 
think she would be completely justified in feeling let down by me if this were not my 
natural stance towards her. Thus I agree with Baker, Stroud, and Keller then that we are 
often supposed to be doxastically loyal to those we love in ways that are not purely 
evidentially based—at least to an extent.      .  
 It is starting to sound more and more like I envision the demands of morality are 
trumping the demands of epistemology in such cases. This is precisely why Stroud and 
Keller endorse premise (2) in the Stroud-Keller argument. Given that the demands of 
close relationships push us to accept conclusions that may not be acceptable on their 
evidence alone, it would seem that these demands run counter to the twin goals of 
pursuing truths and avoiding falsehoods held paramount by widely-accepted epistemic 
norms. Hawley, Curtis Brown, and Troy Jollimore, however, have all argued that there 
are mainstream epistemological views that could actually accommodate this phenomenon.  
 Hawley admits that her objection to premise (1) of the Stroud-Keller argument 
may not be decisive, and so, she takes up the question of whether, assuming for the sake 
of argument the demands of friendship do sometimes require us to engage in supra-
evidential belief-forming practices, these demands must be viewed as being in conflict 
with mainstream epistemic norms. [This was premise (2) of the Stroud-Keller Argument.] 
Hawley claims that these friendship norms (if they exist) could be considered consistent 
with epistemic norms so long as we reject the epistemic doctrine of Uniqueness.  
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Uniqueness 
Given one‘s total evidence, there is a unique rational doxastic attitude that one can 
take to any proposition. 
 
Hawley is herself attracted to rejecting this doctrine. She writes, 
 
Different people—and the same person in different moods—can reasonably differ 
in their doxastic policies. Some people are somewhat quicker to belief than others 
are, some put more weight on the evidence of their own senses than others do, 
some are more skeptical about testimony than others are…We are all familiar 
with situations in which there is more than one conclusion which could 
reasonably be drawn, even against the same background assumptions.
25
 
 
Thus Hawley thinks that even if we grant Stroud and Keller that the demands of 
friendship obligate us to jump to favorable conclusions of our friends‘ characters and 
abilities in ways that are not strictly dictated by the evidence, this does not mean that 
friendship requires us to engage in epistemically unjustified practices, so long, that is, as 
Uniqueness is false. And given, as Hawley seems to assume, that the denial of 
Uniqueness is at least a respectable move among mainstream epistemologists, it seems to 
follow that premise (2) of the Stroud-Keller argument is false.  
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 There are two possible replies to Hawley‘s objection to (2). The first is to argue 
that the denial of Uniqueness is not really consistent with mainstream epistemological 
norms after all. There are certainly some very harsh extant criticisms of this move in the 
epistemological literature, but there are also enough mainstream epistemologists who 
deny Uniqueness to seem to validate Hawley‘s position that the position is consistent 
with some mainstream epistemic norms.
26
 The second reply would be to argue that 
merely denying Uniqueness in the way that many mainstream epistemologists do is not 
sufficient to accommodate the full range of cases of epistemic partiality that Stroud and 
Keller have in mind. After all, one can reject Uniqueness simply because one thinks there 
are cases in which a body of evidence is equally consistent with more than one view and 
that a person is, therefore, epistemically permitted to accept either of those views 
depending on which one strikes him as true. This is one way of interpreting the Hawley 
quote above. The evidence as such does not always dictate what features of the case are 
most pertinent (e.g. the sensory evidence or the testimonial evidence) or what precise 
degree of confidence we should place in the conclusions we draw, and so, the evidence as 
such is consistent with multiple reasonable judgments.  
 But I expect Stroud and Keller would say that the demands of friendship 
sometimes obligate us to adopt views that are not ―equally consistent‖ with the evidence 
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in this way. I think they mean to say that friends ought to sometimes believe well about 
their friends even when it would be irrational for a well-informed non-friend to do so. So 
the good friend in such cases, is not just forming one conclusion among others that the 
―evidence‖ (in an objective sense) equally permits but one that is less supported by that 
evidence. If I am right, then Stroud and Keller will not think the mere denial of 
Uniqueness is sufficient to resolve the conflict between the doxastic demands of close 
relationships and mainstream epistemological norms.  
 To her credit, the Hawley quote above could be interpreted in such a way that 
extends epistemic permissiveness beyond cases where evidence is equally consistent with 
more than one view, but I am not sure that most of the mainstream epistemologists who 
deny Uniqueness are willing to go that far. Thus it becomes less and less clear that we 
can call the move needed to validate Stroud and Keller‘s partial norms a ―mainstream‖ 
move simply by pointing out that several philosophers reject Uniqueness. This does not 
mean, of course, that we should not be willing to consider a view that is not mainstream, 
but we are currently evaluating objections to premise (2) of the Stroud-Keller argument—
objections which are trying to avoid the conclusion that non-mainstream theories are our 
only hope in justifying epistemic partiality. 
Brown’s Critique 
 Curtis Brown has recently criticized premise (2) of the Stroud-Keller argument by 
arguing for a ―mainstream‖ way in which a judgment about a friend‘s ability or character 
could be epistemically justified even if it is not as consistent (in an objective sense) with 
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the evidence as is an alternative judgment.
27
 Brown argues that on a subjective Bayesian 
epistemology—a respectable mainstream epistemological view as he sees it—one could 
deem the Stroud-Keller supra-evidential doxastic practices as perfectly justifiable. Brown 
likens the partial practices of friends to certain investigative practices common among 
scientists.  
 
[C]onsider the case of a scientist who hypothesizes that H, but has not yet 
subjected H to empirical test. It seems that the scientist might have many reasons 
to look with favor on H. One reason might simply be that H is the scientist‘s 
creation, and she is inclined to look favorably on her own creations. A different 
reason might be that she has a hunch that H is true, a hunch that is not based on 
evidence…it seems entirely epistemically reasonable for a scientist to have a 
more positive attitude toward H than toward rival hypotheses, even if there is as 
yet no relevant evidence…28 
 
 It is crucial to Brown‘s view that the degree of credence the scientist gives to H 
prior to his evidential investigation is effectively irrelevant to an assessment of the 
rationality of his position at any point in the investigation of the evidence.  
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It is a staple of Bayesian epistemology that priors can legitimately be determined 
in a variety of ways. They may be the result of evaluating prior evidence…But 
this is not essential. My prior might also be based on a hunch, or even bias or 
prejudice. From the point of view of determining whether I am assessing the 
evidence rationally, what matters is not the prior probability I assign to a 
hypothesis , but rather whether I update that probability appropriately given the 
nature of the evidence [emphasis mine].
29
 
 
 Brown‘s extreme permissivism with regards to priors is highly controversial even 
among Bayesians. I suppose it is fair to say, though, that he is working with a 
―mainstream‖ epistemological theory for whatever that is worth. Thus if he can 
demonstrate that an application of this theory to the Stroud-Keller cases yields no clash 
between (his) Bayesian epistemic norms and the norms of friendship, he will have given 
us a compelling reason to reject (2) of the Stroud-Keller argument, and we can finally put 
to rest the worry that there is simply no live option in contemporary epistemology for 
justifying these practices. In applying his Bayesian view to the Stroud-Keller cases, 
Brown argues that 
 
Stroud and Keller both stress that friends will not only begin with a more 
favorable assessment than a neutral observer might have but will also respond 
differently to new evidence…But a crucial point that Stroud and Keller seem to 
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miss…is that it is entirely rational for two people to assign different posterior 
probabilities to a hypothesis after assessing the same evidence, provided they had 
different prior probabilities for the hypothesis before taking the new evidence into 
account. It seems to me that this simple fact is enough to account for the 
responses to evidence of the friends in their stories.
30
 
 
 As Brown sees it, it can be totally reasonable for two people to form different 
conclusions after looking at the same body of evidence due to the epistemic legitimacy of 
bringing your priors into the investigation—even if those priors are steeped in one‘s 
affective biases. Brown illustrates his point by returning to Stroud's case of your friend, 
Sam, who is reported to have been rude to someone he met at a party.  
 
Let us suppose that the friend [i.e., you] assigns a prior probability of .9 to the 
hypothesis that Sam always acts honorably. And let us suppose that an ―objective‖ 
or disinterested observer would assign a prior probability of .5 to the same 
hypothesis since the disinterested observer has no reason, epistemic or otherwise, 
to favor one belief or the other...Now, suppose that both the friend and the 
disinterested observer agree that the probability of someone [being as rude as Sam 
was reported as being], given they always act honorably, is fairly low, say .3. And 
suppose they also agree that the probability of someone who doesn't always act 
honorably [being as rude as Sam was reported as being] is much higher, say .7. If 
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both the friend and the disinterested observer update the probability they assign to 
the hypothesis in accordance with Bayes‘ Theorem, they will end up with very 
different results. The friend will assign the hypothesis a posterior probability 
of .79, while the disinterested observer will assign it a posterior probability 
of .3.
31
 
 
The numbers in the case are of course completely arbitrary, but they demonstrate how 
two people can agree about how a body of evidence bears on a situation—i.e., how 
probable it is on some hypothesis—while disagreeing in their overall conclusions due to 
the differing doxastic commitments with which they began. And if Brown is right that 
epistemic justification should be considered only in terms of making accurate judgments 
about how probable a body of evidence is on some hypothesis and updating one‘s 
probability assessments accordingly, then he has demonstrated that the differences 
between two people‘s priors can explain why friends and non-friends can rationally come 
to different conclusions even when the evidence as such (i.e., independent of non-
evidential priors) favors one of those conclusions more than the other.  
 Thus a husband‘s affections for his wife will often lead him to assign a much 
higher prior to the hypothesis that she is innocent of a charge of infidelity than the 
impartial observer would assign. Both can then examine the evidence against her and 
agree that the body of evidence is more consistent with the conclusion that she is cheating 
than the conclusion that she is faithful while still rationally disagreeing over which 
                                                 
31
 Brown, ―Friendships,‖ 111-2. 
182 
 
conclusion to accept. Brown‘s approach, then, provides a richer case for epistemic 
partialism than can the mere denial of Uniqueness. What is epistemically justifiable for 
one to conclude about one‘s total evidence is not just determined by the evidence but by 
the combination of one‘s evidence and one's unique priors. And favorable priors assigned 
on the basis of affection are epistemically appropriate so far as Brown is concerned. 
 Brown recognizes that there are two other forms of epistemic partiality 
encouraged by Stroud and Keller that go beyond having favorable priors, and he thinks 
these can also be deemed epistemically appropriate in the spirit of his Bayesian 
framework. ―The first,‖ he says, ―is the possibility that people will more assiduously seek 
out alternative hypotheses to explain evidence that might appear to support negative 
conclusions about their friends than they would for non-friends.‖ And the second is that 
―a friend may also be motivated to look harder for evidence by means of which to test 
those hypotheses.‖32 Brown quickly deems these partial practices epistemically justifiable 
by parity of reasoning of what we should conclude about scientists who propose and test 
new hypotheses to explain away evidence that threaten their ―pet theories.‖ 
 
[W]e would not be surprised or critical if a scientist works harder at testing her 
own theories than those of others, so long as she does not fudge the data and 
properly updates her assessment of the theory in light of it. If this behavior is 
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epistemically rational for a scientist, then it seems that the similar behavior of 
friends is also epistemically rational.
33
 
  
All in all, Brown concludes that we can agree with Stroud and Keller that friendship often 
encourages us to be epistemically partial in our friends' favors without agreeing with 
Keller that there is necessarily anything epistemically unjustifiable about our belief-
forming practices and without agreeing with Stroud that nothing in mainstream 
epistemology can accommodate this conclusion. 
 But what if, as seems most reasonable, one does not find it very plausible that just 
any old prior is epistemically legitimate? Here it might seem less important whether we 
agree that a mainstream epistemological theory says all priors are legitimate and more 
important whether we should agree that they are. I do not have space here to fully enter 
into debates over the merits and demerits of Brown‘s highly subjective Bayesianism, so I 
think it more helpful to propose some reasons to think that there is something special 
about ―high-trust‖ priors that could plausibly make them justifiable even if we reject the 
view that all priors are legitimate. Indeed, I think a compelling case can be made for 
thinking they can. But I have one final critical take on premise (2) of the Stroud-Keller 
argument to cover first, which will also be useful in helping to make the sort of case I 
want to make. 
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Jollimore’s Critique 
 Troy Jollimore has recently published an excellent philosophical treatise on the 
nature of love in which he argues that love is primarily a certain way of viewing the 
beloved.
34
 He devotes a full chapter entitled ―Love‘s Friendly Eye‖ to the issue of 
epistemic partiality raised by Stroud and Keller. His thesis is that epistemic partiality is 
often consistent with mainstream epistemic norms after all because partial epistemic 
practices are often better ways to arrive at the truth in a given situation than impartial 
epistemic practices.  
 
[T]he view that love typically stands in the way of our coming to true beliefs 
about the world is not only false but, in an important sense, the opposite of truth. 
For part of what love offers is a way of seeing the world that makes possible 
insights and understandings that cannot be achieved through less involved, more 
dispassionate modes of engagement. Rather than standing in opposition to proper 
standards of epistemic rationality, then, love offers its own epistemic approach, 
one that is apt to be mischaracterized as epistemically faulty precisely because it 
poses a genuine challenge to the allegedly objective standards that are sometimes, 
wrongly, assumed to represent epistemic rationality itself.
35
 
 
 What sorts of insights and understandings does Jollimore more specifically have 
in mind? His primary focus is on the sort of case Stroud (and Baker) offered involving 
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the partial handling of counterevidence about our loved ones‘ characters. He points out 
that sometimes our loved ones really do have exonerating excuses for threatening 
counterevidence, and if we are not passionately devoted to their cause, we may miss out 
on discovering the truth about their situation. And while he grants that ―the tendency to 
assume the best of a person may indeed lead us astray‖ in some cases, it is his contention 
that this fact must be checked against the fact that ―the tendency not to assume the best, 
to abandon too quickly the effort of seeking an explanation that can rationalize 
someone‘s behavior and render it intelligible and even admirable, can also act as an 
impediment to our efforts to form a truer picture of the world.‖36 In other words, both 
partial and impartial epistemic practices are sometimes a help and sometimes a hindrance 
to truth-seeking. 
 Jollimore even goes so far as to suggest that partial epistemic practices cannot 
only be ―justifiable and admirable‖ but that it is rather unfortunate that we ordinarily 
refrain from engaging in these practices outside of our close relationships. We do so, he 
thinks, ―not because [partial epistemic practices] are inherently flawed or less likely to 
get at the truth [than impartial practices]…but simply because they are too costly for us to 
incorporate them into universal policies.‖37 In other words, it would be too much for us to 
pursue favorable interpretations of the evidence we come across concerning everyone, 
and this is a bit of a shame as Jollimore sees it. Consider this description he gives of the 
unfortunate sort of impartial doxastic practices we often engage in outside the contexts of 
our close relationships. 
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It is very easy, when thinking about the actions of strangers of whose conduct we 
disapprove, to conclude that they had no reason whatsoever for their behavior and 
did what they did simply because they were selfish, insensitive, cruel, or in some 
other way bad, and that there is nothing more to be said of the matter. It is much 
more difficult to reach such a conclusion with respect to a person one knows well 
or whose perspective on life one manages to imaginatively occupy. But 
explanations like ―He is just a bad person,‖ although they do sometimes capture 
part of the moral truth of a situation, very rarely succeed in capturing all of it.
38
 
 
Jollimore concludes from this that partial epistemic practices cannot be dismissed as 
irrational since ―the fact that love encourages us to see our beloveds in a different way 
from the way in which others see them does not suggest that we are seeing them 
inaccurately—if anything, we may be seeing them more accurately than anyone else.‖39 
 As attracted as I am to Jollimore‘s approach, I worry he muddies the waters a bit 
in a few key places. First, he seems to move too quickly from the premise that partial 
epistemic practices are sometimes truth-conducive to his conclusion that engaging in 
them is therefore epistemically justifiable. If it is still open to argue that, on the whole, 
impartial investigations tend to give us a truer conception of someone‘s conduct and 
character than partial investigations, then the fact that there are exceptions in which the 
partial investigations would have done a better job would not be enough to argue from 
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the grounds of truth-conduciveness alone that these practices are epistemically justifiable 
in any given case. So Jollimore needs to either provide us reason for thinking that these 
practices are truth-conducive at least as often as impartial practices or else provide an 
account as to how it is that one could reasonably expect a partial practice to be truth-
conducive in a given case if such practices are not truth-conducive in the majority of 
cases.  
 Second, Jollimore seems to overstate the case for thinking it a shame that we do 
not pursue partial epistemic practices with regards to everyone. It is not for a mere lack of 
resources that we do not extend these practices across the board. Many partial epistemic 
practices would simply be incompatible with each other, and so, could not be mutually 
pursued. For example, when an accuser offers counterevidence against my wife‘s fidelity, 
I cannot simultaneously engage in a biased epistemic practice aiming to sustain my trust 
in my wife and a biased epistemic practice aimed at vindicating the accuser in his giving 
a reliable testimony. Those two partial practices are mutually exclusive, and it would be 
weird from the partialist‘s point of view for me to regret that after having engaged in my 
partial practice on behalf of my wife I did not have the mental resources left over to do 
my best in validating my wife‘s accuser too. I fear this point has more than trivial import 
for Jollimore‘s argument. If, as seems plausible, it is true for any partial epistemic 
practice PEP1 one might engage in that one could engage in another partial epistemic 
practice PEP2 that aims to discover truths incompatible with the truths PEP1 aims to 
discover, then I do not see how we can justify the use of any actual partial epistemic 
practices (e.g., PEP1) by pointing out merely that some partial practice or another will be 
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truth-conducive much of the time. It seems instead we would need a deeper account of 
why a person would be justified in engaging in the particular partial practice he engages 
in in a given case rather than one that would have biased him in the opposite direction. I 
do not claim that no such account is available, but I do not think it can be based on the 
occasional truth-conduciveness of partial practices as such. So far as Jollimore‘s 
argument goes, PEP1 and PEP2 stand an equal chance of being truth-conducive. But 
since they run in opposite directions, either of these practices is just as likely to bias one 
away from the truth as it is towards it. Hence one might well think that any agent 
concerned with engaging in a truth-conducive practice would be better off choosing an 
impartial investigation over either of these partial ones. 
 Third, that rhetorically compelling comparison Jollimore makes between the 
earnest partial epistemic practices we engage in on behalf of our loved ones and the 
rather lazy impartial practices we often engage in for strangers is highly misleading. We 
cannot justify our partial epistemic practices by comparing them to certain impartial 
practices that would be deemed unjustifiable even on impartial standards. After all, lazily 
condemning the behavior of strangers in the way Jollimore describes, while no doubt 
common in human practices, is not necessary to nor recommended by the impartial 
approach. An impartial observer in the sort of case Jollimore describes could just as 
easily take the high road and recognize that there is likely a deeper story behind the 
stranger‘s behavior than simply his ―being a bad person.‖ Clearly, the best-possible-light 
favoritism of the partialist is not needed to arrive at this more reasonable view. Thus 
Jollimore‘s comparison offers us little reason to think that partialism is on the whole more 
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truth conducive than the more careful sort of impartialism just described. And those of us 
who seek to vindicate epistemic partialism would also do well to note that this more 
careful sort of impartial practice, unlike our more demanding partial practices, is well 
within our resources to engage in across the board. 
 In sum, among the objections from the recent literature made against premise (2) 
in the Stroud-Keller argument, Brown‘s Bayesian argument seems to me to be the most 
promising way of arguing that supra-evidential partial practices can be justified by 
mainstream epistemological norms. But as I suggested, it might well be pushing it to say 
Brown‘s view is mainstream, and I doubt many will feel compelled to endorse the 
epistemic justifiability of partialism if Brown‘s extremely subjective Bayesianism is the 
only way to accommodate it. I now want to see, then, if there are any markedly non-
mainstream theories that could stand a decent shot at justifying the partial doxastic norms 
of friendship or whether we should agree with Keller that these practices are simply 
epistemically unjustifiable (even though he thinks we ought to engage in them anyway). I 
will now survey the proposals offered by Stroud and Baker before offering one of my 
own. 
Stroud’s Call for Revising Mainstream Epistemology 
 After having claimed that epistemic partial practices in friendship do not conform 
well to any of the mainstream epistemological theories, Stroud points out that others have 
raised a parallel problem with respect to mainstream moral theories. It has been argued 
there that since friendship and the partial behaviors it requires are necessary for living a 
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good life, any moral theory that cannot accommodate the partial demands of friendship is 
an unacceptable theory. Moral theorists who take this approach are thus willing to 
concede that the immense value of friendship means that we must let its demands give 
shape to the larger moral theory we construct. Stroud suggests that we should wonder 
why any epistemological theory that refuses to accept shaping the demands of friendship 
should garner our acceptance.  
 Stroud grants that this is a highly unorthodox way of thinking about 
epistemology. As she puts it,  
 
We don‘t normally view it as the business of an epistemological theory to be 
compatible with important human goods, such as friendship. In the epistemic 
domain, most theorists would embrace the ‗ideal of purity,‘ holding that 
epistemology‗s concerns are specific, distinctive, and not to be corrupted by 
considerations stemming from the believer‘s interests.40 
 
Stroud, however, thinks that proponents of this orthodox view need to consider what they 
are giving up in light of the partial demands on the doxastic practices of good friends. 
 
Given the very strong reasons we have to engage in friendships, the 
epistemological theorist will have to concede that his standards are not 
authoritative with respect to what we ought to believe all things considered. This 
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is a nontrivial price to pay: many epistemologists no doubt assume that in 
formulating standards for epistemic rationality they are limiting the rationality of 
belief simpliciter.
41
 
 
  We can summarize Stroud‘s argument as follows. 
 
5) It is all-things-considered rational to pursue close friendships. 
6) Pursuing close friendship sometimes requires one to engage in supra-
evidential epistemic practices. 
 7) If the supra-evidential partial practices demanded by close friendships are  
epistemically unjustifiable, then epistemic rationality is not equivalent to all-
things-considered rationality. 
 
This is a neat little argument. While I do not myself feel compelled to insist that the 
prescriptions of all-things-considered rationality will in every case be identical to the 
prescriptions of episetemic rationality, I agree with Stroud that there is ample motivation 
for epistemologists to open up to having a discussion about how our ordinary notions of 
epistemic rationality might be reconstrued in order to at least make room for the supra-
evidential partial practices common in our best relationships. Stroud even jumpstarts this 
discussion with an intriguing proposal. 
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Stroud’s “Social Epistemology” Proposal 
 Stroud offers a very brief proposal for reconstruing epistemic rationality in order 
to accommodate partial friendship norms. Keep in mind that she is not proposing this for 
our acceptance but merely for our consideration as an example of the sorts of 
conversations we could start having in epistemology.  
 
Like a defense lawyer, the friend who consistently advocates the more charitable 
hypothesis serves an important social epistemic function: without her input, 
negative views (which propagate rapidly through gossip) might become 
entrenched with little resistance, leading to a decrease in the overall accuracy of 
the social set of beliefs about her friend. A move to a social perspective could thus 
highlight recognizably epistemic values that transcend the narrower confines of 
evidentialism.
42
  
 
This is a compelling suggestion. Why simply assume that a person‘s doxastic practice is 
epistemically justified or not only by virtue of the likelihood that it will lead that 
individual person closer to the truth? Perhaps we should think of epistemic justification 
instead in the more collective sense: What is the likelihood that this person‘s doxastic 
practice will lead us closer to the truth?  
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 Jason Kawall argues along similar lines that our overall epistemic assessments 
must take into account both self-regarding and other-regarding intellectual virtues.
43
 To 
be ―other-regarding‖ as an epistemic agent is to aim at contributing to others‘ pursuits of 
truth and not just one‘s own. While Kawall is not directly concerned with how an 
epistemic partialist‘s resilient trust in the face of counterevidence might contribute to the 
collective‘s pursuit of truth, he does make one claim about ―creative agents‖ that seems 
especially relevant: ―[C]reative agents can be seen as good epistemic agents, even if their 
creativity leads them to false beliefs, to the extent that their creativity acts as a catalyst 
for others in their epistemic community.‖44 As Stroud sees it, the good friend plays an 
important social epistemic role, serving as a catalyst for others to take on a more careful 
examination of the counterevidence against her friend. I find Stroud‘s proposal 
compelling enough to take seriously, and so, think it serves well in defending my thesis 
that it is at least plausible to think that supra-evidential partial practice are epistemically 
justifiable.  
Baker’s “Moral Discovery” Proposal 
 Recall that Baker had argued for essentially the same thesis as Stroud two decades 
prior. She too thought that the epistemic demands of friendship ―run counter to our 
general picture of what it is to be rational‖45 And she too was unwilling to concede that 
meeting these demands really was irrational. And just like Stroud, she offers in passing 
her own speculative idea as to how we might revise our conception of rationality to 
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accommodate friendship norms. Though Baker does not explicitly say she is offering a 
revision of epistemic rationality in particular, it will suit our present purposes to think of 
her proposal in those terms. I warn my reader that Baker‘s suggestion is very quick and a 
good bit more elusive than Stroud‘s, so I will be forced to take some significant 
interpretative liberties. 
 ―We must look at the nature of moral facts,‖ she says. ―Just as trust is part of 
friendship, it may be that trust is both causally and logically a condition of truths of the 
sort we call moral.‖46 It is difficult to know what Baker means when she says that trust is 
a causal condition of moral truths as well as a logical condition of them. Does she want 
to say that trust is literally necessary for the existence of these truths or just that it is 
necessary for our discovery or appreciation of them? Since I find the second 
interpretation more plausible in its own right, I will interpret Baker according to it.  
 Given this, we can look to some earlier comments in her paper that she seems to 
drawing upon for further clarification of her proposal. She claims in an earlier section 
that trust is necessary for the existence of moral agents.  
 
[M]any philosophers have insisted that the possibility of there being moral agents 
depends upon the kind of development of children in which certain trusting 
relationships are indispensable, in particular, the trust children have first in their 
parents, and next in their peers…What is now to be emphasized is that we cannot 
expect people themselves incapable of trusting others to engender trust on the part 
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of their children, either toward themselves or other children. Nor can we expect to 
develop individuals capable of trust in their formative years only.
47
  
 
 Putting these two quotes together (and keeping in mind the need for taking 
interpretative liberties), here is the basic line of argument Baker proposes as I see it. 
 
8) Trust is needed for the formation and hence existence of moral agents. 
9) Only moral agents can discover and appreciate moral truths.  
 10) Trust is needed for the existence of beings who can discover and appreciate  
moral truths.  
11) If an epistemic practice is necessary for the discovery and appreciation of 
moral truths, then engaging in that epistemic practice is epistemically 
justifiable.  
 12) It is epistemically justifiable to trust. 
 
 This argument may go wrong in a number of places, but rather than getting 
myself bogged down in all those possible discussions, I want to offer one big-picture 
observation about it. Even if the argument is sound, it seems to miss the target of 
justifying the uniquely supra-evidential practices of partial trustings that we are 
concerned with. That is, even if trust is necessary for the formation of moral agents and 
hence for the discovery and appreciation of moral truths, I do not think it follows 
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straightaway that partial epistemic practices in particular are necessary for any of this. So 
in my judgment, this argument does not get off the ground as an argument justifying 
epistemic partialism unless it can be argued that the sort of trust that is necessary for the 
formation of moral agents need involve the biased sorts of trustings we are concerned 
with here.  
My “Important Truths” Proposal 
 I want now to offer a new proposal as to how supra-evidential forms of epistemic 
partiality might be epistemically justifiable in at least some cases. My suggestion is built 
on the claim that an attempt to quell one‘s natural tendency to engage in these practices 
would in many cases prevent one from discovering certain important truths. I will first 
explain how this can occur and then show why I think it is plausible to think that the 
epistemic stakes of trusting should be relevant to epistemic evaluations of epistemic 
partialism.  
 There are many ways in which a failure to engage in epistemic partialism towards 
a friend or loved one can prevent one from obtaining important truths. Thinking back on 
Keller‘s principal case, a failure to look favorably on a friend‘s poetic abilities might 
prevent one from coming to appreciate her genuinely important but otherwise unexpected 
perspective of the human condition. Likewise, a failure to give a loved one the benefit of 
the doubt when presented with an allegation against her might prevent one from pursuing 
and subsequently discovering the explanation that ultimately exonerates her. Those 
would be important truths to miss. 
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 Moreover, a failure to think the best of one‘s friend or lover can significantly 
harm the intimacy of the relationship, and hence prevent one from acquiring important 
truths that intimacy with her makes possible. For example, if your friend or lover comes 
to suspect that you do not believe favorably of her in some respect that matters to her, she 
may be deeply hurt and even subsequently resentful towards you. Hence much of what 
you stood to learn from your intimacy with her may now be unattainable to you. If you 
should try to appease her by informing her that you were at least initially inclined to 
believe favorably of her but talked yourself out of it in the effort to attain a more 
―objective‖ viewpoint, she will be further offended by an awareness of your arguably 
priggish priorities. In general, she will have a hard time sharing much of herself with you 
if she does not feel that she can count on you to view her favorably. In sum, if knowing 
her at a deep level is valuable, then the epistemic stakes of partialism might be rather 
high.  
 A lack of trust can also significantly harm the intimacy of one‘s relationship in 
cases where the untrusted is unaware of it. If, for example, a spouse becomes suspicious 
of his wife‘s fidelity, he will have a great deal of trouble relating to her even if he keeps 
his suspicions private. If that suspicion could have been culled by engaging in the usual 
amount of epistemic partialism typical of a good friend, the intimacy of his relationship 
will have suffered unnecessarily. If in fact she is faithful, this will have been a great 
shame for both of them.  
 In sum, if one is unwilling to participate in the epistemic demands of love and 
friendship, one stands to miss out on a good many important truths in life. It is not just 
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that one stands to miss out on learning the various sorts of privileged information about 
the other person (including non-propositional acquaintance knowledge) in the examples 
above, but one also stands to miss out on vital truths one can learn about oneself and 
about life—all in the process of loving and being loved in a deeply devoted (and so, 
inherently risky) relationship.  
 I want to suggest, then, that there can be significant epistemic value in engaging in 
epistemic partialism on the basis of these heightened epistemic stakes. As a first step in 
lending plausibility to this claim, we can note that numerous epistemologists already 
maintain that some truths are epistemically more valuable than others. Surveying recent 
work on epistemic goods, Jason Baehr writes,  
 
[O]ne often finds comments to the effect that what is good or desirable from an 
epistemic standpoint is true belief, but not true belief simpliciter or true belief 
about just any old subject-matter. For instance, true beliefs about the number of 
blades of grass on the neighbour‘s front lawn, grains of sand in a cubic foot of the 
Sahara, or listings in the Hong Kong telephone directory, are not, it is standardly 
claimed, part of the epistemic goal. Rather, what is good or desirable from an 
epistemic standpoint is true belief about subject-matters or facts which are 
epistemically significant, worthy or interesting.
48
 
 
                                                 
48
 Jason Baehr, ―Credit Theories and the Value of Knowledge,‖ The Philosophical Quarterly 62 (2012): 5. 
For a fuller treatment of this view see Wayne Riggs, ―The Value Turn in Epistemology,‖ in New Waves in 
Epistemology, ed. Vincent F. Hendricks and Duncan Pritchard (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008): 
300-23. 
199 
 
 Given this, it seems that one important measure of the epistemic value of 
engaging in a certain doxastic practice will be the epistemic value of the truths one stands 
to acquire by that practice. And given, as I tried to suggest above, that one might well 
stand to learn some highly valuable truths by engaging in epistemic partialism in one‘s 
close relationships, it seems plausible to think that the epistemic value of engaging in 
epistemic partialism can be fairly high from this perspective. 
 This line of thinking raises some very interesting questions for how we should go 
about making epistemic appraisals. It suggests that the overall epistemic value of a 
doxastic state—e.g., giving the loved one the benefit of the doubt—can be dependent in 
some way on the epistemic stakes of maintaining that state. That is, whether a belief or 
belief-forming practice is overall epistemically justifiable will be determined at least in 
part by a consideration of the epistemic consequences at stake. Despite the fact that it is 
widely accepted among philosophers that one‘s moral justification for performing a 
certain action is at least sometimes dependent on the morally-relevant consequences at 
stake, it is not at all common in philosophy to say that a person is sometimes 
epistemically justified in holding a certain belief by virtue of the epistemically-relevant 
consequences at stake. Philosophers tend to keep epistemic evaluations of beliefs isolated 
from considerations of future epistemic gains. They focus on an individual belief and ask, 
for example, whether the evidence renders it likely that that belief is true. They do not 
bother to ask whether that belief is in some way needed to play an important role in the 
acquisition of other truths. I want to suggest that we reconsider this differential treatment 
between moral and epistemological assessments. 
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 Roderick Firth once drew attention to this issue in his presidential address to the 
American Philosophical Association.
49
 He claimed that belief can fail to have intrinsic 
epistemic merit, by which he means that it fails to be well-supported by the evidence, yet 
have a great deal of instrumental epistemic merit, by which he means that the belief is 
causally related to the acquisition of other beliefs that are well-supported by the evidence.  
 
Consider, to take just one dramatic example, the belief that human beings are 
created and sustained by God for the primary purpose of expanding human 
knowledge. This belief might have no intrinsic epistemic merit at all… Yet it 
might have a very high degree of instrumental epistemic merit. If the belief were a 
common one, it might alter human motivation in a way that would produce 
undreamed of advances in human knowledge.
50
 
 
Firth‘s thesis is that these two forms of epistemic value are ―irreducibly distinct‖ and that 
there are therefore always two different types of epistemic appraisals that can be made 
about a belief. 
 I wonder, though, why we should not think there is a higher-level realm of 
epistemic norms that takes both of Firth‘s kinds of epistemic merit into account when 
making all-things-considered epistemic prescriptions. This is at least very much the way 
many of us think that ethics works. While many of us have strong deontological inklings, 
we nonetheless recognize that a concern for consequences is oftentimes relevant in our 
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all-things-considered moral judgment on the appropriate course of action in a given case. 
Thus we will say, for example, that despite the fact that killing an innocent child has a 
great deal of intrinsic moral disvalue, it can nonetheless be the overall morally 
appropriate action in our overall pursuit of the good under certain extreme circumstances. 
It seems plausible to think that a parallel all-things-considered epistemic norm would take 
into account both the degree to which a given belief is proportioned to the evidence and 
the degree to which it is needed to play a role in one‘s overall pursuit of the truth.  
 Granted, there are a number of complicated variables such an approach would 
have to deal with. These include (likely among others) deciding how to properly factor in 
(a) the degree to which the belief is not proportioned to the evidence, (b) the likelihood of 
the various positive and negative epistemic consequences that may result from holding 
the belief, (c) the intensity of those various consequences, and (d) the degree to which the 
given belief is needed to bring about the desired epistemic outcome. In the case Firth 
mentions, for example, we might think this last factor is especially significant if we think 
it would be easy for folks to have an alternative motivation for pursuing significant 
advances of human knowledge besides the belief that God has given them that pursuit as 
their major purpose in life. So, all of these issues (and likely more) will need to be 
broached if we grant that epistemic stakes are relevant to overall epistemic evaluations of 
beliefs just as ethicists have been forced to discuss parallel issues in granting that the 
overall moral assessments of our actions must be sensitive to their moral stakes. It is 
beyond the scope of my project to broach these very complicated issues here. I want only 
to suggest that it is plausible to think that the highest-level epistemic assessments do need 
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to take epistemic consequences into account. If so, then it seems too hasty to rule out 
epistemic partiality in friendships as epistemically unjustifiable given that the epistemic 
stakes of engaging (or refraining from engaging) in epistemic partialism are sometimes 
high.
51
  
 To close this section, I will now offer a rather bizarre thought experiment 
intended to further corroborate the plausibility of thinking that epistemic stakes should be 
relevant to overall epistemic assessments. The case controls for a few of the variables 
mentioned above and takes us outside the realm of epistemic partiality in friendship and 
into another common realm of supra-evidential partiality, namely that which occurs 
among sports fans. Though fanciful, the case is built on a couple of real-life facts about 
me: my unceasing confidence in my beloved NFL team, the Carolina Panthers, and my 
desire to one day understand Einstein‘s theories of relativity at a very deep level.  
 As any NFL fan will know, the Carolina Panthers have not been very good for 
several years. Yet every single offseason, I find myself feeling optimistic about the 
upcoming season. The current offseason is no exception. If I am honest, I must admit that 
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yet again I find myself believing that the Panthers will have a winning record and make 
the playoffs in the upcoming season. I must also admit that this belief is likely not 
proportioned to my evidence. Thus I know I am engaging in some supra-evidential 
epistemic partiality on behalf of my team, and this practice seems to come quite natural to 
me as fan. I suppose I could take steps to overcome this doxastic practice if I dwelt a bit 
more on the evidence. Honestly, though, it is rather fun to be this sort of fan, and so, I 
choose not to subject this doxastic practice to much conscious scrutiny. If pressed, I 
would probably classify this as a harmless epistemically unjustified doxastic practice. It 
is something I probably ought not do from the epistemic point of view strictly speaking, 
but I would say that it is all-things-considered permissible. But let us see what happens 
when the circumstances of my case are imaginatively altered such that engaging in this 
supra-evidential practice stands to offer me significant epistemic gains. 
 Suppose a brilliant and pedagogically-adept physicist, who is also a fan of the 
Carolina Panthers, hears of my optimism and offers me an exciting opportunity. As he is 
personally distraught about his own inability to maintain confidence in the Panthers, he 
has taken quite an interest in my supra-evidential optimism. After all, I am a philosopher 
supposedly trained in careful reasoning who is nonetheless willing to spurn reason in 
letting myself be carried away as a football fan, and that makes me something of a special 
case.
52
 The physicist has secured the services of a neuropsychologist and would like to 
use me as their principal subject in a study on supra-evidential doxastic practices among 
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sports fans. All that will be required of me is that I maintain my confidence in the 
Panthers throughout the offseason so that they can continue to study me at regular 
intervals by making some harmless observations of my brain activity. Since my 
confidence in the Panthers comes quite naturally to me, I recognize this will be easy 
work . In exchange, he offers to spend as much one-on-one time with me as I need to 
explain the ins and outs of relativity theory. It is apparent to me that this arrangement is 
too lopsided in my favor to pass up; it will give me my best shot at ever attaining a deep 
understanding of these astonishing theories.  
 I expect I would be quite eager to participate in the study under these terms. After 
all, I have no intention of trying to talk myself out of being confident in the Panthers 
anyway, and now there is the added bonus of a great intellectual payoff if I am able to 
persist in my confidence. The question I want now to raise is whether I would still be 
epistemically unjustified in my confidence in the Panthers.  
 It seems rather odd to think that higher-level epistemological norms would dictate 
that I ought even now try to rid myself of this partial practice. In this case, the epistemic 
stakes of my actively seeking to give up my confidence in the Panthers are very high. I 
need that practice to have a good chance at ever understanding the universe at one of its 
most fundamental levels. And the epistemic risks of my maintaining confidence in the 
Panthers are rather low: I likely risk only having some beliefs about a football team that 
are not proportioned to the evidence. I think it quite plausible to think, therefore, that I 
ought epistemically—in the strictest sense—persist in my partialism in this scenario.   
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 Likewise, I am suggesting we could plausibly say the same thing about the 
epistemic partiality involved in friendship. If we agree that it is sometimes necessary to 
make favorable judgments about a friend that ―go beyond the evidence‖ as a way of 
pursuing and maintaining relational intimacy, then I expect there will be cases in which 
the epistemic stakes favor allowing oneself to persist in that partial practice. Hence I 
think this provides an approach to arguing that epistemic partiality in friendship can be 
epistemically justifiably that is worthy of serious consideration.   
Epistemic Partiality: A Final Warning 
 It cannot likely be overstated how dangerous epistemic partiality can be. It comes 
inherent with epistemic, prudential, and even sometimes moral risks. Allowing one‘s 
judgment to be swayed by one‘s affections towards certain individuals can lead one to 
adopt a host of false beliefs, can put one in harm‘s way, and can even cause one to fail to 
stand up for what is right. What I have tried to emphasize in this chapter, though, is that 
there are also important dangers that we face coming from the opposite direction. If one 
is insistent on assessing one‘s loved ones from an impartial, objective point of view, one 
puts oneself at risk of missing out on some very important truths, reaping the prudential 
benefits of enjoying intimate relationships, and failing in one‘s moral duty to be a good 
lover or friend to those whom matter most. In focusing in this chapter on the latter sorts 
of risks (and particularly the epistemic ones), I do not want to suggest that it is generally 
better to err on the side of partiality than impartiality. Rather, I simply think that the risks 
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of impartiality have been underrepresented, particularly among epistemologists, and so, a 
focused discussion of those dangers is, I think, very much needed.  
 In the end, there are likely no easy answers as to how to properly balance the 
various risks between epistemic partiality and epistemic impartiality. Victoria McGeer 
expresses well the tension of trying to operate between these two opposing sources of 
danger when she writes, 
 
[I]f we trust too readily or too far—trust, that is, without question—we can leave 
ourselves open to exploitation, manipulation, tyranny, brutality and the pain of 
betrayal if it turns out that our trust is misplaced. Of course, over-ready—or what 
I shall call, ‗incontinent‘—trust is no worse a problem than over-ready—
incontinent distrust. If we are too ready to withdraw our trust, too prone to 
question or doubt, we not only lose the befits, current and prospective, of a 
trusting relationship, we lay ourselves open to acting immorally towards others 
whom we have, though distrusting, misjudged.
53
 
 
I hope this chapter takes us a step further in appreciating that in addition to the prudential 
and moral risks McGeer describes in this quote, we also face epistmic risks from both 
sides. 
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Chapter Summary 
 My thesis in this chapter was modest. I wanted to argue that it is at least plausible 
to think that engaging in supra-evidential partial epistemic practices is sometimes 
epistemically justifiable in the context of close relationships. I think this thesis is 
substantiated somewhere between the proposals offered by Brown, Jollimore, Baker, 
Stroud, and me no matter how ―mainstream‖ these proposals turn out to be. So I move on 
now to my final chapter in which I explore the implications of evaluating the rationality 
of religious trust given the sort of evidence the religious truster might have for his 
confidence in God and given the plausibility of thinking that one can be epistemically 
justified in engaging in supra-evidential partial practices in trusting a person one loves. 
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Chapter 5: 
Towards an Epistemology of Religious Trust 
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Chapter Introduction 
Having explored the nature of trust and its connections to the affections, I now 
want to more closely explore the epistemology of religious trust in particular. This is a 
discussion I am only hoping to initiate in this dissertation after having spent earlier 
chapters motivating it; I will not attempt to show in this final chapter that any religious 
believers actually are justified in trusting God to prevent gratuitous evils. I do hope to 
show, though, that there is at least enough underexplored territory in the epistemology of 
religious trust to render it too hasty of the ―unfriendly atheist‖ to assert that none are 
owing to the world‘s many inscrutable evils. The upshot to this is that, given my 
argument in Chapter 2 about the proper dialectical goal of theists in the debate over 
inscrutable evils, the religious trust approach is able to achieve for theists the only goal 
that is reasonable for them to have in this debate. I also, however, want to raise a number 
of challenges along the way for theists who think it obvious that their religious trust is 
justified purely on the basis of evidence. This, I suggest, means theists should have 
particular interest in the more general debate on the epistemology of epistemic partiality 
in trusting discussed in Chapter 4—the sort of giving the benefit of the doubt that is 
common in human relationships and that many religious persons are doubtless extending 
towards God in the face of inscrutable evils.  
I will argue for one further thesis at the end of the chapter. I will show that in 
addition to being a viable alternative to dealing with the problem of inscrutable evils, the 
religious trust approach also seems to afford theists the significant epistemic and 
dialectical advantages of being able to avoid all the prominent objections raised against 
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skeptical theism mentioned at the end of Chapter 1. These include all the ―bleeding 
skepticism‖ worries and the falsifiability problem that skeptical theists have had much 
trouble responding to. This will be a somewhat surprising result given that the 
―dismissivism‖ inherent in the religious trust approach about our competency to make 
sense of God‘s allowances of evils is even stronger than the ―mere skepticism‖ of it 
advocated for by skeptical theists. 
Defining My Paradigm Religious Truster 
First, an important qualification: While I am focusing in this chapter on the 
potential epistemic value of religious trust, I am well aware that there are all sorts of 
doxastic attitudes and practices that go by the name ―trusting God.‖ That is, there are all 
sorts of religious trusters in the world trusting God in all sorts of different ways and for 
all sorts of different reasons. I certainly do not wish to lump all these religious trustings 
together in one epistemically evaluable pile, as it is rather obvious that many of them are 
quite properly subject to epistemic and even moral condemnation. The religious zealot, 
for example, who ―trusts God‖ to protect him when he bombs the local abortion clinic is 
thinking irrationally and immorally. As a less extreme example, the religious college 
student who, despite the privilege she has of pursuing a quality education, uses her ―trust 
in God‖ as an excuse to avoid grappling seriously with the problem of evil in her 
philosophy class is also failing epistemically and morally. Since a lot goes by the name of 
―trusting God,‖ I certainly do not want to be understood as trying to chart a path in this 
chapter for defending all such attitudes. 
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Yet I also fail to see a way to precisely circumscribe the range of religious 
trustings I have in mind. I am at least restricting the term ―religious trust‖ to a person‘s 
trust in God to prevent gratuitous evils specifically, but this does little to restrict the scope 
of the sort of truster I have in mind. So, I think a brief description of the sort of 
paradigmatic image that comes to mind for me when I think of the religious truster will 
be a helpful even if imprecise way of defining my target. I am picturing the sort of 
faithful religious believer who has an inner sense of genuine love for God, who seeks 
earnestly and honestly after him, who often subjects her faith in him to honest 
questioning, and who continues to feel herself drawn to love and trust her God in spite of 
the difficulties she faces. She lives her religious life intentionally and passionately but 
with a recognition of her fallibility and many weaknesses, and so, with a hope that she 
will be afforded much grace for her missteps in the process. That is the sort of person I 
will have in mind. I am fortunate to be able to put at least a few names and faces with that 
image, and so, my mental grasp of it is rather tangible even if hard to precisely explicate. 
While I recognize that those who have not so closely observed such folks might prefer a 
more precise description of this image before entering into this sort of investigation, I do 
hope that this is enough to enable us to avoid the distractions that much more obviously 
objectionable forms of ―religious trust‖ might otherwise promote. 
Unfriendly Atheism and the Epistemology of Religious Trust 
It will be important to keep in mind in this chapter what is meant by the term 
―unfriendly atheist.‖ Recall that Rowe gave that label to the proponent of his argument 
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who goes beyond asserting that he (the proponent) is justified in accepting the argument‘s 
crucial premise that gratuitous evils exist to claiming that everyone (who reflects on the 
world‘s inscrutable evils at least) ought to accept it. In the context of the religious trust 
approach, then, the unfriendly atheist asserts that owing to the existence of the world’s 
many inscrutable evils, no one is epistemically justified in trusting God to prevent 
gratuitous evils. This commits the unfriendly atheist to the following two theses on the 
epistemology of religious trust: first, that no religious persons are justified in taking 
themselves to have evidence for trusting God sufficient to override the counterevidence 
of inscrutable evils, and second that, given the first thesis, it is also the case that no 
religious persons are epistemically justified in engaging in supra-evidential epistemic 
partialism towards God to make up for the lack of sufficient evidence—i.e., trusting him 
in the absence of sufficient evidence out of their affections towards him. I aim to show 
that both of these theses seem to lie beyond the scope of Rowe‘s argument from evil and 
thus commit the atheist to positions on other contentious philosophical issues, some have 
which have not be sufficiently explored; thus I claim that unfriendly atheism is, just as 
Rowe suspected, too hasty.  
Can God’s Trustworthiness Be Evidentially Justified? 
Recall that I said to trust a person to do something is to believe she will (or 
would) meet a commitment to do it out of a positive moral attribute. Hence in trusting 
God to prevent gratuitous evils, the religious truster holds three component beliefs: (1) 
the belief that God is able to prevent gratuitous evils, (2) the belief that he has a 
213 
 
commitment to prevent them, and (3) the belief that he will meet that commitment out of 
a positive moral attribute. I will assume that the religious truster can be justified in taking 
God to have a commitment to prevent gratuitous suffering.
1
 So the question of whether 
the religious truster can be justified in trusting God to prevent gratuitous evils ultimately 
depends on whether she can be justified in her judgments of God‘s abilities and her 
judgments of God‘s character. The first question we can ask about the religious believer, 
then, is whether she can have sufficient evidence to believe God is able to prevent 
gratuitous evils. 
 Since we are assuming for the sake of argument that the religious truster can at 
least have sufficient evidence for believing God is the intelligent creator of the universe 
(since, again, nothing in the argument from evil rules that out), it might seem a short leap 
to grant her also that she also has sufficient evidence for thinking him smart and powerful 
enough to be able to ensure that he allows no evil without sufficient reason. But upon 
reflection, I suspect this is too quick. Our current knowledge of the apparent fine tuning 
of our universe as well as its sheer size would certainly suggest that if there were an 
intelligent creator behind it, he must be extraordinarily smart and powerful. But this does 
not automatically entail that he has the ability to prevent gratuitous evils. By definition, 
that would require him to have the ability to intervene in the physical world whenever an 
omnipotent, omniscient being would not have a justifying reason for allowing an evil. 
And while it might well be possible that a being who is not himself omnipotent and 
omniscient could yet be powerful and smart enough to prevent all the evils that an 
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omnipotent, omniscient being ought to prevent, it seems that the religious believer‘s best 
bet for having an evidentially justified trust in God‘s ability to prevent gratuitous evils is 
to have an evidentially justified belief that her God is himself omniscient and omnipotent. 
This shows that our religious truster who wants her trust to be proportioned to her 
evidence will need much more than any evidence of God‘s abilities she might obtain 
through observing the wonders of the physical universe. It is a noteworthy lesson from 
the history of natural theology that an argument for a personal creator of the universe is 
never a good argument for one with the traditional omni-properties of standard theism, 
and a similar lesson applies here.  
Making matters worse for the religious truster, it seems outright impossible that 
God could ever demonstrate that he is omnipotent and omniscient to a person as opposed 
to just really powerful and really smart. Sure, he could amaze one with signs and 
wonders and spout off some brilliant undiscovered mathematical theorems, but it would 
still seem to be a leap beyond the evidence to say that he has all the skill and knowledge 
necessary to make sure our suffering is not in vain. The best God could do, then, is to 
testify to one that he has the requisite abilities, but then one would have to take him at his 
word. So in that case, one‘s confidence in his abilities would have to be grounded in a 
prior confidence in his character. And this brings us rather quickly to the most pressing 
issue for religious trusters: On what evidence can they base their extreme confidence in 
God‘s character when it comes to trusting him to prevent gratuitous evils? 
To be clear, when I spoke just now of religious trusters‘ ―extreme‖ confidence in 
God‘s character, I do not mean to refer the degree of confidence they have in God‘s 
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goodness and unfailing love for earthly creatures. The sort of religious truster I have in 
mind might well find her confidence in God to be rather thin some days. Rather, I was 
referring to the extreme circumstances under which her confidence in God‘s goodness is 
nevertheless sustained (even if it sometimes wanes significantly). There are numerous 
evils in the world that remain inscrutable to the brightest human minds, and yet in the 
face of those many inscrutable evils, many believers continue to trust in God‘s goodness. 
It is in this sense that their confidence in God‘s character seems a bit extreme. What 
evidence could they possibly have for thinking him so immensely good under such bleak 
circumstances? I will now consider some possible approaches the religious truster might 
take to answering this question. 
The Natural Theology Approach 
 Some religious believers might attempt to ground their confidence in God‘s 
character in the theistic proofs of natural theology. Richard Swinburne‘s ―cumulative 
case‖ argument for the existence of God, for example, would afford one this sort of 
approach.
2
 Unlike skeptical theists, Swinburne agrees with me that inscrutable suffering 
does count noticeably against the existence of a perfect God. Unlike me, however, he 
thinks that when all the evidence of the theistic proofs are brought to bear on our 
cognitive situation, they are enough to outweigh the counterevidence of inscrutable evils. 
If he is right, then this is one way in which the religious truster can have sufficient 
evidence for trusting God. 
                                                 
2
 Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God. 
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 I already mentioned my reasons for dissatisfaction with this sort of approach in 
Chapter 3. To briefly repeat, I do not wish to rule out the possibility that there are a 
handful of sophisticated theistic philosophers who are justified in thinking God to be 
perfectly good by way of some combination of arguments for theism, but I for one, would 
not want my trust in God to be dependent on them. The philosophical issues surrounding 
these arguments are too complex and contentious for most religious trusters. I want to 
explore a religious trust approach that fits with the phenomenology of religious trusters 
who feel themselves to be trusting a person as opposed to accepting a set of philosophical 
proofs. 
The Direct-Perception Religious Experience Approach 
 There are some believers who will claim to have evidence of God‘s 
trustworthiness by virtue of having experienced the perfect goodness of God directly in 
some sort of a rapturous religious experience. They may claim the experience to have 
been so vivid so as to outweigh any counterevidence against God‘s goodness afforded by 
inscrutable evils. I do not wish to enter much here into debates over the veridicality of 
such experiences, an issue that has already been discussed at length by numerous others.
3
 
I do, however, want to raise a few worries I have for this approach. 
 First there is the problem that relatively few religious believers have ever had 
such rapturous experiences. Hence like the natural theology approach, this approach must 
also fail to be helpful to the majority of believers, save for the highly controversial 
                                                 
3
 See Jerome Gellman, ―Mysticism,‖ in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition), 
ed., Edward N. Zalta, URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/mysticism/> and the 
sources cited there. 
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prospect that their reports of their experiences grant the rest of us sufficient evidence that 
such a being exists. Second, I have trouble conceiving of what it would mean to directly 
experience a being as perfectly good in the first place. What would be the indicator in 
such an experience that the object of the experience instantiates perfect goodness as 
opposed to just an awesome, inspiring display of goodness that leaves open the question 
of whether the being instantiates full-blown perfect goodness?
4
 Finally, there is the worry 
that a single (or, at best, a handful) of direct perceptual experience(s) of God‘s perfect 
goodness is not enough ―evidence‖ to outweigh the counterevidence of inscrutable evils. 
Speaking for myself at least, given that plausible alternative explanations can likely be 
supplied for these experiences besides the explanation that they are veridical, I would be 
very reluctant to trust God to prevent gratuitous evils in a world such as ours based on a 
solitary experience I had fifteen or twenty years ago.  
 Despite my reservations regarding the direct-perception approach, I should note 
that it may well be sufficient in itself to show that unfriendly atheism is too hasty. It is 
one thing to say that the reports of such experiences do not afford third parties sufficient 
evidence to believe that any of those experiences are veridical and quite another to say 
that even the subjects of those experiences are not justified in taking their own experience 
                                                 
4
 William Alston makes a claim that would push back against this worry.  
[W]e should not suppose that we can identify a priori any limits on what objective features can 
manifest themselves in patterns of phenomenal qualia. Apart from (sense) experience we would 
not have been able to anticipate that trees are, generally, recognizable by their look, while 
physicists are not. In mystical perception, too, one can learn only from experience what features 
and activities of God can be recognizable by the way God presents Himself to one‘s experience. 
See William Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1997): 47. 
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to be veridical.
5
 The unfriendly atheist commits himself to the stronger of these two 
views in his assertion that no one is justified in trusting God in the face of inscrutable 
evils, and so, may already be jumping the gun.  
The “God’s been Good to Me” Approach  
I turn now to what I expect will be the most common source of evidence for 
God‘s trustworthiness cited by religious believers. It is still experiential evidence but of a 
much less rapturous and less isolated sort than that discussed in the previous approach. It 
features prominently in the sort of Christian tradition with which I am most familiar, 
which emphasizes the way in which a devout adherent to the faith can experience a life-
long ―walk with God‖—i.e., a sort of communion with God that the believer can 
experience more or less throughout her life. This communion is not generally 
experienced as living in the presence of an overwhelming force that amazes one‘s senses 
or overpowers one‘s consciousness but more as the quieter companionship of a faithful 
and loving friend whose goodness is perceived in subtler ways. One of the most common 
ways this goodness is perceived is in its seeming to one that God is, or has been, actively 
assisting one in one‘s life journey. In conformance to the way this sort of experience is 
often expressed, we can call the attempt to use this sort of experiential evidence as 
sufficient evidence of God‘s trustworthy character the ―God‘s been good to me‖ 
approach. 
                                                 
5
 William James is famous for claiming that mystical experiences ―when well developed usually are, and 
have the right to be, authoritative over those who have them,‖ but that ―mystics have no right to claim that 
we ought to accept the deliverance of their peculiar experiences, if we are ourselves are outsiders and feel 
no private call thereto.‖ From William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human 
Nature, (London: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1902): 422-424. 
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 I do not know how to adequately describe the nature of an ―experience‖ that spans 
the duration of a person‘s religious life. Generally, though, there will be particular 
episodes in this life-long experience that will stand out to the believer as particularly 
strong evidence of God‘s faithfulness—the sorts of experiences they tend to fall back on 
in moments of acute doubting— and so, it will help to focus here on those. Many 
believers will mention particular events in their lives, for example, when certain events 
seemed especially arranged by God for the meeting of their needs, or times when God 
seemed to urge them to act in certain ways that proved to be to their great benefit or times 
when God seemed to them to ―carry‖ them through difficult circumstances.6 I want to see 
now what the prospects are for thinking a religious truster could acquire sufficient 
evidence of God‘s trustworthiness from a collection of such experiences.  
Even supposing a religious truster can at least be justified in thinking God has 
been actively assisting her, there is, I think, a major problem in thinking such experiences 
could constitute sufficient evidence of God‘s overall trustworthiness to prevent gratuitous 
evils. Here‘s the rub: God‘s demonstrating his good will toward one or one‘s family or 
friends does not amount to his demonstrating good will toward all creatures. While some 
religious believers seem not to appreciate this fact, there are doubtless many who do. I 
expect many religious believers are well acquainted with the disorienting tension created 
                                                 
6
 It is not necessary for the sort of experience I have in mind that the person explicitly forms beliefs about 
God‘s assistance during the trying circumstances. Sometimes, believers will reflect back on these 
experiences and recall having a sort of background sense of comfort or inner strength whilst they were 
consciously preoccupied with the struggle being faced, and so, only later come to recognize that 
background sense as God‘s assistance. For a discussion of the way in which unconscious background 
experiences can later produce justified memorial beliefs, see Jennifer Lackey, ―Why Memory Really is a 
Generative Epistemic Source: A Reply to Senor,‖ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74, no. 1 
(2007): 209-19. Thanks to E.J. Coffman for pointing this out. 
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by thanking God for his loving assistance in their own lives whilst observing others 
suffering with no apparent assistance from him. Perhaps they should conclude, then, that 
they are just God‘s favorites—the ones he prefers to help for whatever reason. This 
would make their God out to be something more along the lines of ancient conceptions of 
deities, who would benefit or disregard certain humans as they please. I do not suppose 
there would be anything obviously irrational in befriending such a deity if you happen to 
be one of the ones it chooses to benefit; after all, we probably all have people in our lives 
whom we are willing to call ―friends‖ despite our recognition that they have some rather 
serious character flaws. Nor would there be anything obviously irrational in coming to 
trust such a deity to take care of one‘s wellbeing; after all even scoundrels can sometimes 
be reasonably trusted by their closest confidants. But this ―God,‖ like some of our human 
friends, could hardly be trusted to take adequate care of the outsiders. Hence he could not 
be trusted to prevent gratuitous evils across the board. 
 So how could the religious truster who wants her trust to be justified by her 
experiential evidence of God‘s goodness ever determine that his God is not just playing 
favorites with her and a select group of others? Some might point to experiences in their 
lives when God urged them to care for strangers, thereby showing his concern for those 
outside their existing inner circle, but this cannot likely go so far as to suggest that he 
cares for all creatures. And if there is not much by way of observable evidence of God‘s 
universal love for all creatures, then the religious truster will just have to take God‘s 
word for it when he assures her that he is trustworthy through and through. Perhaps it can 
be argued that God‘s testimony to her can suffice as evidence of his trustworthiness if 
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indeed he has been so good to her; perhaps, that is, she will have sufficient evidence for 
thinking he would not deceive her. This is an interesting prospect, but I do not know if it 
would be successful. I think it at least as plausible to think that taking God at his word on 
this point without any independent reason to think he has universal concern for creatures 
would, in the face of so many inscrutable evils, be to take a leap of trust in him beyond 
the evidence.   
Appeal to Religious Doctrine 
One way the believer might try to round out her evidential case for God‘s 
trustworthiness is by appealing to certain ―evidences‖ within her faith tradition. From a 
coherentist perspective, at least, we can note that trust in God would be more rational in 
light of some theological beliefs than others. It is hard to see, for example, how a person 
who is committed to thinking God will inflict eternal torture on Aborigines for failing to 
believe certain specific doctrines promulgated in a western monotheism can nonetheless 
take herself to have good reason to trust God to take adequate care of everyone. Other 
religious doctrines, though, cohere much better with trusting God. For many Christians, 
for example, the core of their gospel (as they understand it) is that God has himself made 
an extreme self-sacrifice out of his immense love for all humans. Perhaps, then, such a 
view can contribute to the religious truster‘s case for expecting God to have an 
appropriate level of concern for everyone. 
This gives rise to another way in which a religious truster might appeal to her 
faith system in an attempt to bolster her case for trusting God in the face of inscrutable 
evils. Some religious doctrines speak of God‘s simultaneously loving and mysterious 
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ways. I think the Christian doctrine of divine atonement just referenced fits this mold. 
Despite the numerous Christian theologians through the ages who have tried to formulate 
an explanation both of why humans were supposedly in desperate need of that sort of 
sacrifice and how the death of God (or his son depending on one‘s Christology) somehow 
fulfills that need, I, for one, am unable to make much sense of it.
7
 The Christian 
philosopher, Eleonore Stump, shares this sentiment when she writes: ―What is in fact 
valuable about the atonement? Although the answer to this question might seem 
elementary, on reflection the question turns out to be remarkably difficult to deal with.‖8 
But even if a clear understanding of the ethics and metaphysics of Christian atonement is 
attainable, I think the Christian will have to admit that it does not come easily. To put it 
in other words, the atonement is either inscrutable or at best hardly scrutable even after 
much considerable intellectual effort. This should give the Christian reason to think that 
the human competency to make sense of the necessary connections between God‘s 
allowing—or even enduring—inscrutable sufferings and greater goods is further beyond 
our grasp than we might otherwise expect. Perhaps that makes her trusting him in the face 
of other inscrutable evils more reasonable than it otherwise would be. Perhaps there are 
other core doctrines in her or other religious systems that could have the same effect. 
                                                 
7
 For a brief overview of some major theories of the atonement and their criticisms, see Section 4 of 
Michael Murray, ―Philosophy and Christian Theology,‖ in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 
2012 edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/christiantheology-philosophy/>.  
Analytic philosophers are increasingly taking a look at this issue. There are a number of pertinent 
essays in Michael Rea, ed., Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology vol. 1, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009).  
8
 Eleonore Stump, ―The Nature of the Atonement,‖ with a Response from E. J. Coffman, in Reason, 
Metaphysics, and Mind: New Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga, eds. Kelly James Clark and 
Micheal Rea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 128. 
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But what is the unfriendly atheist to think about such appeals to religious 
doctrine? He might well argue that we ought to keep separate any coherentist appraisals 
of the religious truster‘s epistemic situation—i.e., appraisals that take into account such 
considerations as how well her theological beliefs conform with her trust—from our more 
―objective‖ evidentialist appraisals—i.e., considerations that care more about whether she 
has good evidence for believing any of that stuff. I do not wish to enter into that broader 
epistemological debate here, but it is at least worth noting that the unfriendly atheist 
commits himself to maintaining that either (a) no religious trusters are justified in 
believing those internally helpful doctrines in the first place or (b) their being justified in 
believing those doctrines would be insufficient—even in conjunction with the 
experiential evidence discussed earlier—to constitute sufficient evidence for their belief 
in God‘s overall trustworthiness. There is already, though, at least one formidable 
argument in religious epistemology against taking option (a) found in Alvin Plantinga‘s 
work on the epistemology of Christian belief. Plantinga argues that one cannot claim that 
the core doctrines of the Christian theist‘s worldview (e.g., universal atonement) are 
unwarranted without first taking on the broader project of arguing that they are false.
9
. 
The unfriendly atheist, then, unlike a friendly atheist such as Rowe, commits himself to 
thinking Plantinga‘s argument fails. That should seem rather hasty given that his 
unfriendly atheism is supposed to be based on the existence of inscrutable evils and not 
on his having formidable criticisms to challenging arguments in religious epistemology. 
Option (b) would clearly seem too hasty. Philosophers have not yet even had such 
                                                 
9
 Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, especially Chapters 5 and 6. 
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conversations as whether someone who is by hypothesis justified in accepting the 
Christian doctrine of universal atonement, for example, would have sufficient reason to 
trust God to prevent gratuitous evils. I do not think a question like this has an obvious 
answer either way, so it would be presumptuous for the unfriendly atheist to decide the 
issue on the front end.  
Epistemic Partiality in Religious Trust: Some Preliminaries
10
 
None of this entails, of course, that any religious trusters really do have sufficient 
evidence for their trust in God. All I have claimed thus far is that it is too hasty to say that 
none of them do. Notice, though, that even if I am wrong about that, unfriendly atheism 
may be too hasty for another reason. It does not follow from the supposition that no 
theists have sufficient evidence for trusting God to prevent gratuitous evils that no theists 
are justified in trusting him. That is, the religious truster can still be justified in her trust 
so long as it is a live option that she can be epistemically justified in going beyond her 
evidence in engaging in epistemic partialism towards God. Indeed, I think it obvious that 
many religious trusters have deep affections for God and are thus likely to extend to him 
similar forms of epistemic partialism as good friends and lovers tend to extend to each 
other (see Chapter 4). So, I will now look to position my inquiry into the epistemology of 
                                                 
10
 After thinking about the issues in the next couple of sections for some time, I stumbled upon an old C. S. 
Lewis essay in which he does in his own way essentially what I set out to do here, namely draw a 
connection between the epistemic partiality we show in human-human relationships to the believer‘s 
doxastic practices towards God. See C. S. Lewis, ―On Obstinacy in Belief,‖ in The World’s Last Night and 
Other Essays by C. S. Lewis, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1960): 13-30. [The essay first 
appeared in The Sewannee Review, 63, no. 4 (1955): 525-38.] Though I do not interact explicitly with 
Lewis in what follows, I have no doubt that his discussion has influenced my own.  
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religious trust within the context of that broader debate over epistemic partiality in close 
relationships. 
The Reality of Religious Affections 
It is easy to understand why many people throughout history have feared a deity 
of one kind or another but not as easy for all observers to understand why so many people 
seem to genuinely love God. I have heard of some critics who speculate that all 
contemporary religious love and devotion is really just fear in disguise. I think such 
critics are clearly mistaken. I have known many people of whom I am quite confident in 
saying that they truly love God and that their love for him takes precedence over any 
relevant fear they might otherwise have. They take themselves to be devoted to God as 
grateful and loving servants, children, or friends—or some combination thereof. It 
actually makes a good deal of sense that many religious people grow to love God given 
the sort of experiences they report having had of him and the sorts of things they have 
come to believe about him. They find in God a faithful companion and great source of 
peace and hope. And crucially they find in him a person who is concerned for their well-
being as manifested to them by occasions of apparent divine assistance. And in the 
Christian tradition, believers even take themselves to find in God a person who was 
willing to undergo immense torture out of his love for the world. That sort of being is not 
very hard to love, at least not in moments when the mind is filled with such thoughts of 
him. But what about when other thoughts come along, particularly thoughts about the 
world‘s many inscrutable evils? What is a person who is disposed to love God supposed 
to think of him then?  
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Gale’s Objection to Loving God in the Face of Inscrutable Evils 
In the midst of his attacks on skeptical theism, Richard Gale offers the following 
severe remarks about trying to love a person whose reasons for allowing suffering remain 
inscrutable.  
 
Some amount of inscrutability is not only allowable but even desirable in love and 
friendship relationships. What would love be if there weren‘t a core of mystery to 
the beloved? But how mysterious, how totally other, can the beloved be?...While 
we need not understand all of the beloved‘s moral reasons for her behavior, it 
must be the case that, for the most part, we do in respect to behavior which vitally 
affects ourselves...We can hardly love someone who intentionally hurts us and 
keeps his reasons a secret unless for the most part we know his reasons for 
affecting us as he does and moreover know that they are benevolent.‖11  
 
What should we think of Gale‘s remarks? First, we need not get hung up on his 
implicit construal of God‘s allowing evils as God‘s ―intentionally hurting us.‖ I take it 
Gale would also say that we can ―hardly love someone‖ who simply fails to intervene on 
our behalf unless he (for the most part) explain his reasons for doing so. But why think a 
person could hardly love under those circumstances? After all, it must be acknowledged 
that many religious believers genuinely do love God (quite a bit, actually) despite their 
                                                 
11
 Richard Gale, ―Some Difficulties in Theistic Treatments of Evil,‖ in The Evidential Argument from Evil, 
ed. D. Howard-Snyder, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 211. This objection is repeated in 
Richard Gale, ―Evil as Evidence Against God,‖ in Debating Christian Theism, ed. J. P. Moreland and 
Khaldoun A. Sweis (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, forthcoming Aug. 2013). 
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recognition of the world‘s inscrutable evils. Thus Gale‘s claim could be quickly 
dismissed if it is to be understood merely as a claim about human psychological abilities.  
I think Gale‘s point is best understood instead, though, as an evaluative claim 
concerning the appropriateness of loving someone under such circumstances. I take it he 
thinks that one ought not (in some sense) ever love a person who allows her to suffer 
without clearly communicating at least most of his reasons. But why think this has to be 
true? Why simply rule out the possibility of a person being within her moral and 
epistemic rights in loving a person who allows her to suffer without explaining his 
reasons? It seems like there could be special cases worth addressing before taking this 
categorical view on the rationality of love. Whereas Gale requires not only that the 
beloved reveal (at least most of) his reasons for allowing suffering but also that the lover 
be able to appreciate the soundness of those reasons, it seems to me that neither of these 
is required for justifiably remaining in a love relationship. The key ingredient, on my 
view, is that the lover be justified in thinking her beloved has sound reasons, and it seems 
quite plausible to me that there can be special cases in which one could be justified in 
having that conviction about the beloved even if one is unable to appreciate the beloved‘s 
reasons for acting as he does and even without having heard tell of those reasons.  
To put it concisely, if genuine love already exists, that love ought to be able to 
withstand a good bit of inscrutability. Hence I think it too quick for Gale to claim that 
religious trusters cannot be justified in loving God. Their love for him is not dependent 
on their being able to appreciate the nature of his justifying reasons for allowing suffering 
but on their conviction that he has them. Thus we should not quickly dismiss their love 
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for God as irrational without having explored the rationality of their religious trust which 
sustains their conviction that he has his reasons.  
Owning Up to Religious Epistemic Partialism 
This is especially so when we consider the fact that there is room to think a fair 
amount of epistemic partiality is called for in similar situations. We have already seen 
that lovers and friends tend to handle counterevidence against their loved ones differently 
than impartial observers. I argued in Chapter 4 that not only does this practice seem to be 
morally appropriate in some cases, it is at least plausible to think that this practice can be 
epistemically justifiable as well. Hence I think theists should not fear admitting at this 
point that when it comes to evaluating the counterevidence against God‘s character 
afforded by inscrutable suffering, they are probably not very good at being impartial 
observers. Instead, many approach this counterevidence as lovers and friends of God 
who, despite being stunned at the way in which our world often does not fit easily with 
their sense of God‘s character and confused as to why he does not make more of his 
purposes clear to us, are not yet prepared to turn their backs on him without a struggle. 
Many theists would attest that as they grapple with this tension, they often feel an 
undercurrent of trust running through them, a deep-seated disposition to think that there 
must be a justifying explanation for all the evil we see around us as well as justifying 
reason for why God does not make his rationale clearer to us. Like scientists trying to 
salvage their pet theory, they search for hypotheses to explain this counterevidence. They 
might spend some time first trying to come up with plausible explanations on their own 
as to why God would be justified in allowing various inscrutable evils. When these fail, 
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they might even try to come up with plausible explanations as to why God would be 
justified in not sharing his reasons with us. And when they cannot find hypotheses along 
these lines that conform well enough to their overall body of evidence, they find 
themselves at a significant crossroads: Do they give up on their conviction that God is 
good and trustworthy, or do they give in to the inner call they feel to trust God despite 
their lack of explanations and thereby formulate the ultimate fallback hypothesis that can 
accommodate the troublesome data—i.e., the hypothesis that humans are significantly 
more incompetent about such matters than we would otherwise have reason to suspect? 
The fact that many theists take this latter option might seem to impartial observers as 
evidence of irrational desperation. Impartial observers should note, though, that from the 
theist‘s point of view, taking the first option would not just be giving up on a preferred 
theory (as in the scientific analogue), it would be betraying a loved one, and betrayal is 
never to be taken lightly. Furthermore, as my discussion in Chapter 4 suggests, there is 
reason to think that resisting one‘s tendency towards epistemic partiality is not always the 
high road to take even from the point of view of epistemology.  
I am aware that many theists would not be comfortable describing their response 
to inscrutable suffering in the language of epistemic partiality. Some will want to see 
their acceptance of the ―fallback hypothesis‖ of incompetence as firmly grounded in the 
evidence they have obtained of God‘s trustworthiness. I am confident, though, that other 
theists would recognize that they are probably not relying solely on their evidence when 
accepting the hypothesis of incompetence. I expect that upon closer inspection, many 
would admit that they are probably just doing what good friends and loved ones tend to 
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do; they are giving their loved one—God in this case—the benefit of the doubt. After all, 
they have been living in what seemed to them to be the reality of a mutual love 
relationship between themselves and God. They now feel his call to trust him with the 
proper managing of the world‘s suffering. And they feel in themselves a tendency to do 
just that at the risk of being of naïve and trusting too much. Their fear of trusting too 
much though is checked by their fear of trusting too little, for, as we all know from our 
loving human relationships, it is a sad state of affairs when a lover turns his back on his 
beloved too soon. So these religious trusters ―hang in there‖ so to speak—so long as they 
are able.  
Prospects for a Justifiable Epistemic Partiality towards God 
Should theists resist this doxastic bias? Well, that really depends on how we 
answer the question of the last chapter. When is epistemic partiality justifiable, and when 
is it not? This is why I think theistic philosophers have a horse in the broader epistemic 
partiality race. And since, as I argued in the last chapter, the status of epistemic partiality 
is very much a live debate in philosophy, I do not see any reason as of yet for theistic 
philosophers to be ashamed of exploring this approach to the problem of inscrutable 
evils. In fact, I believe an honest investigation into the epistemic value of our partial 
trusting practices more generally might well have significant payoffs for religious 
trusters. I will now attempt to substantiate this claim by pointing out how well the 
speculative proposals discussed in the last chapter for defending the epistemic partiality 
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of friendship would seem to apply to the religious truster‘s epistemic partiality towards 
God in the face of inscrutable evils. 
Brown’s Subjective Bayesian Approach 
 Recall Curtis Brown‘s argument that epistemic partiality between lovers and 
friends can be viewed as epistemically appropriate if we accept the subjective Bayesian's 
view on the legitimacy of priors.
12
 On his account, it is within one‘s epistemic rights to 
bring one‘s affective biases into assigning a high initial probability to a view. It is also 
within one‘s epistemic rights to formulate further hypotheses in an attempt to explain 
away data that threatens that view and to seek hard after new data that can lend credence 
to those favorable accommodating hypotheses at least until further investigation yield 
evidence to disconfirm these efforts. This can explain in the end why one person is 
justified in accepting a different conclusion than another person given their agreement 
about the bearing of certain counterevidence. 
 Brown‘s approach would seem to accord quite well with the religious trust 
approach to the problem of inscrutable suffering. The truster‘s prior experience with God 
and her deep affections for him lead her to assign a very high probability to the view that 
he is immensely trustworthy. Her view is then frequently threatened by the 
counterevidence of inscrutable suffering. So, she puts her mind to the task of formulating 
favorable hypotheses to accommodate the incoming data, which as I suggested 
previously, ultimately results in the formation of the hypothesis that we are significantly 
incompetent in the domain of God-justifying reasons for allowing suffering. This, as 
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 Brown, ―Friendship: Epistemically Dangerous Liaisons?‖ 
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Brown would point out, is akin to what a scientist might do in an attempt to salvage a pet 
theory. And like the scientist, the religious truster does not have to stop with the mere 
formulation of an accommodating hypothesis. She can also be justified (on Brown‘s view 
at least) in searching for data that supports this new hypothesis. This frees the religious 
truster to turn her attention to looking for evidence that confirms her hypothesis of 
incompetence.
13
  
 There are epistemic dangers here of course. Any sense of confirmation she finds 
for her fallback hypothesis may be a sign of neurosis—i.e., ―seeing‖ evidence for an 
unlikely hypothesis that is not really there out of a deep-seated need to save her theory. 
Conspiracy theorists are well known for this. The threat of falling into the epistemic trap 
of the conspiracy theorist, though, is not unique to religious trusters; it is a threat to 
anyone who has a deep commitment to any view and/or person who is presented with 
challenging counterevidence. Epistemic partialism is always epistemically risky. But as 
my discussion in Chapter 4 points out, impartialism has its epistemic risks as well. 
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 It is worth pointing out that it is not a necessary consequence of this process that one‘s degree of 
confidence in God‘s trustworthiness would come out lower at the end of the process than it was at the 
beginning. This is so even if the truster acknowledges, as I think she should, that the counterevidence of 
inscrutable suffering does in itself lower the probability that God is trustworthy. This is because it might 
well turn out that her willingness to face this threatening evidence will lead the truster to formulate an 
accommodating hypothesis and subsequently discover powerful confirming evidence of that hypothesis. 
For example, perhaps God might afford her some sort of inner confirmation of her hypothesis of 
incompetence. Thus it is conceivable that such an experience could in the end afford her new confirming 
evidence of God‘s trustworthiness that she did not have before. 
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Stroud’s Social Epistemology Approach 
 Consider next the prospects for the epistemic partiality of religious trust in light of 
Stroud‘s sociological approach to epistemic partiality.14 Recall that Stroud suggests that 
epistemic partiality could be viewed as epistemically justifiable if we take a broader 
societal perspective on doxastic practices. From this societal perspective, it is easy to see 
that our collective truth-seeking enterprises often benefit when a subset of individuals are 
willing to run with hypotheses that are not exactly proportioned to their evidence. 
Sometimes those folks will uncover new important data as a result that the rest of us 
would have otherwise missed. Thus from this vantage point, there is a good bit of 
epistemic value in their sticking to these hypotheses. This is not to say that just anyone 
who is committed to a hypothesis is playing an important epistemic social role, however, 
so we must not jump to the defense of all committed religious doxastic practices. Some 
folks are dogmatic and unquestioning in sticking to their hypotheses and have little to 
offer the collective epistemic enterprise, particularly when they inculcate other members 
with their closed-minded perspectives. But having members who earnestly pursue 
opposing hypotheses whilst maintaining a reasonable degree of open-mindedness is, I 
think, very important from the societal epistemic point of view.   
 Here again I think we can see fruitful territory for theistic philosophers to explore. 
If they can expand upon Stroud‘s proposal and defend it as a plausible approach to the 
problem of epistemic partiality more generally, then they can present the unfriendly 
atheist with a new challenge. It seems likely, after all, that there is a good bit of Stroud‘s 
                                                 
14
 Stroud, ―Epistemic Partiality in Friendship.‖ 
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society-level epistemic value in having members of our society who are able to stick with 
the ―God-hypothesis‖ in the face of inscrutable evils when others are unable to, 
particularly those who do so in a reasonably open-minded way. Surely, there will be 
something worthwhile we can learn from these folks whether from their failures or their 
successes. And in the case of religious trusters, we must admit that they give us the 
potential—no matter how unlikely it might seem to outsiders—to uncover some 
extremely worthwhile data. If, for example, they should somehow uncover new evidence 
for thinking there exists a trustworthy God after all, this would be vital information for all 
of us to grapple with.  
On the other hand, perhaps a deeper exploration into Stroud‘s social epistemology 
approach will yield the conclusion that we cannot deem an individual‘s partial doxastic 
practices as epistemically justifiable for the individual in any relevant sense. Perhaps, that 
is, even if we agree that the religious truster‘s doxastic practice can play an important 
society-wide epistemic function, this does not render her practice epistemically justifiable 
for her to engage in. Indeed, I expect many people would want to distinguish between 
epistemic justification in the social sense and epistemic justification in the individual 
sense, and we must acknowledge that it is only the latter with which the unfriendly atheist 
is chiefly concerned when he asserts that no one is justified in trusting God to prevent 
gratuitous evils. At the very least, though, taking Stroud‘s proposal seriously should give 
pause to the sort of unfriendly atheist who would like to talk religious trusters out of their 
trusting enterprise. (I am thinking here of the so-called ―new atheists.‖) For since it looks 
like society stands to benefit epistemically from the epistemic partiality displayed by 
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religious trusters (at least the reasonably open-minded ones), it seems plausible to think 
one would be epistemically unjustified from this societal perspective in actively seeking 
to put an end to their practice.  
The “Important Truths” Approach 
 Finally, consider how the epistemic partiality of religious trust might be defended 
from the vantage point of my ―important truths‖ proposal from the end of Chapter 4. 
There I suggested that there can be significant epistemic value in friends engaging in 
supra-evidential practices by virtue of the way in which those practices make possible 
their pursuit of certain important truths. I do not think it an overstatement to say that if 
there is a supremely powerful God whom we can depend on to have a brilliant plan in 
which our plight is significant and meaningful, and who loves each of us more than any 
human can, that would be among the world‘s most wonderful truths. Consider, then, the 
religious truster as she finds herself drawn to ―gutting it out‖—i.e.., in sticking with her 
God by giving him the benefit of the doubt in the face of the powerful counterevidence 
afforded by inscrutable evils. For her it is precisely this doxastic move that makes 
possible her continued (even if strained) intimacy with God; if she did not believe he had 
a higher purpose at stake in his way of managing worldly affairs, she would not be able to 
carry on with him. And if the relationship turns to be what she hopes it is, namely a 
mutually loving relationship with a genuinely trustworthy God, then continuing in that 
relationship makes possible her coming to perceive some of the most important truths the 
universe has to offer her.  
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Now, she knows on the front end of course that this could all turn out to be a ruse 
and that instead of obtaining some of the world‘s most important truths, she may be led to 
accept a series of unfortunate delusions. And she even knows that giving herself over to 
her trusting tendencies may—though not necessarily so—prevent her from ever seeing 
those delusions for what they really are. So, does she take the epistemic risk that love 
compels her to take? Or, does she turn her back on God, seek to put an end to her 
epistemic bias, and risk missing out on the vital truths she might possibly learn if she 
sticks with him?  
I recognize that there is an added element of significant epistemic risk in this case 
relative to the thought experiment I used to motivate the plausibility of my ―important 
truths‖ proposal in Chapter 4. Having false beliefs about a sports team is not the same as 
having false beliefs about the ultimate nature of the universe. Just as some truths are more 
epistemically valuable than others, we must admit that some falsehoods are more 
epistemically disvaluable than others. Nevertheless, I think a case can be made for 
thinking the unfriendly atheist would be too hasty to assert that any religious truster who 
stands on the precipice of possibly discovering some of the world‘s most wonderful 
truths is epistemically unjustified (solely on the grounds of Rowe‘s argument) in 
engaging in the very epistemic practice that makes her continued pursuit of those truths 
possible. Religious trusters would do well, I think, to embrace the fact that their trust in 
God commits them to a grand vision of the universe—one in which the turmoil of 
humanity is (somehow) not allowed in vain and the trustworthy creator can even be 
known in personal experience. A serious investigation into the epistemic value of sticking 
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with such a hypothesis given the potential epistemic consequences at stake, therefore, 
might well pay dividends for them in a debate over unfriendly atheism.  
Conclusion on Epistemic Partiality in Religious Trust 
 In sum, there are already some promising avenues for philosophers of religion to 
explore in defending the epistemic partiality inherent in many actual religious trustings. I 
conclude that this should give additional pause to the unfriendly atheist who is adamant 
that no one is justified in trusting God in the face of inscrutable suffering. This should 
also give theists an incentive to spend less of their collective energy trying to defend 
skeptical theism against its numerous objections and focus more on the epistemology of 
the more natural theistic response to the problem of inscrutable suffering—a doxastic 
practice of committed and therefore likely not impartial trusting in God.  
As an added incentive for this shift of focus, I will now show how I think the 
religious trust approach (whether based on an appeal to evidence, epistemic partiality, or 
both) is able to avoid the most pressing objections raised against skeptical theism in the 
philosophic literature. I take it that any approach to the problem of inscrutable suffering 
which is both philosophically tenable and able to skirt around the major problems facing 
the current in vogue approach is worth talking about. 
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The Religious Trust Approach and Bleeding Skepticism 
 At the end of Chapter 1, I briefly surveyed some of the prominent objections 
raised against skeptical theism in the current philosophical literature. The bulk of these 
objections, which I labeled ―bleeding skepticism‖ objections, claim that skeptical theism 
commits its proponents to certain obviously pernicious forms of skepticism beyond the 
skepticism they call for concerning our ability to detect God-justifying reasons for 
allowing suffering. One major advantage of the religious trust approach over the skeptical 
theist approach is its apparent ability to steer clear of all these bleeding skepticism 
worries. 
This is ―apparent,‖ though, only after inspection, as it should actually come as a 
bit of a surprise given that the hypothesis of incompetence that the religious truster is 
driven to accept constitutes an even stronger skepticism of our ability to grasp God‘s 
justifying-reasons for allowing evils than does skeptical theism. Recall that the skeptical 
theist‘s defensive strategy requires ―only‖ what I called in Chapter 2 ―mere skepticism‖ 
of the relevant competency. This is the view (roughly) that it is at least as likely that there 
are justifying reasons beyond our grasp for all the world‘s inscrutable evils as it is that 
there are not. I pointed out that theists, however, are committed to the non-existence of 
gratuitous evils and hence require that it be more likely than not that there are such 
reasons. The religious trust approach attempts to locate grounds for this highly 
―dismissive‖ view of the relevant human competency in the theist‘s grounds (evidential 
and/or partial) for trusting God. Hence it would be reasonable to expect that if the mere 
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skepticism called for by skeptical theists bleeds perniciously, then the stronger skepticism 
inherent in the religious trust approach would absolutely hemorrhage. 
Interestingly, however, I think the opposite is true. The reason has to do with the 
drastically different grounds on which the skeptical theist and the religious truster base 
their respective skepticisms. The skeptical theist accepts as a philosophical premise that 
we have significant cognitive limitations that prevent us from making reasonable 
judgments about whether inscrutable evils are gratuitous. He is then faced with the 
critic‘s challenge of explaining how taking such a negative view of our competency in the 
relevant domain can be motivated by purely philosophical considerations and why these 
considerations would not in turn entail deeper skepticisms. The religious truster, 
however, arrives at her hypothesis of incompetence in the relevant domain only by way 
of her prior trust in God. In other words, apart from her grounds for trusting God, she 
claims to see no reason to suspect significant human competence in the domain of God-
justifying reasons for allowing suffering. It is only because her trust compels her to 
accept this hypothesis that she holds it. And this makes a huge difference, I think, in the 
skeptical implications of her view, for her skepticism will bleed only as far as the trust on 
which her skepticism cuts.  
Consider first how the religious trust approach would handle the most prominent 
bleeding skepticism objection lodged against skeptical theism, namely that skepticism of 
our ability to detect God-justifying reasons for allowing suffering entails pernicious 
moral skepticism. If, says the objection, one cannot form reasonable beliefs about 
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whether an omnipotent, omniscient being would need to allow evils for the attainment of 
greater good, then one cannot reasonably decide when one ought to prevent evils onself. 
Skeptical theists have recently attempted a flurry of responses to this objection,
15
 
but none of them are as clean and simple as the one the religious truster can provide. The 
religious truster will say that she is not skeptical about what to do in these moral 
situations, because even though her trust in God compels her to view humans as 
incompetent in one particular domain—i.e.,. the domain of God‘s reasons for allowing 
suffering—that very same trust assures her that she is plenty competent in the domain of 
her moral obligations in response to suffering. After all, in her mind, this God that she 
trusts so much has made it very clear what she ought to do in such situations. Indeed, 
many theists experience God‘s clear call to alleviate suffering in both their consciences 
and their scriptures. While it is of course natural for a theist to wonder from time to time 
how it is that God could have such different obligations in response to creaturely 
suffering than she has, her trust in him ultimately compels her to view this discrepancy 
itself as some sort of cosmic matter that must be beyond our comprehension. Her trust in 
God thus compels her to think both that (a) humans are incompetent about the justifying 
reasons as to why God allows various sufferings and (b) she has every reason to alleviate 
them herself. 
 Another way to put this point is to say that in the religious trust approach, one‘s 
trust in God serves as a litmus test for which human competencies one is to be skeptical 
of. If trusting God dictates that one take oneself to be significantly incompetent about 
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 See sources listed in p. 63, note 54. 
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God‘s moral obligations in response to suffering, then that is what a committed truster 
will do. And if, contrary to fact, trusting God would dictate that one ought to take oneself 
to be significantly incompetent about one’s own moral obligations in response to 
suffering, then the religious truster would be challenged to do that as well. Fortunately, 
though, many religious trusters will recognize that their trust in God pushes them in the 
opposite direction on that point. 
The religious truster can make a similar move in response to Weilenberg‘s 
provocative argument that skeptical theism entails that the theist cannot trust divine 
revelation.16 Recall Weilenberg maintains that the skeptical theist must admit that, for all 
he knows, there would be a necessary connection between God‘s deceiving him in any 
putative revelation of truth and the attainment of some greater good. The religious truster, 
however, would be able to handle this worry differently from the skeptical theist. Unlike 
the skeptical theist, the only reason she has to suspect incompetence in the domain of 
God-justifying reasons for allowing inscrutable evils is that she trusts God. But it is hard 
to see how she could simultaneously trust God in such a grandiose way and yet fail to 
take him at his word on other matters. Put simply, either she trusts him deeply, or she 
does not. If she trusts him, she will take him at his word and will also believe that he has 
good reasons for allowing suffering. Giving up either of these would be a failure to trust. 
This serves to underline just how fundamental a role religious trust plays in the noetic 
structure of the sort of theist I have in mind. 
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 Wielenberg, ―Skeptical Theism and Divine Lies.‖ 
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 Consider next how the religious truster can make a similar move in response to 
Bruce Russell‘s objection that skeptical theists are committed to global skepticism about 
the external world.
17
 Russell argues that as far as the skeptical theist can say, there might 
well be a necessary connection between God‘s putting him in a globally deceptive 
skeptical scenario and the attainment of some greater good. But again, the religious 
truster will simply assert that she is skeptical of her ability to ascertain God‘s justifying 
reasons for allowing suffering only because she trusts God and that this very same trust 
compels her to think she inhabits a very real universe. I suppose it should be conceivable 
to her that God might one day tell her that she is actually in a globally deceptive world in 
which case she would then have to decide whether to go on trusting him and hence 
distrusting her own senses. But it is not as if this is a choice the religious truster actually 
has to make.  
The Religious Trust Approach and Falsifiability 
Finally, recall the powerful objection against skeptical theism from William Rowe 
and Ian Wilks that is distinct from all these bleeding skepticism objections.
18
 They point 
out that skeptical theism (at least in its current formulations) renders theism impervious 
to falsification in a way that seems out of the bounds of rationality. As Rowe puts it,  
 
                                                 
17
 Russell, ―Defenseless.‖ 
18
 Howard-Snyder, Bergmann, and Rowe, ―An Exchange on the Problem of Evil.‖; Wilks, ―Skeptical 
Theism and Unfalsifiability.‖  
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Since we don‘t know [according to the skeptical theist] that the goods we know of 
are representative of the goods there are, we can‘t know that it is likely that there 
are no goods that justify God in permitting human and animal life on earth to be 
nothing more than a series of agonizing moments from birth to death. But such a 
view is unreasonable, if not absurd.
19
  
 
I do not know of any place in the literature in which skeptical theists have 
responded to this challenge. Perhaps this only validates Wilks‘ suspicion that a skeptical 
theism that is strong enough to prevent inscrutable suffering in the actual world from 
counting against the existence of God yet weak enough to allow some conceivable 
sufferings to count against his existence would be an ―impossibly nuanced‖ view.20 Or 
perhaps it is because skeptical theists have had their hands full with trying to head off all 
those bleeding skepticism worries. Either way, the religious trust approach provides a 
helpful alternative to consider given, as I will now show, that it can avoid this pressing 
worry. 
The religious trust approach in no way renders belief in God impervious to 
disconfirmation from suffering. It does not at all entail that humans in all conceivable 
worlds would be justified in discounting the weight of inscrutable evils against theism. 
Rather it claims only that in those worlds in which it is justifiable to love and trust God, 
one can have a defeater for the counterevidence of inscrutable suffering. Obviously, a 
person would not be justified in trusting God in the heinous sort of world Rowe mentions 
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 Howard-Snyder et al, ―An Exchange on the Problem of Evil,‖ 156-7. 
20
 Ian Wilks, ―Skeptical Theism and Unfalsifiability,‖ 76. 
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and Yandell describes in detail (see Ch. 1, p. 66) in which there is nothing but immense 
suffering all around. God has done nothing in that world to garner one‘s love and trust; 
hence it would clearly be unreasonable to take the religious trust approach to the problem 
of inscrutable suffering in that world. But the religious truster does not take herself to 
inhabit that world. Rather, she takes herself to inhabit a world in which her belief in 
God‘s loving and ultimately trustworthy nature is cultivated in her via a deeply lived 
experiential process. Hence, so long as it is remains an open question whether the theist 
can be justified in taking herself to occupy such a world, the religious trust approach 
remains a viable alternative to skeptical theism. It is a great advantage of the religious 
trust approach that it does not render the rationality of theistic belief impervious to the 
counterevidence of inscrutable evils. But even better, it provides a promising way to 
suggest that faithfully persisting in theistic belief in the actual world can be rational all 
the same. 
Conclusion 
 In this dissertation, I have tried to motivate and initiate the religious trust 
approach to defending the rationality of theism in the face of inscrutable evils. This 
approach diverges sharply from skeptical theism, a view I have become less and less 
enamored with over the years. Whereas I once agreed with skeptical theists that 
proponents of Rowe‘s evidential argument were puffing themselves up in assuming they 
are too smart for there to be explanations of suffering that lie beyond their 
comprehension, further reflection has led me to think that the presumption of competence 
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needed to ground their belief in the existence of gratuitous evils is actually quite 
reasonable. Fortunately for theists, the religious truster, unlike the skeptical theist, is able 
to say with sincerity that it makes a great deal of sense for a person to base his atheism on 
the many terrible evils of our world given that so many of them defy our best attempts at 
explanation. The religious trust approach is intended only to serve as a way of defending 
the theist’s rejection of the premise that gratuitous evils exist and not to attack the 
atheist‘s acceptance of it. Just as it can be rational for impartial observers and close 
friends to rationally disagree over whether a given person is trustworthy in some respect, 
I think it plausible that atheists and devoutly religious persons could rationally disagree 
over whether the existence of inscrutable evils renders God untrustworthy.  
 So while there is much about the epistemology of religious trust I have left 
unexplored in this dissertation, I hope to have at the very least achieved enough here to 
enable proponents of Rowe‘s argument and theists to better respect each other‘s point of 
view. Proponents of Rowe‘s argument are simply acknowledging how unlikely it would 
seem to think that humans would be so drastically incompetent about an omnipotent, 
omniscient being‘s moral obligations with respect to creaturely suffering. And theists, in 
turn, are engaging in a doxastic practice towards God that we often deem laudable in 
relationships more generally; they are continuing to trust someone they love in spite of 
counterevidence. Thus it would behoove both sides, I think, to refrain from accusing the 
other of being unreasonable—at least until further investigation could substantiate the 
accusation.  
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